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A B S T R A C T 
A carefu l survey of the e x i s t i n g L i t e r a tu re in the 
f i e ld of UN adminis t ra t ion r evea l s c e r t a i n important inadequ-
ac ies In the study on the subjec t . Very few comprehensive 
and up to date s tud ie s are ava i lab le , and most of the works 
are by Western Scholars and lack a non-western pe r spec t ive , 
I would l ike t o review the subject from non-western perspec-
t ive , but not exc lus ive ly so. 
I t - . i s not claimed t h a t a l l the problems have been 
Overcome in t h i s work, never the less , an attempt has been 
made to prepare as comprehensive an account of the adminis-
t r a t i v e problems of the U N Sec re t a r i a t as poss ib le with 
the help of authent ic records of the assignea pe r iod . 
The study has been divided i n t o nine chap te r s . The 
f i r s t chapter dea ls with the concept of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c i v i l se rv ice . The term " In t e rna t iona l Civ i l Service" i s 
general ly considered t o mean the c i v i l service of the U N^  
the Special ized Agencies and other a l l i e d i n t e rna t i ona l 
o rganiza t ion . However, the concept came to not ice in the 
I9th century with the adminis t ra t ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c i v i l a f f a i r s through i n t e r - s t a t e t r e a t i e s . The i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c i v i l sexrvants are persons who, on the bas i s of an i n t e rn -
a t iona l t r e a t y c o n s t i t u t i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community, or by an organ of i t , and are under i t s control 
- i i -
to exercise/ in a continuous way, functions in the interest 
of t h i s par t icu lar international ccmmunity, and who are 
subject to a par t icular personal s ta tus . 
The second chapter has been devoted for the study 
of the Genesis of the Vhi Administrative System and the concept 
of an internat ional secre ta r ia t . The United Nations Charter, 
signed on June 26, and enforced on October 24#19 45 was not 
quite a new and sudden development. I t was rather the actua-
l iza t ion of-the ideas of an internat ional unity that had been 
germinating during the past several years. I t was in Greece 
that the idea of making an organization of s ta tes was fe l t 
as back as 1400 years ago. After the establishment of in ter -
national organiz-t ions, the need for an internat ional secre-
t a r i a t was f e l t to perform some essent ia l dut ies , like , 
making phyical arrangements for meetings, preparing conference 
documents, and keeping records. For th i s reason, an interna-
t ional secre tar ia t has i t s history since the international 
conferences were held. 
Administrative organization and composition of the 
UN secre tar ia t are the subject matter of discussion in 
c h ^ t e r I I I , The UN charter does not bave any provision in 
i t se l f , which might give specific-guide l ines for the 
orgcinization of the Secretar iat . For t h i s purpose, one of the 
f i r s t questions that the Preparatory commission had to consider 
- i i i -
was whether the s e c r e t a r i a t should be organized on the func-
t i o n a l b a s i s or in r e l a t i o n t o the organs, which i t had to 
serve . Later on funct ional bas i s was apprec ia ted . The reason 
was t h a t the re were some of the work of the S e c r e t a r i a t , l ike 
the r e g i s t r a t i o n of t r e a t i e s , which did not r e l a t e to the 
work of any p a r t i c u l a r organ and many of the se rv ices to be 
provided were by t h e i r nature common to a l l organs. 
The fourth chapter dea ls with the funct ions of UN 
S e c r e t a r i a t . The General Assembly a t the time of adoption 
of the r egu la t i ons for the S e c r e t a r i a t declared t h a t , 
"the degree in which the ob jec ts of the Charter can be 
r e a l i s e d wi l l be l a rge ly determined by the manner in which 
the s e c r e t a r i a t performs i t s t a sk" . To make i t r e a l i z e d , 
the UN S e c r e t a r i a t seems t o be a funct ional wheel, which 
makes ava i lab le a l l kinds of a s s i s t ance required by d i f fe ren t 
organs and agencies of UN in performing t h e i r funct ions . 
In the f i f t h chapter an at tempt has been made to 
high l i g h t the major problems of the UN S e c r e t a r i a t , such 
as recrui tment and career development, ca ree r versus fixed 
te rn appointments, and merit versus equ i t ab le geographical 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s ta f f . In the context of recru i tment , the 
concept of occupations and occupational groups i s used t o 
- i v -
iden t i fy and e s t a b l i s h pools of candida tes with comparable 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , experience and sjcills# su i t ab le for pos t s 
within a given occupational group. The key to successful 
recrui tment i s ca r re r development. In the UN S e c r e t a r i a t , 
the o f f i c i a l s appointed on permanent b a s i s t o make t h e i r 
ca ree r s table are termed as career based s taff , whereas 
the o f f i c i a l s / appointed for pe r iods l e s s than f ive years 
are r e fe r red to as fixed term s taff . The meri t i s the p r i o -
r i t y of the Charter in the employment of the s taf f . Which 
has been reversed to the point t h a t the paramount considera-
t i o n in recrui tment has become geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
While the highest s tandards of e f f i c i ency , competence and 
i n t e g r i t y have become secondary in s ign i f i cance . 
The seventh chapter con ta ins d iscuss ions on UN 
Financia l c r i s i s and the r epor t of the Group of Eighteen. 
The 1986 was the year when the f i nanc i a l emergency of UN 
had threatened t o bankrupt and enfeeble the United Nations. 
I t was perhaps the worst, the UN has evt^r faced in i t s 
fo r ty years old h i s t o r y . This c r i s i s forced the Secretary 
General to announce a s e r i e s of economic measures in c a p i t s l 
expendi tures , programme a c t i v i t i e s and personnel matters 
l i k e freeze in recrui tment and suspension of a l l promotions 
for s ix months. In addi t ion, on 19 December 1986, members 
- V -
a c t i n g by consensus i n t h e General Assembly, approved 71 
recommendations c o n t a i n e d in t h e r e p o r t of the Group of 
E igh teen , 
The V l l t h Chapter d e a l s wi th the problem of grading 
of p o s t s i n t h e UN S e c r e t a r i a t . For t h i s , the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
C i v i l s e r v i c e cortmission was r e q u e s t e d by ACC and FICSA i n 
1975 t o c o n s i d e r a number of u r g e n t p rob lems ; which the 
s t a f f of t h e UN Common system were f ac ing fo r a long t i m e . 
The commission h o l d i n g 24 s e s s i o n s from 1976 t o 1987 had 
s t u d i e d t h e grad ing of p o s t s t o p r o t e c t t he remunera t ion of 
the s t a f f i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l and h i g h e r c a t e g o r i e s . The 
Commission took t h e d e c i s i o n i n 1987 t o lower down t h e 
margin between t h e s a l a r y l e v e l s of t h e two s e r v i c e s i , 6 , 
u n i t e d Nfetions and the Comparators federal(USA) C i v i l 
S e r v i c e s , below 115 in f i s e a l y e a r s 1988. 
In t h e V l l l t h Chap te r , an a t t e m p t has been 
made t o study the problem of J o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n 
the UN S e c r e t a r i a t . T h i s was t h e gecod i s s u e , which the 
ICSC had t a k e n up f o r examina t ion f o r so lv ing t h e problems 
r e l a t i n g t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of occupa t ion g roups , a l l p r o f e -
s s i o n a l c a t e g o r y p o s t s i n t h e S e c r e t a r i a t , r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the d u t i e s of p o s t and the g r a d e . 
The n i n e t h , t h a t i s the l a s t c h a p t e r has been 
devoted t o s tudy the n a t u r e and r o l e of UN A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
- v i -
Tribunal . The Tribunal was e s t ab l i shed on 24th November 
1949 by the General As^mbly, The judgments of UN Admini-
s t r a t i v e Tribunal are f i n a l , binding and j u d i c i a l i n 
n a t u r e . There i s no other forum to which «©appeal can be 
made. The Tribunal has performed an important task in i n t -
roducing concepts of f a i r proedures , of equal r i g h t s 
to p r o t e c t i o n , proper defence, and of the r igh t to be heard, 
I hope my study wi l l make a small con t r ibu t ion 
towards t h i s e f f o r t . 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECRETARIAT: 1974-88. 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF 
Bottor of $^tl0!e(0jp{ip 
IN 
POLmCAL SCIENCE 
By 
MD. USMAN GHANIANSARI 
Under the Sapcnrision of 
Prof S. HASAN AHMAD 
(CHAIRMAN) 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1993 
^^ irl/2:70 
. 1 ^ 
T4270 
r * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ! 
Y 
* 
* 
* 
D E D I C A T E D 
P A R E N T S 
V 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
h 
* v * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ^ 5 t 
Dcparlnuiit oT Politic;!! Science 
Ali[vuli Muslim IJiuvcn.ily 
A l i [ ; ; i i l i 
I'hones : I,, . ic 26720 
266 
T h i s i s t o c e r t i f y t h a t Mr. Md. Usman G h a n i 
Anr .n r i h a s w o r k e d u n d e r my s u p e r v i s i o n f o r h i s P h . D . 
( l o ( j r o c . I l l s P h . D . t h e s i s e n t i t l e d , "ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS'SECRETARIATE: 1 9 7 4 - 8 8 " , 
now b e i n g p r e s e n t e d , r e p r e s e n t s Mr. A n s a r i ' s own 
r e s e a r c h w o r k b a s e d on p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y s o u r c e s . 
D u r i n r j h i s r e s e a r c h lie s t a y e d a t A l i g a r h a s a r e g u l a r 
r e s e a r c h s c h o l a r of t h e d e p a r t m e n t of P o l i t . i c a l 
S c i e n c e , A . M . U . , A l i g a r h . 
T h i s t h e s i s i s r e c o m m e n d e d f o r s u b m i s s i o n f o r 
e x a m i n t i o n f o r t h e a w a r d o f t h e P h . D . d e g r e e . 
P r o f . S . H a s a n Ahmad 
( S u p e r v i s o r ) 
10/11^/ J 3 
C O N T E N T S 
Page 
PREFACE i - i i i 
ABBREVIATION iv- vi 
CHAPTER-I THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
SERVICE- ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 1-25 
CHAPTER-II A. THE GENESIS OF THE UNITED'NATIONS 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
26 - 46 
B. THE UN CHARTER AND THE CONCEPT OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 
CHAPTER-III ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND 
COMPOSITION OF THE UN SECRETARIAT 47-71 
CHAPTER-IV THE FUNCTIONS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT 72 - 90 
CHAPTER-V MAJOR PROBLEMS 91 - 127 
1. RECRUITMENT AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
2. CAREER VERSUS FIXED TERM APPOINTMENTS 
3. MERIT VERSUS EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL 
DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF 
CHAPTER-VI THE UN "FINANCIAL CRISIS" AND THE REPROT 
OF THE "GROUP OF EITHTEEN" - A REVIEW 128-151 
CHAPTER-VII PROBLEM OF GRADING OF POSTS IN THE 
UN SECRETARIAT 152-175 
CHAPTER-VIII PROBLEM OF JOB-CLASSIFICATION IN THE UN 
SECRETARIAT 176-200 
THE NATURE AND ROLE OF THE UN 
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL 201-218 
CONCLUSION 219-222 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223-227 
CHAPTER-IX 
************************* 
This work has been done under the supervision of 
Prof. S. Hasan Ahmad. He introduced me to the topic. A 
careful survey of the existing literature in the field of 
the UN administration reveals certain important inadequacies 
in the study on the subject. And a systematic study of the 
administrative problems on the UN Seretariate is long over 
due. Very few comprehensive and uptodate studies are 
available, and most of the works are by Western schlors and 
lack a non -Western perspective. I would like to review the 
subject from non - western perspective, but not exclusively 
so. A non - western view is particularly relevant not only 
of the present Asian - Aferican majority _ . in the UN 
General Assembly, but also because of the desired increasing 
participation and responsibility sharing by Asian - African 
and Latin American members in the UN system. 
It is not claimed that all the problems have been 
overscome in this work, nevertheless an attempt has been 
made to prepare as comprehensive an account of the 
administrative problems of UN Secretariat as possible with the 
help of authentic records of assigned periods. 
The study has been divided -into Nine Chapters. 
The first and second chapters have been devoted to 
introduce basic facts concerning the origin, development and 
characteristics of an international civil service; Genesis 
of the United Nations Administrative system and the Charter 
and the concept of an interantional Secretariat. 
Administrative organization and compossition, and 
functions of UN Secretariat are the subject matter of 
discussion,, on chapters III and IV respectively. 
The Fifth chapter deals with the major problems of 
UN Serectariat such as recruitment and career development , 
career versus fixed term appointments, and merit versus 
equitable geographical distribution of staff. 
In the Sixth chapter an attempt has been made to 
high light the UN Financila Crisis and the report of the 
Group of Eighteen. 
TheSeventh and Eighth Chapters contain discussions 
on the problems of grading of posts and job 
classification in the UN Secretariat. 
« 
The Nineth, that is last chapter has been devoted to 
study the nature and role of UN Administrative Tribunal. 
The content" analysis of the published literature on 
the subject comprises, books, statutes, different UN 
Documents and the reports of the various Commission, 
Committees, Study Teams, delegations and other bodies 
related to the United Nations. 
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C H A P T E R - I 
THE CONCEPT:, OF AN IK TERN AT ION AL C I V I L SERVICE*. 
ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND 
CHARACTER I S T I C S 
The term 'International Civil Service* is generally 
considered to mean the civil service of the UN, the 
specialized Agencies and other allied international orga-
nization. Thus it includes the officials working under 
the U.N, System i the personnel of the U.N. Secretariat, 
Secretariats of its specialised Agencies, and other UN 
organisations engaged in the promotion of peace and welfare, 
However, the concept came to notice in the nineteenth 
century with the administration of international civil 
affairs through inter state treaties. The history begins 
with an official, who was appointed as an international 
civil servant to control the navigation of the Rhine by 
a bilateral treaty between France and the German Empire 
in 1804. The status of an international civil servent 
was also given to the officials appointed in international 
organisations of later origin. The concept was reflected 
in administrative and engineering staff of European 
Commission for nevigation of the Danube created by the 
Paris Treaty of 1856; Permanent administrative staff of 
the Bureau of the Universal Postal Union set up in 1876 
in Berne, and the International Institute of Agriculture 
which was created by a convention of 38 s ta tes in 
1905. These off ic ia ls were assigned some duties to 
perform for the achievement of the objectives of the 
organisations. The o f f i c i a l s of these organisations 
t r i ed the i r best to keep themselves away from the 
influence of s ta tes of which they were nationals 
in executing the i r dut ies . The d i f f i cu l t i e s and 
hurdles experienced by these o f f ic ia l s became very 
valuable factors to the l a t e r growth and development 
of an international c i v i l service. The experience of 
there organisations was taken into account at the time 
of establishment in 1920 of the League of INations 
secre tar ia t and the International .JLabour Office at 
Geneva to provide of f ic ia l s who do the i r duty, that 
might re f lec t the most accessible charac ter i s t ics of 
an internat ionat lonal c i v i l service. 
As a resu l t of the League experience, and the 
experience of the International Labour Office in 
l.Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in Unitp^d 
Nations^ (New Delhi, Stert lng, 1989) pp. 3 & 8. 
p a r t i c u l a r , there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n t e rna t i ona l 
c i v i l service to be c rea ted comprlng with the bes t c i v i l 
se rv ices of the world by the es tabl ishment of» 
•*•..• an i n t e g r a t e d body of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o f f i c l a i s , 
loyal to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency and ready to 
discharge f a i t h f u l l y the i n t e r n a t i o n a l ob l iga t ions 
Incumbent upon them"^ 
The concept was accepted at San Francisco and 
in the preparatory commission of the United Nations 
t h a t the S c r e t a r i a t should c o n s t i t u t e a t r u l y i n t e r -
na t iona l c i v i l service to ensure eff iciency* indepen-
dence and i n t e r n a t i o n a l cha rac t e r . These were implied 
in the p rov i s ions of the c h a r t e r based on the f o l l o -
wing p r i n c i p l e s I 
•'(X) Members of the s ta f f should be chosen on 
the b a s i s of t h e i r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s to do 
the work required of them, e f f i c i e n t l y and 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . 
2. Leland M.Goodrich, THE UNITED NATIONS (Stevens 
and sons Limited, London, 1960) p . 146. 
(2) Members of the staff thus recruited should 
loyally serve the United Nations, should 
refrain from any action inconsistent with 
their status as international officials, 
and should be protected against political 
pressures by their governments. 
(3) Service in the Secretariat should be viewed 
as a career, with security, compensa-
tion, opportunities for advancement, and 
other benefits adequate to attract and keep 
3 
highly qualified personnel". 
The national and international civil services 
seem to be similar on functional basis but reflect 
differences when the source, nature and application 
of authority are taken into account, ive may briefly 
discuss the differences. The composition of the exec-
utive body of a country is entirely based on the nat-
ionals of the state, whereas an international organisation 
3. Ibid.pp. 146-147. 
i s represented by Sovereign, independent s ta tes 
which have decided to cc»ae and work together for 
the achievement of certain common objectives. 
The other difference between the two i s the 
area of their dealing. The ju r i sd ic t ion of the 
national c iv i l servents are mainly confined to the 
c i t i zens of the i r respective s t a t e s only, whereas 
international c iv i l servants are given authority 
and responsibi l i ty to deal with the problems of 
nation s t a t e s . Thirdly, in a nation s ta tes , there 
are laws e i ther const i tut ional or statutory which 
are taken into consideration by the of f ic ia l s in 
exercising the i r power. And no individual ci t izen 
i s above these laws. On the other hand, there are 
no such laws and provisions mentioned in the charter 
of an International Organisation, which a nation 
s ta te i s forced to acce^rpt. Here the only thing 
which i s to be followed by a nation s ta te i s to 
respect the pol ic ies and del iberat ions morally, adop-
ted by the charter of an internat ional organisation 
4 for the functioning of i t s laws. 
There is no s imilar i ty in the power of executive/ 
legis la ture and judiciary of a nat ionr state and an 
international organisation. The executive of a nation 
s ta te does not have i t s counterpart in the s t r i c t 
sense in a body of international nature, whereas some 
organisations are assigned cer tain specific dutiesto 
perform in specific circumstances, l ike the General 
Assembly and the ^Security Council of the United 
Nations. The General Assembly i s roughly equated 
with the legis la ture of a s tate but i t s resolut ions 
and recommendations do not force a member s tate to 
consideri t as legal obligations for them.' to follow. 
Similar is the case with the jurisdicffoflt at the 
national leve l . The legal proceeding, f inal judgement 
and opinions of the International Court of Just ice 
are Limited and are not enforceable, except through 
the Security Council; while the area of Jurisdication 
4.Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United 
Nations, (New Delhi, s ter l ing, 1989')pp.8-9. 
of judicial system at national level are more extensive 
and effective and its opinions have a binding force. 
An International Civil Service is basically 
concerned with the deliberations and Recommendations 
of the organizations to which it belongs. The intern-
ational civil servants put into effect the recommend-
ations and decisions of the social organizations. These 
officials do their duty without direct administrative 
responsibility, before a ligislature or a Court, On 
the other hand, national bureaucrats undertake direct 
administrative responsibility of any action taken by 
them in enforcing the laws of the land. 
5. waltercrocker, a former official of the United 
Nations Secretariat asserted that an international 
civil service has no direct administrative 
responsibility, e.g. in working out a distri-
bution of food supplies, engaging employment 
services, or undertaking experiemental activities 
as in the case ... of the expanded programme of 
Technical Assistance for economically under 
developed countries, see Rumki Basu, Personnel 
Administration in United Nations, p.13(Reference 2), 
A single po l i t i ca l community i s to be adminis-
tered by a national bureaucrat, whereas an International 
Bureaucrat i s bound to serve internat ional organisations 
which are assigned different works to perform by a 
ser ies of contracts between many diverse communities. 
The difference i s also observed in the service 
conditio!^ of an international c i v i l service and of 
i t s national counterpart. In the case of an international 
c i v i l service, the service conditions are based on 
contractual re la t ions , whereas at the national level , 
i t i s on an obligatory bas is . The legal relat ionship 
between c i v i l servants and the i r employer at national 
and international level also di f fer . At the national 
level , the sovereignty of the s ta te i s legalised as 
compared to the contracting pa r t i e s in international 
employment. Many features of National c iv i l service 
l ike "Central administrative authority. Central 
recruitment control , verified service conditions, 
c tn t r a l appeals machinery" are not found in an 
inteimational c i v i l service, while the International 
Civil Service Advisory Board and International c i v i l 
Service Commission made many effor ts to ensure common 
service conditions for the different international 
org an i s a t ion £, 
The decision makers at the national level have 
many options to come to a conclusion while deciding a case. 
The options are available to them because they are 
legitimate po l i t i c a l actors, which are not available , 
at l eas t openly, to international decision makers. The 
international bureaucrats are devoid of these power, 
because they do'nt have any d i rec t l inks andsupport of 
any primary source of p o l i t i c a l power, which are available 
to the national o f f i c i a l s • This i s the reason why decision 
making a c t i v i t i e s of an international bureaucrat are 
7 passive and not active like his national counterpart. 
These are the main points of difference, apart 
from those of ethose and ecology. In addition, there 
6. Ibid, p . 9 
7.David P i t t and Thomas G. weiss. The nature of United 
Nations Bureacucracv (Printed in Great Britain by 
Mackays of Chiattan t t d . Keil, 1986). 
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are specific characteristics of an international 
Civil Service which need to be discussed. The defi-
nition of international bureaucracy is affected by 
its history of uneven development. There are many 
persons, regulations and institutions* who have 
given different meanings to the term. For example, 
Suzanne Basdevant has stated the features of inter-
national bureaucracy in the following words : 
"International officials are persons who, 
on the basis of an international treaty 
constituting a particular international 
community , or by an organ of it, and 
are under its control to exercise, in a 
continuous way, functions in the interest 
of this particular international community, 
and who are subject to a particular personal 
status".® 
In the above definition, it is cl-arified that inter-
national civil servants are permanent employees of 
an international organisation, from which they draw 
their salary and other benefits while ensuring their 
loyalty to the same. 
8. Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United ^ 
Nations, (New Delhi, sterling,1989} p.10 
11 
The o f f i c i a l s of the secre ta r ia t of the 
League of Nations were cited as international c iv i l 
servants by the Staff Regulations of/League of Nations. 
The same thing was repeated in the United Nations 
Staff Regulations. 
The very nature of internat ional bureaucracy 
has described by htU Claude in the following manner: 
" i t i s a bureaucracy without a government, 
without a country", standing alone in an 
internat ional vacuum,"lacking the appropriate 
in s t i tu t iona l envelopment and po l i t i ca l 
a l legiance," the international c iv i l service 
will obviously be plagued by d i f f i cu l t i e s of 
a unique type. Therefore, i t has to develop 
i t s own framework and norms specifically 
suited to i t s requirements",9 
There are many other features, apart from 
those mentioned above on the basis of which in te r -
national o f f i c ia l s can be characterised as a c i v i l 
service. The f i r s t one among those i s the international 
character and loyalty of the personnel. The second i s 
9. Ibid. 
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the i r indepdendance and thi rd one i s po l i t i ca l neutra-
l i t y . 
All members of the staff of the United Nations, 
are international c i v i l servants. They are employed 
not to carryout the instruct ions of any par t icular 
s t a t e , but to implement those pol ic ies formulated 
by the policy forming organs of the organisation, 
through a const i tu t ional process acceptable to a l l 
member s t a t e s . 
All the of f ic ia l s of an international organi-
sation are c i t i zens of par t icular nation s ta tes and 
often seconded by the i r respective national executives, 
but they have to sacrif ice thei r na t iona l i s t i c and 
partisan loya l t ies and develop an ent i re ly interna-
t ional outlook, an a t t i tude defined by C, Wilfred 
Jenk in the following words : 
"The internat ional out look required 
of the internat ional c i v i l servant i s 
aa awareness made ins t inct ive by 
10. Ibid, p. 11 
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habit of the needs, emotions, and 
prejudices of the peoples of diffe-
rently circumstanced countries, as 
they are felt and expressed by the 
peoples concerned, accompanied by 
a capacity for weighing these frequ-
ently impondirable elements in a 
judicial manner before reaching any 
decision to which they are relevant. 
It is no part of the duty of an 
international official to protect in 
advance the interests of his country 
of origin; that is the duty of the 
responsible representatives of that 
country on policy-making bodies, 
and of its permanent representatives 
accredited to the international 
institution in question",11 
Article lOO of the United Nations charter 
says that the Secretary General and his staff".... 
shall not seek or receive instructions from any 
government or from any other authority external 
to the Organization," They shall also •' refrain 
from any action which might reflect on their position 
as international officials responsible only to the 
12 
organisat ion," In addition to th i s charter provision. 
1 1 . Leiand M.Goodrich, The Uni ted N a t i o n s (S tevens and 
Sons L imi ted , London, I 9 6 0 ) p , 1 5 2 . 
12. I b i d , p . 149. 
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every member of the Scretariat is required under the 
staff Regulations to undertake to the following oath 
on appointment. 
"to exercise in all loyalty, discretion 
and conscience the function" entrusted to 
him "as an international civil servant 
of the United Nations",13 
The provision of Article 100 of the Charter 
including the oath under the staff Regulations as 
analysed above reveal that the position of the inter-
national official has two aspects, which require 
special consideration. One aspect is his duties as 
international official irrespective of the specific 
position that he may secure in the administrative 
hierarchy, and the other, his obligations to his own 
state. Thus the relationship of this oath to the 
duties of an international bureaucrat for his own 
country creates most difficult problems. But the 
Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission 
of the united Nations defends tbe loyalty of an 
international official with the help of these words» 
14, Francis O.Wilcox and Carl M.Marcy, Proposals for 
changes in the United Nations (The Brookings 
Institution Washington,D.C. 1955). 
p. 410. 
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"Loyalty to the organisation is in no 
way incompatible with an officials 
attachment to his own country, whose 
higher interest he is serving in serving 
the '.Ifiiited Nations. It clearly involves, 
however, a broad international out look 
and a detachment from national prejudices 
and narrow national interest".14 
International Civil Service Advisory Board took the 
same stand in its report on standards of conduct in 
the international civil service. Maheu, the former 
Director General of UNESCO also defended it while 
speaking to his staff on this subject in the following 
words: 
"It is a grave error to believe that the 
international Service required you to 
forget, or worse, to repudiate, your 
respective countries. If we are inrern-
ational, it is not because of the 
effects of a particular nature, but it 
is because of our work, our function, 
our approach to problems in our field . 
Cur work, our function, our point of 
view are far from being incompatible with 
what we are by our nationality, and it 
is our privilege to proclaim here all 
that is universal in our different 
cultures and our national histories.Far 
from being without a country, we belong, 
on the contrary, to all countries.15 
14. Rumki Basu, Personnel Aoministration in United 
Nations, (New Delhi ,Sterling, 19S9) p.11 
15. Ibid, pp. 11-12. 
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Another controversy came into being when 
commentators on the Charter opined that there might 
be a situation when an employee ofthe United Nations, 
has to participate in the United Nations enforcement 
functions, that is, in the preparation of plans for 
military action against the country to which he belongs. 
This type of activities might be declared as treasonable 
under the laws of his land. To solve problems of this 
kind faced by the officials of the United Nations, the 
content of Article 100(2) of the charter was quoted as; 
"Kember states have undertaken to respect 
the exclusively international character 
of the responsibilities of the Secretary 
General and the staff and not to seek to 
influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities".16 
A more difficult question arises in connec-
tion with the status of an official of the secretariat 
and his loyalty to his state, when he is called upon 
to perform his duties within the territory of his 
17 
own s t a t e . The mat ter was found to be important 
16. Francis O.Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, Proposals for 
Changes in the United Nations (The Brookings 
i n s t i t u t i o n Washington,D.C.)1955,-p.4l0. 
17. Leland K. Goodrich, The United Nations^ p.150. 
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when some seventeen United Nations s ta f f members 
of United Sta tes n a t i o n a l i t y pleaded the p ro tec t 
of the F i f t h Amendment of the United S ta tes Cons-
t i t u t i o n during a hearing in October,1952/ by the 
In te rna l Security Subcommittee of the senate Committee 
on the Jud i c i a ry . On the b a s i s , they claimed exemp-
t ion from ansv^ering ques t ions Lateron a Special Federal 
Grand Jury expressed the view while re turn ing a 
"presentment" t h a t a large number of d i s loya l s t a t e s 
n a t i o n a l s have entered in to the United Nat ions, 
Though no one out of those seventeen U.N. Of f i c ia l s 
was accused during t h a t general hear ing, the secre -
ta ry General. Trygui Lie terminated the serv ices of 
a l l those on December 5,1952, who had denied to 
answer ques t ions before the grand jury on the ground 
of poss ib le s e l f - i nc r imina t ion . Lie opined t h a t 
the se rv ices of a l l those o f f i c i a l s who pleaded the 
p ro tec t ion of the F i f th Amendment in such circum-
stances must be terminated, because they had 
acted in a manner in which an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l 
servant should not a c t . The controversy did not ended 
18 
ended here , but took a new shape. All the eleven 
American na t i ona l s whose se rv ices were terminated 
by the secre ta ry General, approached the United 
Nations Administrat ive Tribunal and succeeded in 
g e t t i n g awarded dan ages. The au thor i ty of the Tr i -
bunal was challenged in the In t e rna t i ona l Court 
of J u s t i c e but the cour t advised t h a t the ve rd i c t s 
of the Tribunal were f ina l and the Assembly could 
not refuse to pay the awards. The loya l ty issue did 
not die with the v ic tory of the terminated o f f i c i a l s . 
I t come a l ive again in October 1954, when the 
secre tary General permit ted the United States to 
i nves t iga t e i t s na t iona l s employed in the S e c r e t a r i a t 
of the United Nat ions. Thus the loya l ty question 
remained unresolved 
"as a r e s u l t of United Sta tes concern 
ooer the p o s s i b i l i t y t ha t some of 
i t s n a t i o n a l s employed by the United 
Nations might now or in the future 
become engaged in subversive a c t i v i t i e s " . 
consequently the concept of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l 
servents* loya l ty only to the United Nations, seemed 
18. Francis 0, wilcox and Carl ^i.Marcy, Proposals for. 
Changes in the United Nationc; (The Brookings 
I n s t i t u t i o n Washington,D.C.)1955 pp.414-15. 
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to be in a>much more controversial stage now 
than it was at the time of the adoption of the 
Charter. 
The second distinguishing feature 
of the international bureacurat is independence. 
To have preserved their independence, the 
United Kations Charter gives instructions to the 
Secretary General and his staff, not to bow 
against the direction of any government or 
institution in the performance of their . duties 
external to the organisation in which they are 
employed. To help maintain such an independent 
attitude the Charter has expectations from all 
member countries to abide by the international 
status of the secretary General and the responsib-
ilities of the officials. The Member states 
should keep away from trying to exertany influe-
nce in them while Jthey are supposed to be perfo-
rming their international responsibilities. 
Further the officials of the United ^3ations are 
instructed to avoid the acceptance of any honour. 
20 
decoration, favour/ gift or remuneration from 
any government or institution, except for war 
service, external to the organisation without 
the approval of the Secretary General. 
The third characteristic of the 
international civil servant is his political 
neutrality. They are permitted in the field of 
political activities to cast their franchise in 
national elections. The United Nations Staff Regu-
lations make it clear that the U.K. officials are 
directed to conduct themselves in a manner befitting 
their position as international officials. They 
must avoid any action and in particular any kind of 
public pronouncement or open expression of their 
opinions which may affect their status or integrity, 
independence and impartiality which are required 
by that status • At the same time, they are not 
expected to give up their national sentiments or 
their political and religious convictions. They 
may exercise their right to vote and become member 
of a political party, but they are supposed to be 
21 
debarred from public support or criticism of 
party programs or candidates or public criticism 
or support of the polities or actions of national 
governments which are considered to be Inconsistent 
19 
with their international status. 
However, the independence and political 
neutrality of the international officials are not 
immune from career motivation national political 
consideration and nature of international power politics. 
Though the officials of the United Nations are compar-
atively highly paid in terms of salaries and allowances 
but they have loss scope for career development 
through promotion in comparison with national civil 
20 
service s. 
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l C iv i l se rvants of an 
In t e rna t i ona l publ ic organisa t ion are more p o l i t i c a l l y 
vulnerable than t h e i r na t iona l coun t e rpa r t ; . The 
19. Rumki Basu, personnel Administrat ion in United 
Nations , p . l 2 . 
2p. Leland M.Goodrich, The United Nations p.154 
22 
reason.is that almost all important acJministrations 
of national public organisations are nominated, 
controlled and in some cases dismissed by political 
decision makers. It shows that they are responsible 
to only one teer of authority, whereas international 
officials depends, in addition to national political 
authority, on two more tiers of national bureaucrats , 
one in the national foreign ministry its equivalent 
and other to the national representatives within 
the international organisation. The officials of 
international organisation, however, work directly 
or indirectly under five tiered control structures, 
each of which corresponds to the institutional 
relationship between the international body and one 
of the its member states. The control structures 
are as i 
"The first level includes all the 
relevant national constituencies 
(sectorial interests, pressure 
groups, opinion leaders, ideological 
movements, etc.) which constitute, 
within the given state, the national 
sources of political power. Their 
function, in the present context, is 
to elect, support or replace the 
members of the second level, the 
23 
national decision-makers. These, 
in turn, appoijftt and control the 
components of the third level , 
the national bureaucracy 
The po l i t i c a l decision makers 
and foreign ministry bureaucrats (second and third level) appoint 
and instruct 'the national repres-
entat ives within international 
organisations (fourth level ) ,Al l 
four national levels may exer ts , with 
widely different d e g r e e , . . . . some 
control on an international organi-
sations bureaucracy f i f th leve l . "^ l 
The above si tuation become even more d i f f i cu l t 
because of negative charac te r i s t i cs . F i r s t , a l l 
the f i r s t three leveJs of above control structures 
are almost independent from each other and keen to 
pul l internat ional organisations in different , i f 
not in opposite direct ions, second theie are often 
confl ic t and change in p o l i t i c a l processes at local , 
regional and national level which affects each of 
these f i r s t three levels of control structure, in 
iturn, international organisations^ are affected. 
21. David P i t t and Thomas G. W^iss, The nature of 
United Nations Bureaucracies (Printed in Great 
Britain by Mackays of Chattam Ltd.) 1986 pp.44-45. 
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The decision makers and their national 
bureaucrats are often called directly or indirectly 
to give their consent in the nomination of international 
civil servants from their state. Richard Hoggart in 
his book on "inside life at UNESCO" discussed, how 
permanent representatives of certain number states 
within international organisations bring pressure on 
the staff and play their roles in selection and recrui-
tment of international officials, who are their 
countrymen. 
The means and methods, which a national 
bureaucracy adopt to extend its influence on its 
international bureaucrats are defined by Ramond 
Hopkins in his study of the United states. On the 
same topic, GerardlBlano, in his study of member 
counteries, points out that, there are a number 
of administrative units established by each state 
which are keen to influence and supervise the inter-
national officials belonging to it or assigned job-
duty in that state. This often causes difficulties 
I 
in the coordination process and results in duplica-
tion. For instance, in France there are five units 
25 
of s\ich type they are helped by several departments 
in the technical minis t r ies , which are related 
with international affa i rs . 
Finally, the type of polarisat ion in 
power-politics at international level also affects 
the independence of action enjoyed by international 
o f f i c i a l s . As at present in the unipolar power poli-
t i c s led by the United State s# of f ic ia l s of in te r -
national organisations are l i ab le to be influenced 
by permanent representatives of the United states 
22 
in their organisations. 
22. Ibid, pp.44-53 . 
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A. THE GEKESIS OF THE UKITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE 
SYSTEMS 
The UN system I s n o t a s i n g l e body 
bu t more t h a n t h a t . I t i n c l u d e s the Uni ted Na t ions 
i t s e l f , t he f i v e r e g i o n a l economic commissions/ and 
20 o t h e r major programmes and o rg , an i za t i ons . In 
a d d i t i o n , t h e r e are 17 s e p a r a t e i n t e r - g o v e r n m e n t a l 
S p e c i a l i s e d Agencies '" . 
The Uni ted N a t i o n s C h a r t e r , c o n t a i n -
ing 111 a r t i c l e s , d i v i d e d i n t o 19 c h a p t e r , s igned 
2 
on June 26 and enforced on October 24,1945, was 
n o t q u i t e a new and sudden development , i t was 
r a t h e r the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the i d e a s of i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l u n i t y t h a t had been g e r m i n a t i n g dur ing the 
p a s t s e v e r a l c e n t u r i e s . The d e s i r e f o r an o r g a n i -
z a t i o n of n a t i o n s da ted j u s t as f a r back a s any t h i n g 
l i k e d i s t i h c t n a t i o n s o r s t a t e s cou ld be found. 
T r a c e s of d iplomacy, t r e a t y - m a k i n g and a r b i t r a t i o n 
d a t e d back s e v e r a l thousands of y e a r s , though t h e r e 
i s n o t much r e c o r d of r e c o g n i s e d i n t e r - s t a t e o r g a n i z -
a t i o n s du r ing t h a t per iod . 
1. Rumki Basu, [personnel Adminigt^ratipn in the Uni ted 
N a t i o n s (New D e l h i , S t e r l i n g , 1989) p . 4, '• 
2. Madan Gopal Gupta , I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s s ince 
1919, (Char tanya P u b l i s h i n g House ,Al lahabad ,1968)p . 540, 
27 
I t was in Greece t h a t the idea of making an organi-
zat ion of s t a t e s was f e l t as back as 1400 years ago. Is idore 
of Sevi l le (560-6361 AD), dreamed i t a world which being 
free of d i sun i ty , would be a "Society of na t i ons" . The 
p a c i f i c set t lement of d i spu tes by submission to an impar-
t i a l t h i r d par ty was qu i t e frequent among the Greeks. Cont-
r o v e r s i e s were often submitted to the a r b i t r a t i o n of the 
Delphic Oracle, the Amphictyonic League, or a t r i buna l of 
i nd iv idua l s , chosen by the d i spu t an t s . The Amphictyonic 
League was the Greek prototype of the League of Nations. 
These Leagues f a i l e d , the reason being t h a t the members 
f a i l e d to subordinate t h e i r spec ia l I n t e r e s t s of the loca l 
p o l l s ( i . e . c i t y , s t a t e s ) to the general i n t e r e s t s of a l l . 
However the actual concept came in to being in 1306 ,when 
P i e r r e Dubois, a p o l i t i c a l philosopher a r t i c u l a t e d J 
the need for a confederat ion of the Pr inces of Europe with 
a counci l and a cour t under the ru le of the Holy Roman 
Empire, He proposed co-opera t ive act ion to p r o t e c t the Holy 
Land from the i n f i d e l . Several at tempts were made in the 
medieval period in general and in the 19th century in p a r t i -
c u l a r for the same. Examples are to be found in S u l l y ' s 
"The Grand Design" in the ea r ly 17th century , and in William 
Penn 's essay to 1693 on "Present and Future Peace in Europe", 
In 1712 St. P ie r re presented h i s "Project to Bring Perpetual 
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Peace in Europe- a union of 24 christians States of Europe. 
The Quadruple Alliance came into being at the Congress 
of Vienna in November 1815 by four big powers-Britain, Russia, 
Austria and prussia to discuss any problem that might arise, 
and settle them without going to war. This alliance gave 
birth to the "Concert of Europe" and inaugurated the era of 
Congresses - Congress of Troppau in 1820, Laibach in 1821, 
Verona in 1822, and Congress of St. Petersberg in 1823. But the 
Concert of Europe failed after 1822 on the issue of inter-
vention in Latin America to suppress the revolts of the 
people there, against Spanish domination, France wanted to 
intervene while England did not like the revolts to be 
suppressed. However, the process was revived in 1852 by the 
Congress of Paris, Later on the Hague Conferences were called 
for the same objective in 1899 and 1907. 
All the above efforts could be deemed to be fruitful 
for futurerdevelopments leading to the two of the most 
comprehensive and complex of all international organization, 
the League of Nations and the United Nations, in the twentieth 
century. The process of creation for the league of Nations 
3. M. W., The United Nations- International Organization and 
Administration (The Mecmillan Company, New York collier-
Macmillan Limited London,1967 )pp,6-7, 
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became s t ronger , when woodrow Wilson, p res iden t of U.S.A. 
enunciated h i s Fourteen Point Peace Programme on January 8, 
1918. The l a s t po in t declared: "A general Association of 
Nations must be formed under speci f ic covenants for the 
purpose of affording mutual guarantees of p o l i t i c a l indep-
endence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y to g rea t and small s t a t e s 
a l i k e " . The r e s u l t came on April 28,1919 when a d ra f t was 
accepted by the Peace Conference, and beceme the covenant of 
the League of Nations, which came i n t o force on January lO, 
1920 the day when the V e r s a i l l e s Treaty aslo came i n to e f fec t . 
Thus the covenant of the League of Nations was a t r e a t y 
signed as a p a r t of another t r e a t y , the Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s , 
which was a d i c t a t ed t r e a t y of peace with Germany. 
As an organ of peace and secur i ty the League of 
Nations f a i l e d . However, i t succeeded in jjSromcting coopera-
t ion in c e r t a i n economic and techn ica l areas , the reason 
being t h a t , t h e bui ld-up of armaments and the subsequent 
aggression could not be stopped. Consequently the League 
l o s t respec t and potency as an instrument of c o l l e c t i v e 
s ecu r i t y . 
Those, who worked for the c rea t ion of the United 
4. Ibid pp .8 -9 . 
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Nations opined that the unbearable tragedies of the World 
War II might have been avoided if the Leaque was given such 
authority and force^which would have made it competent for 
stopping agression. 
Hence the United Nations seemed to be the only 
hope to serve the purpose with the required authority, 
consequently, the final form of the Charter was worked out 
at the San Francisco conference in the spring of 1945, 
75 days after Franklin Roosevelt, the Chief architect of 
the Ui^ , died. It was the result of the following previous 
efforts the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, The UK 
Declaration of January 1, 1942; >and the Yalta Agreement 
of Feburary 11, 1945, 
Moreover, we may say that : 
"many of the ideas found in both the covenant 
and the Charter came from the minds of men of 
past centuries. One could refer to the writings 
of such men as Mo Ti of ancient China, of 
William Peun of England, of Kant and Asoka and 
Henry IV, of Germany, India and France respec-g 
tively and of Semon Boliver of Latin America. " 
To/ understand t ^ United Nations in its 
proper perspective, it is necessary to go through its 
5. Ibid, pp 9-10. 
6. Ibid, pp. lO 
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7 basic charac te r i s t i c s . These are : 
1. The United Nations i s a system of international organi-
zation , 
2. I t s chief purpose and function l i e in the f ield of co l l -
ective security. 
3. I t developed as an extension of a war time al l iance, 
4. I t gives special recognition to the principle of jo in t 
action by the Great powers. 
5. I t i s primarily an association of member s ta tes , 
6. The United Nations has a legal s tatus and international 
personality of i t s own. 
Any system can be identif ied as an international 
organisation if a minimum of four c r i t i r i a are fu l f i l led . 
These are, the system should be defini tely constituted, an 
established continuity, generali ty of membership and a 
broad scope of functions. All these c r i t e r i a are found in 
the United Nations. The charter i s the consti tution of 
the United Nations. I t makes i t an international agency 
with specified powers to carry out certain assigned functions, 
There are provisions in the Charter that the United Nations 
includes an ins t i tu t iona l ized system of regularly securring 
meetings and conferences to remove great obstacles from 
7. Amry vandenbosch & Willard N.Kogan, The United Nations 
Background, Organisation, Functions, Activit ies (NcGraw 
Hill Book Company, INC, New York, Tor an to, London, 1952) p. 93. 
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the common discussion of ma t t e r s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l concern. 
U n i v e r s i l i t y of membership i s a t h i r d t e s t of a system of 
general i n t e rna t i ona l o rganiza t ion to unable the agency to 
function on a global b a s i s . There are nov^l79 n a t i o n - s t a t e s 
which are members of the United Nations including a l l the 
Great Powers. On the contrary the United s t a t e s was never 
a member of the League, and the Soviet Union did not 
jo in u n t i l 1934. In addi t ion , there i s a provis ion in the 
Charter for l a t e r admission of peace-loving s t a t e s . The 
fourth c r i t e r i a i s the wide scope of funct ions. The areas 
assigned to the United Nat ions for i t s funct ions , are as 
broad as the a c t i v i t i e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p o l i t i c a l , economic and soc ia l cooperat ion. I t s ob l iga t ions 
are t o maintain i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and secur i ty , to deve-
lop f r iendly r e l a t i o n s among na t ions and to take appropriate 
measures to preserve un iversa l peace, and to work for i n t e r -
na t iona l cooperat ion in the s o c i a l , economic, and r e l a t e d 
f i e l d s and in encouraging r e spec t for human r i g h t s and 
g 
fundamental freedoms. 
The areas of the United Nat ions ' funct ions can 
be b e t t e r understood from the following f a c t s . There was 
a s ta f f of 15000 working in t h e UN s e c r e t a r i a t alone in 1986 
and there were 56000civil 5=ervants in the e n t i r e UN System 
8. Ib id , pp 94-95. 
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in 1982. Persons of about 155 n a t i o n a l i t i e s were employed 
on the s taff of UN organ i sa t ions t i l l October 1985 for 
helping na t ion s t a t e s , e spec i a l l y the developing coun t r i e s , 
in thejr inarch towards socio-economic p rogress . The s taff 
also helped the UN to tack le new problems, circximstances 
and i s sues t h a t the world community faced. These personnels 
are posted in more than 700 duty*- s t a t i o n s in a l l p a r t s 
of the world. The growth r a t e of UN work can be b e t t e r 
understood from the fac t t ha t i t had a $ 1.6 b i l l i o n b iennia l 
budget in 1985-86. ;\hereas, the high po in t of the aggregate 
9 
of the League budget was only $ 12 m i l l i o n . 
The second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the United Nations was 
i t s chief purpose and funct ions in the f i e l d of co l l ec t i ve 
s ecu r i t y . The c o l l e c t i v e secu r i ty i s a method of maintaining 
peace and avoiding war between two or more s t a t e s . I t pointed 
out t h a t any country which s t a r t e d a war would be r e s i s t e d by 
the r e s t of the world. All o ther coun t r i es would come to the 
help of a v ic t im of aggression. A p o t e n t i a l invader, knowing 
t h i s / would never dare to launch an attack.. In Jan, 1991, 
the US under the aegis of the United Nations took act ion in 
the Gulf war under the p r i n c i p l e of c o l l e c t i v e secur i ty agains t 
9. UN Doc. A/41/627. 
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Iraq to get Quwait freed. 
Thirdly, the extension of a war time a l l i ances char-
a c t e r i z e s the United Nat ions in terms of i t s h i s t o r i c a l develop-
ment. The United Nations was the product of the grea t a l l iance 
against the f a s c i s t powers during world war - I I . The s t a t e s 
and powers gathered at a common platform to defeat the aggressors, 
a lso agreed to cooperate in maintaining peace a f te r winning 
m i l i t a r y v i c to ry . Evolution from the stage of dream to the 
r e a l i t y of i n s t i t u t i o n a l embodiment may be t raced through a 
s e r i e s of ; 
dec l a r a t i ons and conferences, beginning with the 
At lan t i c cha r t e r and proceeding to the United 
Nations Declara t ion , the Moscow Conference , the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference the Ya l ta Conference , 
and the San Francisco Conference".^^ 
Fourthly, the j o i n t ac t ion by the Great powers 
under the f lag of the United Nations was deeded to be 
necessary for the guarantee of world s e c u r i t y . Under the 
league p r inc ip l e of the Here and Cry implied t h a t x 
Any war or t h r e a t of war whether immediately 
affect ing any of the members of the league or not 
i s hereby declared a matter of concern to the 
whole League,"11 
10.Amry vandenbosch & Willard N.Hogan, The United Nations^ 
p .97 . 
ll.Wadan Gopal Gupta, In ternat ipr .a l .Relations since 1919. 
(Chatanya Publishing House, Allahabad^ 1968) p , '542. 
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Thus under the League, It was the responsibility of some 
thing like world community, while under the U.N, System, 
leadership of the responsibility for peace rests with the 
Security Council under the Big Five . It can be expressed 
in the simplest terms : 
If the United states. Great Britain, the soviet 
Union, France, and China remained United and 
in basic agreement, how could a third world war 
occur? If, on the other hand , they disagreed to 
the point of fighting among themselves, what ^j 
could the result be ,except a third world war?'-
These Big Five were given permanent membership in 
the Security Council under the Charter, while the other 
members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year 
terms. These great powers are also authorised to use veto power 
on substantive matter in stopping the taking of any decision 
by the Security Council . The question whether an issue is 
substantive or procedural is itself declared to be a substan-
tive question and is, therefore, subject to the veto.This 
is called the "Double veto". However, the permanent members 
of the Security Council can not by themselves make affirmative 
decisions under the Charter, Nine votes are needed, and 
they are having only five, so at least four of the nonper-
manent members must be with them if action is to be taken. 
In other words, we can say that any seven of the ten non-
permanent members acting as a group may exercise a "collective 
13 
veto" "^  
12, Amry vandeubosch & Wi l la rd N, Hogan, The United Na t ions ,p ,9S 
1 3 . I b i d , p . 100. 
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Fi f th ly , the United Nations i s ba s i ca l l y an associa-
t i o n of i t s member-states. I t i s seemed to be a device or 
instrument of cooperation for the achievement of c e r t a i n 
common ob jec t ives by j o i n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l Jiction. I t i s not 
said to be a super s£ate or a world government, but some how, 
i t can be c l a s s i f i e d as a confederat ion , since most of the 
powers of government are r e t a i n e d by the member-states. Howe-
ver , in a unipolar power system in which the d i c t a t o r s h i p of 
only one super power i s dec i s ive in taking any act ion, the 
United Nations may be c l a s s i f i e d as more than a super s t a t e 
in a care l i k e the gulf war and l e s s than an e f fec t ive 
i n s t i t u t i o n in any other ca re , l i k e Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the 
l a t t e r case the i n t en t ion of Great Powers in general and the 
super power in p a r t i c u l a r i s the deciding fac tor . 
Las t ly , the United Nation i s not ca l l ed to be only 
an assoc ia t ion of member-states. I t i s more than t h a t , 
as has been said above. I t has an i n t e rna t i ona l l ega l personal i ty 
on i t s own account, the season being t h a t i t has the author-
i t y t o make t r e a t i e s . I t has a headquar ter , a l ega l s t a t u s , 
14 
a s taf f , and even a f lag of i t s own. 
14. Ib id . p . 105. 
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B. THE UK CHARTER AMD THE CONCEPT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECRET.^IAT| 
Any I n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t compr i se s the 
S e c r e t a r y General o r t he D i r e c t o r -Genera l o r what eve r h i s 
t i t l e may be and h i s o f f i c i a l s o r g a n i z e d t o perform i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s of a c o n t i n u i n g o r temporary n a t u r e . I t i s 
n o t of r e c e n t o r i g i n . I t was common before ' t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
of t he League of N a t i o n s . An i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t has 
i t s h i s t o r y s ince t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f e r e n c e s were h e l d . 
The need of such a body was f e l t t o perform some e s s e n t i a l 
d u t i e s l i k e , making p h y s i c a l a r rangements f o r m e e t i n g s , p r e p a r i n g 
confe rence documents, and keep ing r e c o r d s . A t t h a t t ime i t 
was of temporary n a t u r e , tanall in s i ze in compar ison t o modern 
s t a n d a r d s and were g e n e r a l l y p rov ided by the h o s t coun t ry 
from among i t s own d i p l o m a t i c o f f i c i a l s . I t was t e m p o r a r i l y 
a r r a n g e d , t he r ea son be ing the con fe rences . were of temporary 
p u r p o s e s and c a l l e d t o perform s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s and ended 
once t h e i r pu rpose s had been served or f a i l u r e had become 
c e r t a i n . 
The conven t ion of temporary i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t 
was changed with t h e e s t a b l i s h e d of permanent i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Te l eg raph ic Union 
(1865) and the U n i v e r s a l P o s t a l Union(1874) . To p rov ide r egu -
l a r s e r v i c e s t o t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , permanent s e c r e t a r i a t s 
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became necessary in order to perform a variety of functions. 
These Secretariats were made responsible not only for t r ad i -
t ional functions l ike organizing and servicing conferences/ 
but also for doing a variety of jobs in the periods between 
conferences, such as making studies , publishing s t a t i s t i c a l 
and other informations, maintaining r eg i s t r i e s , and performing 
certain roles in connection v?ith disputes between national 
governments. However, the o f f ic ia l s were lent by s ta tes for the 
purpose. Thus u n t i l l the establishment of the League of 
Nations, the secre ta r ia t s could not be truly regarded as 
composed of international c iv i l servants and sir Eric 
Drummond, designated in the Covenant of the League as the 
f i r s t Secretary General i s deemed to be responsible for the 
decision to organize an internat ional secretar ia t d i s t inc t 
from a multinational secre ta r ia t .As Mr. Frank p. Walters 
has written: 
"The creation of a secre ta r ia t international alike 
in i t s s t ructure, i t s s p i r i t , and in personnel, 
was without doubt one of the most important events 
in the history of international p o l i t i c s - important 
not only in i t se l f , but as the indisputable proof 
of p o s s i b i l i t i e s which had hi ther to been confidently 
denied".! 
1, Leland M,Goorich, The United Nations (Stevens and sons 
Limited, London, 1960) p,132. 
39 
The second example of an international secretariat 
was set when the International Labour office came into being 
as the administrative organ of the International Labour Org-
anization under the effective leadership of Mr. Albert Thomas. 
Originally the League Secretariat was established 
to play a modest role in the work of the organization. How-
ever some multidimensional factors became responsible for 
making it an indispensable part of the League system. The 
most important factor was that, the secretariat was the only 
source to provide continuing information to all organizations. 
The secretariat in a very short duration developed a very 
sufficient amount of diverse nature of expertise.Of all the 
league organs only the Secretariat wa5 in a position to 
provide the needed guidance in every field of the functioning 
of the Leagues, To a degree beyond expectation, the League 
organs got successes, particularly in the field of economic 
and social cooperation and the development of the colonial 
territories , This was due to the officials of the League 
Secretariat and their authority to do their duties. They 
were proved tobe more effective in the case of the Interna-
tional Labour Organization. The successes, which the secre-
tariats get in the above organizations induced the drafter of 
the charter of the United Nations, to accept the desirability 
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in fact the necessity, of haying a strong secre tar ia t 
composed of international c i v i l servants. The only question 
raised, was the extent of i t s po l i t i c a l power and was 
supported that i t s p o l i t i c a l role would be under national 
control in seme respect, l ike top posit ions heldin the 
cornmittees of the UN were concerned. 
After the examination of the consti tut ional basis 
of the secre ta r ia t , i t was found that the secretar ia t which 
consisted of the Secretary General and his s taffs , were 
having very important par t in the work of the United Nations . 
In the eye of the Charter, the Secretariat occupies the same 
posit ion as other principal organs of the United Nations. 
(Article 7) , I t may be cal led as the executive and admini-
s t ra t ive arm of the UN, The Secretariat prepares the ground 
for the meetings of the del iberat ive organs (the General 
Assembly and the three councils) so that they may more 
readily arrive at agreed international pol ic ies . I t s impor-
tance l i e s in the fact that i t i s a continuing organ compri-
sing expert personnel and also a permanent body of career 
o f f i c i a l s . In other words, the secretar ia t transforms the 
United Nations from a ser ies of periodic meetings of Assembly 
and councils into a permanent and cohesive organisation. 
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without the Secretariat the UN would be deprived of its 
centre of communication and coordination, its international 
core as distinct from the national character of the delega-
tions which make up the Assembly and the Councils, The UN 
Secretariat may be said to be the all pervasive cylinder on 
which the UN machine functions. On the efficiency and 
honesty of the Secretariat largely depends the effective 
functioning of the UN and the extent to which the objectives 
2 
of the Charter are realised. 
It) make the Secretariat as effective as possible, 
the first question raised by the framers of the UN Charter 
was as to whether the Secretariat would be multinational or 
international in character and composition. They clarified 
that the pattern of multinational meant that there would be 
seconded officials of member ^^ tates with fixed term contracts, 
paid for by their respective governments, but in the second 
case , there would be International officials on the pattern 
of the officials of the League Secretariat, However, in 
Article 101,3 it is provided that the paramount consideration 
in the employment of the staff and In the determination 
of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of 
securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence. 
2, Ibid, pp. 132-33, 
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and Integr i ty . But/ as the very next sentence goes on to say, 
"Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruit ing the 
staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible". The members 
of the preparatory Commission in the i r reports cl arified the 
contents of t h i s a r t i c l e . They pointed out that the fixed term 
appointees to the Secretariat must tender the i r resignation 
from any post whether public or private in the i r respective 
s t a t e s . Preparatory Cornnission further reccinmended for a provi-
sion in which the staff from national c iv i l services would be 
given a chance to work in the Secretar iat for periods not 
longer than two years under a system of secondment or leave 
without pay so that personal contacts betvs«een the Secretariat and 
the national administration might be strengthened and a body of 
national o f f i c ia l s with experience in international administra-
tion created. Here the preparatory Commission said about the 
short-term appointments of the candidates from geographical 
regions inadequately represented in the Secretariat, I t means 
preference would be given not to "particular s ta tes" but to 
"regions" which are inadequately represented. Moreover, the 
Commission concluded that the principle of merit in recruitment 
could be reconciled with thatofrecruit ing staff on as wide 
a geographical basis as possible. 
The chapter XV (Article 97 to lOl) of the UN charter 
deals with the Secretaz-iat, Article 97 says that the secretar iat 
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comprises a Secretary General and such s taff as the organi -
za t ion may requ i re . The Secretary General i s the chief admi-
n i s t r a i i v e , o f f i c e r / . t h e United Nations. The Secretary General 
himself, or by deputy, ac t s as Secretary of a l l the meetings 
of the General Assembly, of the Secur i ty counci l , of the 
Economic and Social Council and of the Trusteeship Council 
and performs such other funct ions as are assigned to him 
by these organs. 
The o r ig ina l s i g n a t o r i e s of the Charter made i t 
c l e a r t h a t the success of the uni ted Nations depends upon 
supra-na t iona l l oya l ty , i m p a r t i a l i t y and ind.ependence of 
the o f f i c i a l s of the o rgan i sa t ion . As Ar t i c l e 100 provides; 
" 1 . In the performance of t h e i r d u t i e s , the 
Secretary General and s ta f f should not 
seek or receive i n s t r u c t i o n s from any 
government or from any o ther au thor i ty 
ex te rna l to the organ iza t ion . They sha l l 
refrom from any act ion which might r e f l e c t 
on t h e i r pos i t i on as i n t e r n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s 
responsible only to the organiza t ion . 
2. Each member of the United Nations undertakes 
to respec t the exc lus ive ly In t e rna t iona l 
charac ter of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the 
Secretary General and the s taff , and not 
seek to inf luence them in the discharge of 
t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s " . 3 
3» Rumki Basu, Personnel Administrat ion in the United Nations 
(New Delhi, S te r l ing , 1989; pp. 26-28. 
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The f i r s t p a r t of the r epo r t of the preparatory 
Commission i s r e l a t e d to the general pos i t i on of the Secre-
t a r i a t in the cha te r of the UN, while the second pa r t dea l t 
with the Secretary General, The main funct ions ent rus ted to 
the Secretary General by the Chater were c l a s s i f i e d by the 
prepara tory corrmission in to six groups-
i) General, adminis ta t ive and executive; 
i i ) Technical, 
i i i ) F i n a n c i a l ; 
iv)Organisat ion and Administration of the s e c r e t a r i a t , 
v ) P o l i t i c a l ; and 
vi)Repre sent a t iona l 
In t h i s r epo r t , the importance of the r o l e s of 
the Secretary General in multidiamensional f i e l d s are also 
r e a l i s e d . He i s the chief appointing au thor i ty for a l l 
the s taff under the r egu la t ions formulated by the General 
Assembly, He i s also responsible for the f inanc ia l admini-
s t r a t i o n of the United Nations (Ar t ic le lOl ,paras 1 6^3). 
He has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to make ava i lab le the qua l i f ied 
s t a f f s as per requirement of the va r ious organiza t ions of 
the United Nations (Ar t ic le lOl, Fara 2) , He i s the only 
Source of motiva t i on and has a duty to ere at and maintain 
team s p i r i t in a body of o f f i c i a l s r e c r u i t e d on a mul t inat ional 
b a s i s . 
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The secre tary General i s a lso given specia l importance 
as regards h i s r o l e -
"as a mediator and as an informal advisor of 
many governments . , . , he wi l l undoubtedly be 
ca l l ed upon from time to t ime , in the exercise 
of h is adminis t ra t ive d u t i e s , to take decis ions 
which may f i r s t l y be ca l l ed p o l i t i c a l , under 
Ar t ic le 99 of the Char ter . Moreover, he has 
been given a qu i t e spec ia l r i g h t which goes 
beyond any power previously accorded to the 
head of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l adminis t ra t ion 
. , , . , I t i s impossible to fore see how t h i s 
Ar t ic le wi l l be applied, but the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
i t confers upon the Secretary General wi l l requi re 
the exerc ise of the h ighes t q u a l i t i e s of p o l i t i c a l judgement, t a c t and i n t e g r i t y " . 4 
An i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t iden t ica l to a 
na t iona l adminis t ra t ion, must be organized along c e r t a i n 
l i n e s defining functions and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to be an 
e f f i c i e n t working instrument . The Preparatory Commission 
was requi red to consider as one of the f i r s t quest ions 
as to whether the S e c r e t a r i a t should be organized on 
a funct ional b a s i s or in r e l a t i o n t o the organs which i t 
had to serve. Theodore Meron opined t h a t the Founding 
Fathers ne i the r c l a r i f i e d the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
meri t to geography nor they gave exact thought as to what 
was meant by geographical b a s i s . They might have been in 
4. Ibid pp.23-24. 
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favour of the widest possible representation of different 
nationalities in the secretariat. All these question are 
being discussed in the next chapter, W E STRUCTURE OF 
THE SECRETARIAT. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION CF THE 
UN SECRETARIAT 
47 
The secretariat is headed by the secretary General, 
who is also the chief administrative officer of the United 
Nations. He is appointed by tr.e General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. On January 24,1946, 
the General Assembly decided that the term of the appoint-
ment should be for five years, being open at the end of that 
period for a further five year term, which might be modified 
in future by the General Assembly and the Security Council. 
To make him independent and impartial in the performance of 
his duties, every member state is advised to refrain from 
offering him any governmental position, immediately upon retire, 
ment and if offered, he should avoid that offer. 
The UN Charter does not have any provision in it-
self , which might give specific guide lines for the orga-
nization of the Secretariat, However, from the very beginning, 
it v;aE realised that an International secretariat, like a 
national one, must be organized by defining its functions 
and responsibilities, in such a way as to make it a most 
efficient working system. And for this reason, one of 
the first questions that the preparatory Cormiission had 
to consider was whether the secretariat should be organized 
l.YUN, 1947-48, (Department of Public Information United 
Nations, Lake Success^New York) pp. 804-5. 
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on the functional basis or in relation to the organs 
which it had to serve. The Charter in its article 
lOi, par. 2 supports latter one by the specification, 
that appropriate staffs should be permanently assigned 
to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship 
Council and as required, to the other organs 
of the United tJations. However, the organization of 
the Secretariat in relation to the orgcins, was not 
appreciated, the reason being that there were some of 
the work of the Secretariat, like the registration 
of treaties, which did not relate to the work of any 
particular organs and many of the services to be pro-
vided were by their nature common to all organs. 
Though the Preparatory Commission in its 
Report recommended the method of organisation of the 
Secretariat for the most part leased on the functional 
principle, it avoided the acceptance of either view in 
full. The reason it cited was i 
"Because the organs of the United Nations 
have both distinctive and common functions", 
it concluded, "the staff or secretariat, 
which serves them at all times. Should be 
so organized as to meet this situation. 
Every organ, therefore, has its disposal 
the services of the whole of the secretariat. 
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and each Department of the Secretariat 
Serves all the organs as required, subject 
to one qualification, the proposed Depart-
ment of Security Council Affairs". 
Owing to the fact that the Security Council 
was given",,,,., exclusive powers to deal 
with military and enforcement measures,.,,," 
the Commission deemed it necessary " that 
the special units of the Department of Security 
Council Affairs concerned with these measures _ 
should serve the Security Council exclusively". 
The General Assembly accepted the recommendations 
of the Preparatory Commission, though in a somewhat 
modified form, in the first part of the first regular 
annual session held in London, It lasted from January 
10 to February 14, 19 46, During the session, the Assembly 
decided that the Secretary General should set up the 
Secretariat so that it could perform effectively the 
functions and services required. The Secx-etary General 
was directed to divide his operations into eight princi-
pal divisions, established on a functional basis as 
distinct from being created to serve the principal organs 
of the United Nations, The eight units for which it 
provided were ; 
-Department of Security Council Affairs 
-Department of Economic Affairs 
-Department of Social Affairs 
-Department of "Trusteeship and Information from 
Non-Self-Governing Territories 
2. Leland K, Goodrich, The United Nations, (Stevens and 
Sons Limited, London^ 1960)p,143. 
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-Department of Public Information 
-Legal Department 
-Conference and General Services 
-Administrative and Financial services 
Each of these department was given in charge of 
an Assistant Secretary General. They were not only res-
ponsible for performing their administrative responsi-
bilities but also to assist the secretary General in his 
dealings with governments and were chosen for appointment 
with an eye to their political acceptability. Five of 
the departments were filled by the assistant Secretary 
Generals who were the nationals of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council. In the remaining cases, 
the national governments were also consulted. One of 
the Assistant Secret^^ Generals was authorized to act 
as an Acting Secretary General in the absence of the 
Secretary General or if he was unable to perform his 
functions. It is the responsibility of Secretary General 
to take steps of any type to ensure coordination between 
the Department of Economic Affairs and of Social Affairs 
and to maintain appropriate administrative relationships 
between those Department and the Economic and Social 
Council and the Specialized agencies. For this purpose 
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a Joint Division of Coordination and Liaison was estab-
lished, provision was also made for the creation of an 
Executive Office for the Secretary General at his dis-
posal with a small staff of advisors and assistants/ 
which would perform certain functions in connection with 
the General Assembly meetings as well as functions of 
a general coordinating nature under the direction of an 
3 
Executive Assistant, 
Each department was further divided Into different 
divisions and divisions into sections as per requirement of 
the service. The complete organization of the Secretariat 
under these proposals is shown on the chart 1 on the 
next page. 
The first proposed organization adopted in 1946 
continued without substantial change until 1953/ except for 
a Technical Assistance Administration/ which^ was established 
to assist in the administration of the Expanded Program 
of Technical Assistance under the supervision of a Director 
General, A number of delegations made demands for greater 
administrative efficiency in successive years' budget 
3.Ibid, pp.143-44, 
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debates in general and expressed doubts regarding the 
soundness of the present adminis t ra t ive s t ruc tu re . 
These views were expressed in p a r t i c u l a r in the course 
of the debates on the 1952 budget e s t ima tes . Consequently, 
the F i f t h (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee requ-
es ted in i t s r epor t to the General Assembly tha t the 
Secretary General prepare a study on the d e s i r a b i l i t y 
of a general reorganiza t ion of the Secre tar ia t - for submi-
ssion t o the Seventh session of the General Assembly in 
1952. Secretary General Trygve Lie did not take any s tep 
for s u b s t a n t i a l changes in the organiza t ion during h i s 
s ec re t a rysh ip . However, the new Secretary General,Hammars* 
kjold , who followed Lie, opined in an explanatory memoran-
dum t h a t the s t ruc tu re of the S e c r e t a r i a t should be s impl i -
f ied and the l i n e s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y more c l ea r ly defined. 
He. made i t c l e a r t h a t e igh t a s s i s t an t / and a Director-General 
was too la rge number e i t h e r to act as a coordinat ing group 
or to work with him in cons ide ra t ion and formulation of 
po l i cy . At the seventh session held in 1952, The General 
Assembly requested the Secretary General for the prepara-
t i o n of a more de ta i l ed r e p o r t , which was submitted at 
e ighth session in 1953. The proposals of the secretary 
General along the l i n e s of the reorgan iza t ion , he had 
suggested,was recommended a t t h i s session and approved at i t s 
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ninth session in 1954, generally the measures, he had 
adopted. 
On the hasls of these proposals seme important 
changes were made in the organization of the Secretariat, 
According to the Flan, the Department of Legal Affairs, 
the office of Personnel and the office of the Controller 
were brought into the immediate office of the Secretary 
General, The Flan also made a provision for the two under-
secretaries without portfolio to serve as advisers to the 
Secretary General on special questions and to undertake 
special assignments on his behalf. Another important 
change according to the new plan was the consolidation of 
the separate Department of Economic Affairs and Depart-
ments of Social Affairs into one single Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, The previous offices of 
assistant secretaries-general were replaced by the offices 
of under-Secretaries, And, except for the two under-
secretaries in the office of the Secretary General, all 
the other under-Secretaries were assigned to particular 
departments which were functioning for specific purposes. 
In addition, the Department of Conference and General 
services was bifurcated into a Department of Conference 
Services and an Office of General Services, The Technical 
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Assistance Administrat ion was not changed and remained 
as a separate u n i t , however, i t s c lose coordinat ion with 
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs was brought 
under the d i r e c t supervision of the Secretary General, 
The reorganiza t ion of the Sec re t a r i a t under these proposals 
i s shown in the Chart-2 on the next page. 
After the approval of new organiza t ion , the Sec-
r e t a r y Generalopined t h a t i t wi l l help him in making ce r -
t a i n de legat ion of p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y within 
spec i f i c f i e l d s . He also considered t h a t the reorganiza-
t ion would r e s u l t in some f inanc ia l savings. He made i t 
c l e a r , in present ing h i s proposed changes to the Fi f th 
Committee at the ninth sess ion , 1954 of the General Asse-
mbly, t h a t h i s plan would : 
" ( l ) reduce the number of high ranking o f f i c i a l s 
repor t ing d i r e c t l y <to sixteen^ 
(2) c rea te more c l e a r - c u t l i n e s of authori ty 
than have ex i s t ed in the system, and 
(3) give the new top - l eve l p o s i t i o n s the same 
s t a t u s with eachother-a matter t h a t i s 
l a rge ly concerned with diplomatic previ leges 
and immunities".4 
4. Francis 0. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy, Proposal for Changes 
in the United Nations (The Brookings i n s t i t u t i o n Washington, 
D.C., 1955)p. 409. 
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After completing the task of administrative orga-
nization of the UK Secretariat, the first UN Secretary 
General, Trigue Lie had to face another difficult task 
of greater responsibility. It was the composition of the 
secretariat. For this purpose, the Secretary General had 
to recruit a large number of staff in the shortest possible 
time in order to make the UN Secretariat a working system. 
Ohe General Assembly expressed the view in February 1946, 
that appropriate methods of recruitment should be esta-
blished to have a staff that would be characterized by 
the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and 
integrity, with due regard being paid to recruitment on 
as wide a geographical basis as possible. And the secretary 
General was instructed to abide by the suggestions concer-
ning recruitment included in the report of the Prepara-
tory Commission. He started functlng in 1946 with an 
extempore staff of about 300 persons, recruited partly 
from the Secretariat of the preparatory Commission , the 
first General Assembly and former officials of the League 
of known merit. In the short period of few months, he 
gathered a staff of 3,000. The American nationals got 
opportunity to be recruited in large number due to geo-
graphical proximity, which made the recruitment easiest. 
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However the need of the hour made the adherence to the 
p r inc ip l e of broad geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n d i f f i c u l t 
to uphold. The r e s u l t which came, gave a very imbalan-
ced p ic tu re of the s taf f composition. Thus, in 19 46, 
83.8 percent of the profess ional s ta f f were the na t iona l s 
of the 11 most subs t an t i a l l y over represented na t ions . 
In the t h i r d quar te r of 1947, 13 na t ions had contr ibuted 
a t o t a l of 721 s taf f members out of a t o t a l of 902 in 
the profess iona l and higher grade pos t s of the in t e rna -
t i o n a l l y r e c r u i t e d s taff , o ther than those in pos t s 
requ i r ing specia l language q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , In 1947, 31 
member s t a t e s were c l e a r l y under-represented including 
the Soviet Union , India , and c e r t a i n o ther regions such 
5 
as Latin America and the Middle East . 
Consequently, the problem of geographical imbalan-
ce in s taf f r ep resen ta t ion in to the Sec re t a r i a t remained 
unsolved from the very beginning, i n s p i t e of great e f f o r t s 
made by successive Secre ta r i es General to minimise i t . 
The f i r s t Secretary General faced a l o t of problems 
in the appointment of Ass i s t an t Sec re t a r i e s General, the 
5. Theoder Meron, The United Nations srecretar iat (Lexington 
Books, D.C. Health & Company, Lexington, Massa chuse t t s 
Toronto, 1977) p . 1 1 . 
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reason being tha t the Charter was s i l e n t on the subject 
and the preparatory Conrunission only recommenced on the 
mat ters r e l a t e d to t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and supervision 
of Departments or Services . I t did not say any thing 
about how they would be se lec ted for appointment by the 
Secretary General, This led Trygye Lie , the f i r s t Secretary 
General to be pressus ised by the Five Great Powers, All 
these powers made i t c l e a r t o the Secretary General/ t h a t 
he had to go by the decis ion made by them in the appoint-
ment of Ass i s tan t Secre ta r i es General, according to which 
"the USSR had reserved for i t s e l f the post of 
Ass is tan t Secretary General for Security Council, 
the United Sta tes t h a t of Administrative and 
F inanc ia l , the United Kingdom t h a t of Economic 
Affa i rs , France t h a t of Social Affairs , and China 
tha t of Trusteeship Council Af fa i r s " .6 
The agreement reached at t h i s stage among the 
Great Five was u n o f f i c i a l . I t had no l ega l authori ty 
which the Secretary General to follow. However, i t became 
the f i r s t precedent for the occupation of the Key posts 
by the Great Fov,-ers, and thus a t rend developed tha t was 
to remain in operat ion in the years to come. 
The success, which the g rea t powers gotthrough 
exerc i s ing na t iona l pressure in the appointment of the 
s ta f f for the Sec re t a r i a t p o s t s developed as a convention. 
6, Ibid . pp. 11-12. 
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This was so not only in the case of the higher level 
officials, but also in the allocation of lower ranking 
posts. The principle of geographical distribution ment-
ioned in the Charter proved to be a means for them to 
plead their cases and also to lobby for their condidates, 
whom they wished to be appointed to the Secretariat posts. 
Another opportunity was provided to the great powers through 
the practice of seeking the help from the governments by 
the first secretary General in finding necessary recruits 
for the Secretariat. This governmental help became a tradi-
tion inspite of being contrary to the principles of the 
Charter. 
In September 1948, for the first time, Trygye 
Lie proposed a formula for giving a turn in the interpre-
tation of the principle of geographical distribution, 
enunciated in Article 101(3) of the charter into a practi-
cable administrative detail for the use of recruitment 
of Secretariat staff. The Secretary General pointed out 
that the meaning of the principle of geographical distri-
bution which was implied, not necessarily that nationals 
of a particular member state should have a specified 
number of posts and of a particular grade or grades alloca-
te 
ted/them or that a particular percentage of the total outlay 
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in s a l a r i e s should be reserved for them, Hov.ever the 
primary essence to be cared for was t h a t , the U^ admini-
s t r a t i o n should be s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t would be enriched 
by the experience and cu l t u r e which each member nat ion 
can provide , and t h a t each member s t a t e should be s a t i s -
f ied t h a t i t s own cu l tu re and Ideology had m=de a f u l l 
con t r ibu t ion to the S e c r e t a r i a t . 
The Secretary General considered tha t any r i g i d 
mathematical formula, whether r e l a t e d to na t ional income, 
l i t e r a c y , f inanc ia l con t r ibu t ions to the UN budget, or any 
other c r i t e r i o n would reduce the necessairy adminis t ra t ive 
f l e x i b i l i t y . There was no a l t e r n a t i v e to basing geographical 
d i s t r i b u t i o n on the budgetary con t r ibu t ions of the member 
s t a t e s . However, General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 153 (Xl) of 
15 November 1947, which was considered as a ba s i s of the 
future recrui tment p o l i c i e s in the S e c r e t a r i a t , I t permi-
t t e d a margin of 25 percent above or below nat ional quotas, 
in the hope t h a t t h i s margin would not be applicable in 
the number of .na t ionals from member s t a t e s cont r ibu t ing more 
7 
tha-n lO percent of the t o t a l budget. Member States whose 
na t iona l s were within the l i m i t s of t h i s margin (desi rable 
7, A/652, 3 GAOR Plenary Meeting, p . 157. 
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range) would not be regarded as over represented if the 
number of its nationals in the Secretariat was less than 
8 four. 
For the purpose of solut ion to a l l the controver-
s i a l i s sues concerning i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l service r e c r u i t -
ments the General Assembly setup an In t e rna t i ona l Civi l 
Service Advisory Board(lCSAB) by resolu t ion 13 at i t s f i r s t 
session on 13 February 1946, The aim of i t s establishment 
was to advise the Secretary General on the methods of r e c r u i t -
ment of the s taf f for the S e c r e t a r i a t and on the means by 
which common standards of recrui tment in the Sec re ta r i a t and 
the Special ized Agencies may be ensured. The Board submitted 
an exhaustive repor t in March 1950 on recrui tment methods 
and standards for the United Nations and special ized Agencies, 
Fur ther , i t made some addi t iona l con t r ibu t ions on the 
methods of recrui tment , the confirmation of the main fea-
9 
t u r e s of the Preparatory Commission recommendation. 
Administrat ive Committee on Coordination 
appointed a committee of exper ts to work for a b e t t e r 
General System on Sa la r i e s and Allowance. The Committee 
8. Secretary Genera l ' s Bu l l e t in No.77, 3 GAUR, Plenary 
Meetings p.160, 
9. Rumki Basu, personnel Administration in United Nations,p. 35. 
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submitted i t s r epor t a f te r a wide d i scuss ion to the 
General.__ Assembly and the Assembly adopted i t in 
December,1950 by r e so lu t i on 470 at i t s f i f t h session. 
The eommitteeof Experts pointed out in i t s repor t tha t 
d e f i n i t e secu r i ty of employment, adequate remuneration 
and re t i rement pe rss ions were necessary condi t ions for 
the recrui tment and cont inuat ion of high qua l i ty o f f i c i a l s . 
As time went on i t became obvious tha t the 
S e c r e t a r i a t had become to a g rea t ex ten t a body of tenured 
o f f i c i a l s . There was l i t t l e hope for cor rec t ing the 
imbalance in i t s geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , I n 1956, Hammars-
kjold, second UN Secretary General observed tha t in 
view of the large number of permanent appointments, oppor-
t u n i t y for change in the n a t i o n a l i t y p a t t e r n was r e s t r i c -
ted. The process of ensuring the wide geographical d i s t r i -
but ion mentioned in the Charter , requi red therefore , a 
continuous, long term e f f o r t s , 
Hammarskjold opined tha t to ensure merit and 
qua l i ty in the Character of s taf f of the s e c r e t a r i a t , the 
majority of the s taff would have to serve on a permanent 
b a s i s . However , he f i r s t p re fe r red the use of fixed term 
10. Ibid. p. 36, 
11. A/c 5/689, 11 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 43, p. 71. 
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appointments as a waj^  of creating a quicker turn-over 
which would help in the creation of greater geographical 
balance without sacrifice to the stability provided by a 
career principle. He also advanced a greater administrative 
freedom for the movement of staff within the approved 
budget. He opined that since the Secretariat was one and 
indivisible, the Secretary General should be able to trans-
fer both posts and staff between departments and offices 
so as to use that staff to its best advantage and where 
the individuals were most required. This policy of Hammarskjold, 
which came to be known as "CONSOLIDATED MAl^ NH^ G TABLE" gave 
him the necessary administrative flexibility to promote 
12 
staff by moving posts around within the Secretariat. It 
also enabled him to neutralise the effect of situations in 
which key posts in a unit were held by staff members of the 
same nationality. This plan made it possible to both oppor-
tunities for promotion and for better geographical balance 
13 
within the different departments of the Secretariat. 
with the help of this principle^ the Secretary General had 
tried to avoid the domination of one particular country or 
12. A/3041, 10 GAOR, Agenda Items 38 and 47, pp. 41-42, 
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region in particular units of the secretariat. 
The pressure for more rapid improvement of geogr-
aphical distribution mounted in the Fifth (Administrative 
and Budgetari')committee of the General Assembly. With the 
admission of new states to the UN membership after 1955, 
the under represented states were increased and were 
dissatisfied not only with the slow rate of improvement 
of the geographical balance in the staff but also with the 
contents of the 19 48 form.ula which failed due to its stress 
on budgetary factors. It inadequately reflected, in their 
view, the principle of equality of states and the differences 
in population. During the 12th session of the General Assembly 
in 1957, it was repeatedly stressed by the delegates of 
under represented member states, that in a political organi-
zation such as the United Nations, the principle of equitable 
geographical distribution should be given primary or at 
least equal, not secondary importance in the composition 
14 of a principal organ. 
In 1958, the Secretary General started to use 
the term "DESIRABLE RANGE OF POSTS" in tables showing the 
nationality and the number of staff in posts subject 
to geographical distribution* The minimum desirable range 
14. Ibid. 
region in p a r t i c u l a r u n i t s of the s e c r e t a r i a t . 
The pressure for more rap id improvement of geogr-
aphical d i s t r i b u t i o n mounted in the F i f th (Administrative 
and Budgetari.)Committee of the General Assembly, l-.'ith the 
admission of new s t a t e s to the Ui^  membership af ter 1955, 
the under represented s t a t e s were increased and were 
d i s s a t i s f i e d not only with the slow r a t e of improvement 
of the geographical balance in the s t a f f but also with the 
contents of the 1948 form.ula which f a i l ed due to i t s s t r e s s 
on budgetary f a c t o r s . I t Inadequately r e f l e c t ed , in t h e i r 
view, the p r i nc ip l e of equa l i ty of s t a t e s and the di f ferences 
in populat ion. During the 12th session of the General Assembly 
in 1957, i t was repea tedly s t r essed by the delegates of 
under represented member s t a t e s , t h a t in a p o l i t i c a l organi-
za t ion such as the United Nations, the p r i nc ip l e of equitable i 
geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n should be given primary or at 
l e a s t equa l , not secondary importance in, the composition 
14 of a p r i n c i p a l organ. 
In 1958, the Secretary General s t a r t ed to use 
the term "DESIRABLE RANGE OP POSTS" In t a b l e s showing the 
n a t i o n a l i t y and the number of s taff in pos t s subject 
to geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n . The minimum desi rable range 
14. Ibid, 
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of posts was one to three for each member state whose 
rate of assessment for budgetary contributions was less 
than 0,14 percent. The General Assembly passed resolution 
1436(XIV) in 1959, that mace it clear that vacancies in 
posts at higher levels should be filled, as far as possible, 
by qualified candidates who were representative of geogr-
aphical areas and main cultures, either not represented, 
or Inadequately so in such posts. 
The General Assembly appointed a Com.mittee of Experts* 
by passing Resolution 1446(XIV) in December 19 59, whose 
mandate was to work with the Secretary General to review 
the activities and organization of the Secretariat in order 
to bring about maximum economy and efficiency. iWith the 
help of Resolution 1559 (XV) of 1960, the General Assembly 
expanded its terms of reference to include questions relating 
to the geographical distribution of staff, instructing it 
to further study the categories of posts subject to 
geographical distribution and the criteria for determining 
the range of posts for each member country with a view 
to securing a wide geographical distribution of posts. 
The decision to revise the original terms of the 
Committee was the result of two developments. The first 
was the "Troika" arrangement proposed by the Soviet Union 
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in 1961. The soviet Union made it clear that the United 
Nations was primarily a political organization, it could 
not fulfill its multifariouscobligations^ unless the 
different regions, with distinctive political features, 
get adequate representation In the Secretariat, The 
Soviet Union proposed that the Secretariat should equally 
represent the three groups of members countries, described 
as the "Socialist", states, the "neutralist" states and 
"United States and its Allies". However it was opposed 
by the Western countries on the basis of Article 100 
and 101 of the Charter in which geography was subordinated 
to the consideration of merit. 
In the second development , the newly admitted 
member states opined that the method for determining a 
desirable range of posts for each member country was 
against the basic charter, which accorded equality to 
each member state irrespective of its material rresources. 
The Committee of Experts on the activities and 
organization of the Secretariat submitted its report 
in June 1961 , accepting in principle with most of 
the criticisms levelled against the "desirable range" forrrula. 
15 
15, See A/4642, 15 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 60, 
pp. 22-23. 
16, A/4776, 16 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 61,p. 1 
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They developed a formula which would take into account all 
the factors over looked earlier. According to it, every 
member country would have at least two staff members in 
the Secretariat in order to reflect the membership in 
the United Nations. To give due importance to the popula-
tion factor, from each member state one staff was to be 
recruited for each 10 million population upto 150 million, 
and one additional staff member would be alloted for each 
30 million population in excess of 150 million. The remain-
ing posts available under geographical distribution would 
be allocated to member states in accordance with their con-
tributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. For 
the high ranking posts in the Secretariat (D-2 and above) 
the committee proposed a similarly constructec formula for 
post distribution on a regional basis. 
The proposals of the Committee of Experts was debated 
in the Fifth Committee during the 16th General Assembly 
focussing on conflicting interpretations of the Charter, 
The western delegates made it clear that nowhere in the 
Charter was geographical basis as defined as being nation-
ality representation based on Article lOi(3) and the 
16. Ibid pp. 10-11, 
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Secretariat staff must be considered as individuals, 
rather than as nationals, of member states and it must 
be protected by Article 8 of the Charter. 
The Fifth Committee faced two dissimilar draft 
resolutions, was unable to reach an agreement and asked 
the Secretary General to solve the problem with the help 
of his effective ideas. The Secretary General presented 
his views in the 17th session of the General Assembly 
held in 1962. He confirmed in principle all the major 
suggestions of the Committee of Experts, Ke made it clear 
that no mathematical formula proved to be a practical 
substitute of the discretion and good sense of the 
chief administrative officer. He proposed that for pro-
fessional posts in the Secretariat (excluding those with 
special language recruitment), equitable geographical 
distribution should account for a minimum range of one 
to five posts attributable to membership , and the 
reservation of lOO posts to be assigned on a regional 
basis. To consider such differences as in the size of 
population, as do not receive sufficient evaluation in 
other two factors and the balance of posts should be 
distributed on that basis of the ratios of assessed 
contributions. These recomjnendations of the ReSblution 
1852 (XVII) of 1962. It also called for a more blanced 
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reg ional composition of the s ta f f at the D-I level and 
above. 
Resolution 1852 based on Secretary General ' s formula 
with minor changes, s t i l l form the b a s i s of the presen t 
system. Accordingly, the p r i n c i p l e of g e c g r ^ h i c a l d i s t -
r i b u t i o n was to be r e f l ec t ed in des i rab le ranges ca lcu la ted 
for each s t a t e in the following manner ; 
"A range of one to six pos t s was to be a s s i -
gned to each s t a t e by v i r t u e of i t s member-
ship in the organiza t ion , out of 2400 profe-
s s iona l and higher l eve l pos t s financed under 
the regu la r budget in the UN Sec re t a r i a t , 
200 pos t s were to be d i s t r i b u t e d jimong the 
gegraphical regions , taking in to account the 
populat ion fac to r . The remaining pos t s would 
be a l loca ted to each s t a t e on the bas i s of 
i t s con t r ibu t ion to the budget. Obviously as 
the number of s t a t e s inc rease , the number 
of pos t s a t t r i bu t ed to the membership factor 
would increase , while the number of remaining 
p o s t s a t t r i b u t e d to the fac tor of con t r ibu t ions 
to the budget would dec l ine ,18 
Resolution 2736(XXV) of 1970 of the General Assembly 
made i t c l e a r t h a t in pos t s involving complex du t i e s and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the General Assembly considered tha t 
ca ree r appointments were preferable to fixed term pos ts 
which were growing in number. And with so many addi t iona l 
gu ide l i ne s , the s u i t a b i l i t y of a candidate for appoint-
ment had to be judged in addi t ion to 1962 formula ) against 
l!7,See V5270, 17 GACR , Annexes, Agenda Item 70. 
18,Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United 
Nations , p , 40 
6S 
such additional guidelines as, 
(a) the need to improve the connposition of the 
staff by working language, by age and by sex; 
(b) determination of the career versus fixed 
terms ratio; 
(c) for senior posts, recruitment among the 
19 
regions and within the regions. 
The 'Group of Experts' proposed in 1975 the 
structure of the United Nations System that countries 
within a region or within a sub region agree among 
themselves to pool the number of posts allocated to 
them/purposes of satisfying the requirements of equita-
20 ble geographical distribution. As a result there 
was a shift of demand from a national to a regional 
balance in the composition of the Secretariat. 
The pressure from under developed countries made 
it possible for the General Assembly to adopt Resolution 
3417B at its 30th session, in which preference for 
nationals of developing countries over nationals of 
other under-represented member states was introduced in 
19. I b i d , pp . 41-42 . 
20. See E/AC 62 /9 , Para 93(b) on A New Uni ted Nat ions 
S t r u c t u r e for Global Economic Coope ra t ion . 
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the S e c r e t a r i a t , 
The General Assembly a t i t s 35 th Sess ion (1980) 
r e q u e s t e d the S e c r e t a r y General t o c a l c u l a t e new d e s i r a b l e 
r a n g e s fo r a l l member s t a t e s for be ing app l i ed fcom 
Janua ry 1, 1981^ on the b a s i s of t h e fo l lowing c r i t e r i a ; 
a ) - b a s e f i g u r e f o r the c a l c u l a t i o n s w i l l be 
3350 p o s t s , 
b)-membership f a c t o r w i l l be based on 7,75 as 
the mid, p o i n t of t h e minimum d e s i r a b l e r a n g e ; 
c ) - p o p u l a t i o n f a c t o r , t o which 240 p o s t s s h a l l 
be a l l o c a t e d w i l l be d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the 
p o p u l a t i o n s of the v a r i o u s r e g i o n s and be 
d i s t r i b u t e d among the r e g i o n s i n p r o p o r t i o n 
t o t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n , 
d ) - c o n t r i b u t i o n f a c t o r w i l l be based on the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of the remain ing p o s t s in 
p r o p o r t i o n t o the s c a l e of a s ses smen t s . 
e) -Upper and lower l i m i t s of each range w i l l be 
based on a f l e x i b i l i t y of 15 per c e n t o r down 
from the m i d - p o i n t , b u t not l e s s than 5.75 
p o s t s up o r down. 
These above c r i t e r i a were pu t i n t o e f f e c t on January 1, 
21 1981. -^^  
2 1 . See , A / c , 5 /41 /6 p . 4. 
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The base figure 3350 pos t s for the ca lcu la t ion 
as on January 1,1981 was reduced to 3000 from January 
1, 1986, when the United Nations I n d u s t r i a l Development 
Organizat ion (UNILO), with 347 s ta f f members in pos ts 
subject to geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , separated from 
the United Nations, This base f igure i s fur ther reduced 
to 2700 in 1987.^^ 
However, unless the funct ions of the Sec re t a r i a t 
are d i scussed , the s t ruc tu re and composition of i t 
remain unc lear . To make i t c l e a r , functions of the UN 
Sec re t a i a t wi l l be discussed in the next chapter . 
22, See A/42/636, Agenda Item 122(a) 16 October, 1987, 
p . 6. 
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The 14081 or so, s taff members of the UK Secre-
t a r i a t , of whom about half are in New York i t s e l f , se t 
up a U.N. Civ i l se rv ice . However,the purpose and nature 
of t h e i r work and the circumstances under which they 
perform t h e i r du t i e s are in many r e spec t s so d i f f e r e n t , 
as they may not be compared with na t iona l bureaucracies 
The General Assembly a t the time of adoption of 
the r egu l a t i ons for the S e c r e t a r i a t declared t h a t : 
"The degree in which the ob jec t s of the Charter 
can be r e a l i z e d wi l l be l a rge ly determined by 
the manner in which the Sec re t a r i a t performs 
i t s t a sk" .2 
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t i s a funct ional wheel , which 
makes avai lable kinds of ass i s tance required by d i f f e r en t 
organs and agencies of the United Nations in performing 
t h e i r funct ions . There i s no appearance of the In te rna-
t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n ' s a c t i v i t y in which staff members 
of the UN S e c r e t a r i a t do not play a basic p a r t . I t i s 
accepted in the f i r s t p a r t of the repor t of the prepa-
r a t o r y Commission. The r epor t revea ls t ha t the framing 
and adoption of agreed i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s i s the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of r ep resen ta t ive members of the organ-
i z a t i o n , however, the S e c r e t a r i a t i s assigned the e s s e n t i a l 
l .See A/42/636, Agenda Item, 112(a) , Oct. 1987, p . 10. 
2.John Maclaurin, The United Nation? and power P o l i t i c s / 
(London, George Alln £. Unwin, Ltd. 1951), p . 413. 
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tasks to make ready the ground for these decisions and 
of executing them in cooperations with the members. 
There are multifarious functions which the Secre-
tariat has to perform. The first function might be 
called the role of the Parliamentary staffs so extended 
as to be effective for a parliament which work in many 
languages. It requires multifeatured servicing, such as 
interpretation, translation, minuting, drafting, reprodu-
ction of documents and provision of library facilities. 
In addition, the Secretariat make available the high -
level legal and procedural assistance to the bodies 
requirea for drawing their authority from written docu-
ments. Numerically, largest proportion of the staff of 
the Secretariat is involved in doing the work of inter-
pretation and translation and make themselves available 
round the clock, when the General Assembly in session. 
All the planning and organizational arrangements 
for various meetings and conferences fall to the secre-
tariat, as it makes available all the secretariat vvork, 
such as , the typing and reporting and taking of minute: 
and translating and sending the results to those, who 
need it. The secretariat works are required before any 
mission, meeting or conference it to be held, in gatheri: 
3. See FC/20, Section 2-B, p,86. 
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information and documenting its members on the task 
ahead of them and on the local conditions they will 
encounter. 
At every meeting of every UN organ. Secretariat 
member play their role. The visitors are impressed by 
their remarkable interpreting services* They equally 
make the journalists to be impressed by furnishing to 
the press, of brief, accurate summary records of all 
speeches almost as rapidly as the simulataneous inter-
preting. The chairman at every meeting of UU bodies 
manages one or more members of the Secretariat at his 
side in the full sessions to observe officials in the 
sub-committees. However, these unobtrusive staff members 
of the Secretariat infact involved directly or indirectly 
to a large extent in conducting the meetings. The reason 
being that they are available without any doubt with 
the rules of procedure at their fingers' ends, they 
remember the detailed course of events in former meetings 
and feed the official Chairman with the right documents, 
the right note and the right whispered wtjrd at the right 
moment. In other words, in all, n»re than a quarter of 
the Secretariat is engaged in servicing, in one way or 
another, the conference activities of the U.N. 
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4 bodie s. 
The United Nations can not achieve its objectives 
unless the peoples of the world are fully informed of 
its aims and activities. To make it possible, the 
peoples of the world must be familiar with the activi-
ties of the UK family of organizations. The UN Secre-
tariat makes the informations available to those, who 
are responsible for making policy decision in an inter-
national institution and most of the findings of experts 
or sepcialist groups such as the International Law 
Commission, the Economic Commission for Europe and this 
is also true of specialist bodies like Economic and 
Social Council, or the Trusteeship Council are based 
on information furnished by the Secretariat. This 
information is gradually making contribution in develop-
ing libraries for research purposes based on different 
set hypothe-sis in all the major fields of social, 
economic and political interest. The publications work 
of the Secretariat have gained a reputation for reliab-
ility and comprehensiveness. And praise of their efforts 
is one of the few exchanges in which all political groups 
regularly unite. 
4. H,G. Nicholas, The United Nations; as a political 
Institution(Oxford University Press, London, 1971)p.162. 
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The Secretariat makes possible to keep the world 
informed almost on all matters and happenings which 
are taking place in the United Nations* The hundreds 
of correspondents of the press, radio <=ind cinema have 
a smoothly working service at their arrangement. There 
is a very rich library and a quite remarkable documents 
file for delegates and research students. A regular 
stream of visitors, hundreds daily and a thousand or 
more during Assembly sessions, are taken on conducted 
tours, briefed on what is going on and are given seats 
in the meeting halls. The Secretarial is always available 
for a wide correspondence required by organization, 
schools, libraries and even individuals concerning any 
information, Dectures on the U^< are provided, courses 
and seminars arranged. There is enormous output of infor-
mative booklets, charts, pictures, radio scripts, film 
scripts, and mimeographed material. The journalists and 
the radio correspondents, infact inform the world what 
they observe about the activities of the United Nations 
with the approval of their employers. 
There is very much less freedom 1? given to the 
UN Information services and in addition have to be 
very much accurate Ineverything they send out, which 
soon becomes second nature to any civil servant. Itie 
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officials of the information services have to avoid any-
thing which might be taken as unfair by any government and 
inceed avoid all those things that even hints at criticism 
of governments as such. This becomes great hindrance in 
the way of functioning for the Secretariat's information 
officers, Inspite of major obstructions/ they have deve-
loped remarkable facility in producing readable descriptions 
of the complex UN machinery and many of their accounts of 
actual events are to some extent made intelligible by 
judicipus quotations from critical statements given by 
opposing government delegates. The largest single publica-
tion, the monumental Yearbook, which the Secretariat put-out, 
is a complex compilation of very concise information covering 
almost all the fields which are under the UN areas of 
activities. The detailed annual and special reports officially 
assigned to the principal UN organs are also examples of 
skilled writing of the Secretariat.However, the inability 
to estimate with and at times expose remains a sever handicap 
in more popular publications, when the reader must be under-
stood to be on wholly unfamiliar ground and can not make 
political interpretation? possible for hisiself , 
Moreover, it Is by the centralizing of information 
and by furnishing it every kind of publicity, that the UN, 
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makes i t c l e a r t o be much of i t s deepest impression upon the 
mind of the woxld outs ide i t s own conference chambers. To 
maintain i t , no single department of the S e c r e t a r i a t i s exclu-
sively concerned with, however^ i t i s a predominant a c t i v i t y 
of such departments as Trusteeship and Economic and Social 
Af fa i r s , department of Fiiblic Information, department of Conf-
erence se rv ices . Communications aod Record Serv ices , and of 
the Office of Legal Affa i rs , 
The UN S e c r e t a r i a t i s seemed t o p lay very small 
percentage of executive functions in coirparison to any nat ional 
c i v i l s e rv ice , for the obvious reason, t ha t the U»N. i s not a 
government. There are two a reas , in which i t administer ce r t a in 
executive se rv ice , of those providing t echn ica l ass is tance and 
pre-investment aid through the Expanded Programme for Technical 
Assistance (EPTA^ and the UN. Special Fund for Economic Develop-
ment(also c a l l e d - s p e c i a l Fund), The EPTA scheme i r mainly for 
providing exper t advice and ass i s tance to the under-developed 
n a t i o n - s t a t e s . And Special Fund se t up in 1958,not to provide 
funds for c a p i t a l investment, however as ft] pr«-investment a id- to 
help in research p r o j e c t s , s u r v e y s , or the provis ion of t r a in ing 
f a c i l i t i e s . Both these programmes combined i n t o single United 
Nations Development Programme(UNDP) in 1966 of which Mr.Paul 
Hoffman became administrator,One of the major problems which cane 
in the way of adminis t ra t ion of t h i s programme i s tha t of coor-
d ina t ion , the e f f i c i e n t harmonizing of the e f f o r t s of a l l 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l agencies through which the Funds resources 
5 . Ibid pp.162-163. 
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are d i s t r i b u t e d . The only body which involved in the 
execution of the Fund's p r o j e c t s lis the In ter Agency 
Consul ta t ive Board(lACS), ccroposed of the Secretary 
General and the heads of the var ious agencies twenty in 
number. 
The Jackson Report of 1969, c r i t i c i s e d the UNDF 
for being devoid of enforceable powers and having only 
few of persuas ion , There i s a l so provis ion of a Resident 
Representat ive of the UNDP in each country on a p ro jec t 
a t the loca l l e v e l , however, he i s too devoid of powers 
to compel or induce e f f ic iency . The Jackson Report made i t 
c l ea r t h a t i t might be the most corrplicated organizat ion in 
the wo^ld and made i t pub l ic the 20 per cent of deadwood 
in the opera t ion . The consequence of i t might be seen in 
the fac t t h a t the F i r ^ t Development Decade came to l a s t in 
1969 with a widening gap between r i ch and poor. And only 
twenty seven coun t r i e s out of the whole developing s t a t e s 
achieved the t a r g e t of a 5 per cent r a t e of growth, while 
many of those who more in need remained far behind. 
The S e c r e t a r i a t i s also assigned a quasi-execut ive 
function of completely d i f f e r en t na tu re , which i s discharged 
by the UN, F ie ld se rv ice . I t was e s t ab l i shed in 1949. I t i s 
a body of force having i t s own uniform. The members are not 
given arms exept to car ry side arms on spec ia l occasion. Their 
duty i s to provide t r a n s p o r t , maintain communications and 
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look after security for UN Commissions in the field. It does 
not engaged itself to take any functions of observation, 
supervision of peace~treaty or the like. However, is being 
permanently available to help any UN bodies who are so engaged. 
Managing the administrators for the United nations 
administration is an additional and most necessary function 
of the Secretariat, There were some administrative problems, 
which the UN faced in general and the Secretariat in particular 
as a gift of the circumstances in which the organization 
took the operation. The Secretariat was to be composed of , 
in 1945 and 1946 out of nothing. There were necessity, zeal, 
and hustle altogether combined to foster a recruitment rate 
so . apid that some quality was inevitably sacrificed to 
quantity. At present, however, the most sever consequences 
of these early errors have been removed by developing many 
new administrative procedures and the effluxion of time. The 
UK bureaucracy certainly remains deemed to be further improve-
ment. 
The last function of the UK Secretariat is the diplo-
matic or the political In every democracy, the civil servant, 
seemed to be a part ana parcel 6± a politician. He needs a 
politician to be his minister in the front line for all 
his political activities, whereas, the UN Civil Servant not 
6, Ibid, pp. 163-65. 
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only works without any front l ine p r o t e c t o r , what i s worse, 
he has a hundred min i s t e r s competing to i n s t r u c t and order 
him about h i s d u t i e s . Consequently, i t may r e s u l t in a 
vacuum of decis ion which, 
" i f the purposes of the Organization are to be 
r e a l i z e d , the o f f i c i a l may have to f i l l himself 
by p r a c t i s i n g tha t most de l i ca t e of a r t s , making 
pol icy without appearing to do:: so, Df course 
there wi l l be l e v e l s and hideaways in the Secret -
a r i a t where the winds of i n t e r n a - t i o n a l p o l i t i c s 
wi l l hardly be f e l t to blow, but for most of i t s 
thousand odd adminis t ra tors the complex p o l i t i c s 
of a hundred i n t e r locking s t a t e s a r e , i n g rea te r 
or l e s s e r degree, both the context and the content 
of t h e i r labour. I t i s the Secretary General himself, 
of course, for whom t h i s holds most completely, 
but the r e s t of the Sec re t a r i a t are j u s t 
h i s emanation". 7 
The functions of the Sec re t a r i a t have a l e s s dramatic 
fea ture than the ro le of the Secretary General, The scope of 
the S e c r e t a r i a t ' s work has a lso expanded as a r e s u l t of 
evolving ro l e of the secre ta ry General in var ied circumstances 
to solve the m u l t i - f a c i a l problems. To make the ro l e of the 
Secretary General indispensable , the second p a r t of the 
r epo r t of the preparatory Commission d e a l t with the Secretary 
General. The chief funct ions a l l o t ed to the Secretary General 
in one way or another by the Charter were c l a s s i f i e d by the 
Q 
preparatory Commission under the six headings. 
7. Ibid p .169, 
8. See PC/20 section 2-B, Chapter VI I I ,P . 87, 
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a) General, adminis t ra t ive and execut ive; 
b) Technical , 
c) F inanc ia l , 
d) Organization and Administration of the Secre-
t a r i a t ; 
e) p o l i t i c a l , and 
f) Representat ional 
The adminis t ra t ive ro le of the Secretary General i s 
given in a r t i c l e 97 of the Charter , which s t a t e s tha t : 
"he sha l l be the chief adminis t ra t ive of f icer 
of the Organizat ion". Ar t i c l e 98 provides tha t 
he sha l l act in h i s capaci ty as Secretary 
General at a l l meetings of the Assembly, the 
Security Council, the Economic and socia l Council, 
and the Trusteeship Councils and "shall perform 
such other functions as are en t rus ted to him by 
these organs",9 
I t necessa r i ly compelled Trygne Lie, the f i r s t 
Secretary General to t ack le the i n i t i a l adminis t ra t ive 
problems of the S e c r e t a r i a t , such as the f inanc ia l s t r uc tu r e , 
terms of employment, and s imi lar ques t ions . However, these 
adminis t ra t ive problems were dea l t with by the end of 
L i e ' s tenure of o f f i ce . By assuming h i s o f f ice as Secretary 
General, Mr, Dag Hammarskjold r e v e l e d t h a t h i s cont r ibu-
t ion would be f i r s t l y admin i s t r a t ive , more espec ia l ly in 
the socia l and economic f i e l d . To solve the adminis t ra t ive 
problems, he at the ou t se t examined thcroughly the 
9. Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M, Marcy, proposals for 
Changes in the United Nations (The Brookings i n s t i t u t i o n 
Washington, D,C. , 1955) p . 4O3. 
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structure of the Secretariat and gave a proposal for 
making referms in the structure of the secretariat, 
which was approved by the General Assembly in 19 58 with 
these reforms, most of the administrative problems concern-
ing to personnel and finance were solved, consequently, 
the post of Assistant Secretary General for Administration 
and Finance was granted to be lapsed with the retirement 
of Byron price, for reason that only a residuum of admini-
strative problems remained to be solved, which should not 
demand more than about an hour a day on the part of the 
Secretary General. And the Secretary General was seemed 
to be in a position to take that task. ^ 
The report of the preparatory Commission revealed 
that though the Secretary General would primarily delegate 
large number of his duties to his staff members, however 
the sole responsibility remained with him alone. In 
prospect of his administrative and elective duties he is 
the channel of all communications with the United Nations 
or any of its organizations. He is also able to provide 
expert technical assistance relating to the work of the 
Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council, 
10, M.W., The United Nations, International Organization 
Administration ( The Macmillan Company New York, 
Collier Macmillan Limited London ,1967)pp.147-48. 
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which clearly affect the degree in which these organi-
zations achieve their set goals. 
The Secretary General being the head of the Secre-
tariat/ appoints all staff under regulations established 
by the General Assembly (Art. lOl of the Charter) and assigns 
suitable staff to the various organizations of the United 
Nations, 
The role of the Secretary General regarding the 
administration of the Secretariat is thirstly required 
for the reason that the international civil service is still 
to recent an innovation for many men and women. They 
vocationally have engaged in the UN Secretariat and have 
to be fully molded to its special urgent needs. These 
newly appointed officials become for the most part exiles, 
living in such circumstances/ which are alien to them. 
Consequently/ the disintegrative tendencies become strong 
in an international Secretariat, To deal with these 
disintegrative tendencies, 
"a conscious effort is required to develop 
the corporate spirit capable of absorbing into 
itself the energies of the individual members 
of the Secretariat and of imparting to them 
a sense of "belonging" in order to compensate 
11, Rumki Basu/ Personnel Administration dn United Nations 
pp, 23-24. 
8! 
in some measure for t h e i r a l i ena t ion from 
t h e i r own n a t u r a l background, Thi? infusion 
of a common sense of purpose r equ i r e s a 
conscious and t i r e l e s s effort* and in the 
development of t h i s common purpose the 
leadersh ip of the secretary General i s 
v i t a l . In the absence of such l eadersh ip 
each department/ even each d iv i s ion or 
Section, may tend to become a segregated 
area in i t s e i f , taking i t s Character to only 
too g rea t an ex ten t from the q u a l i t i e s of 
i t s head". 12 
I t i s in the p o l i t i c a l sphere t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the Secretary General and the S e c r e t a r i a t , re fe r red 
to a t the s t a r t has been most d i s t i n c t . I t i s known to 
a l l t h a t in any na t iona l government, the prime Minister 
does hot frequently t ake , the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y under h i s own 
d i r e c t i o n , of the predominant ro le in the formulation and 
conduct of foreign pol icy except in circumstances of 
na t iona l c r i s i s . Vvhere as in an In t e rna t i ona l s e c r e t a r i a t , 
the tendency of the Secretary General to keep the d i r ec t ion 
of p o l i t i c a l mat te r s with himself and to discharge h i s 
d u t i e s through c o l l a b o r a t o r s well known to him and Specially 
se lec ted by him i s necessa r i ly even more c l e a r . At most i t 
i s the nature of h i s personal a b i l i t y to have the confidence 
. ••'' ^ of governments in h i s conduct of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . 
12. M.W. The United Nations, In t e rna t iona l Organization 
and Administrat ion, p .149. 
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One thing is clear that the Secretary General has discharged 
the political duties given to him by the Charter to a far 
less degree through the ordinary machinery of the Secretariat 
13 than in other fields. 
The charter of the United Nations has allowed 
the Secretary General to assum his political role under 
article 99/ which authorizes him to "bring to the attention 
of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may 
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security". 
Being chief officer of the Secretariat, he too draws consider 
able political power from the fact that Article 7 establi-
shes the Secretariat one of the "Principal organs of the 
United Nations". 
Other legal power given to the Secretary General 
which can be used as a political Influence by him if he 
has a strong will to do so is found in Article 98, that he 
must sut*nlt an annual report to the General Assembly regarding 
the work of the Organization, and in Article 100, which 
makes it clear that the Secretary-General and his staff members 
are not to seek or receive instructions from any government 
or from any other authority external to the organization. 
Although the Secretary General has been given a 
wide range and strong basis by the Charter to exercise his 
13. Ibid. pp. 156-57. 
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political influence than the Covenant of the League of 
Nations provided the Secretary General, however, the 
question arises whether he should be a general manager 
or a leader with political influence was, still indistinct 
14 
according to one study. Consequently, the proposed 
suggestions were accepted at the San Francisco Conference 
to require that the Secretary General of the United 
Nations should bring peace and Security matters to the 
attention of the Security Council, and the General Assembly 
as well. However, the final decision was taken for his 
authority in this respect would be permissive rather mandatory 
and would be applied only to the Security Council and to 
the General Assembly. Moreover, the Preparatory Commission 
of the United Nations described this authority as a quite 
special right which went beyond any power previously given 
to the head of an international organization.^ 
Despite some ambiguous language of the Charter 
regarding the nature of the duties of the Secretary General, 
the opinion has been made that : 
There was wisdom in their conclusion to 
entrust the solution to the process of 
growth and experiment. But at the same time 
the general direction of the desired evolution 
14, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,The United 
Nations Secretariat (1950)p,li, 
15. See Doc. PC/20(1945) pp. 86-87, 
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was c l e a r l y ind ica ted : the Secretary 
General of the United Nations i s intended 
to be a more powerful o f f i c i a l than was 
the Secretary-General of the League".16 
Trygve Lie, the f i r s t Secretary General at the 
ou t s e t , took immediate s t eps to develop the p o l i t i c a l 
powers of the o f f i ce . According to one analys t . Lie 
made i t c l e a r t ha t h i s time and energy should be devoted 
to p o l i t i c a l negot ia t ions in the i n t e r e s t s of the world 
peace, and tha t the adminis t ra t ive ro l e of h i s author i ty 
17 should be delegated to a s s i s t a n t s . Lie himself has said 
t h a t when he took o f f i ce , he was adamant t h a t the Secretary 
General should be a force for peace. However, he opined 
tha t the influence he might exer t would be a moral power 
r a t h e r than a physical one, and the Secretary General 
should be more the general than the Secretary. Nevertheless , 
Lie did not c l a r i f y t h a t where the d iv i s ion would be made 
18 between the general and the Secretary . 
Consequently, the L i e ' s term of off ice was 
c r i t i c i s e d at the ou t s e t when the second Secretary General 
Dag Hammars Kjold assumed the charge of off ice on the 
p l e a t h a t the Sec re t a r i a t had lacked e f fec t ive leadership 
16. Carnegie EndovvTnent for I n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. The United 
Nations S e c r e t a r i a t p .11 
17. Waldo Chamberlin, "Strengthening the Sec re ta r i a t jAnalysi 
and Proposi t ion" (Annals of the American Academy of 
p o l i t i c a l and Social Science, Vol, 296 (1954) p ,131 . 
18. Francis 0. Wilcox and Carl M, Marcy, proposals for 
ghanges in the United Nations, 1955,pp. 405-6. 
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for seven years, with the resul t of deterioration of 
off ic ia l morale. The new Secretary General was seemed 
to give more attention to the administrative problems 
than p o l i t i c a l and l a t t e r one might be delegated to his 
19 under-secretaries . At the very moment, the decision 
of the General Assembly in the fa l l of 1954 in giving 
Hammarskjold responsibi l i ty for acting on behalf of the 
Organization in i t s effor ts to make possible the release 
of American flyers held by the Chinese communists indicates 
the importance of the p o l i t i c a l influence vested in the 
office of the Secretary General, Despite i t , the Secretary 
General opined that his role was not as what had been 
described "a third l ine" in the international debate. Neither 
i t was for him to i n i t i a t e compromises that might encroach 
upon the areas that should be exclusively within the j u r i s -
diction of responsibi l i ty of the respective national govern -
ments. Moreover, in the Second decade of the existence of 
the United Nations, the role of the Secretary General came 
to be real ised with remarkable rapidity the centre point 
of internat ional ac t i v i t i e s of a re la t ive ly novel feature, 
added by the c r i s i s of Octo ber 1956, '/.hich gave r ise to 
the circumstances in which the p o l i t i c a l forces required 
the Secretary General as thei r ca ta ly t ic agent. The experience< 
19.Doc..V273l(Sept, 21,1954) p. 5. 
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which the Secretary General gained from th is c r i s i s was 
proved to be very helpful in l a te r c r i ses . However, the 
new p o l i t i c a l obligations of the office necessarily had a 
basic claim on the responsibi l i ty of the Secretary General 
and some how his increasing close re la t ions with national 
governments and delegations were achieved at the cost 
of greater remoteness from the generali ty of the Secretariat 
He himself came to be realized that th i s was so, and i t i s 
s ignificant that his l a s t speech, on September 8,1961, was 
a speech to his own off ic ia l members: 
m 
Undoubtedly, if the secre tar ia t i s to 
laintain a l ively sense of unity, i t i s 
essent ia l for any Secretary General to 
ensure that h is office functions as a 
center from which the sense of purpose ^n 
and dedication permeates the ent i re staff. 
In la ter c r i s i s , par t icu lar ly in Iran-Iraq war, 
i t was the only resu l t of the effor ts of the Secretary 
General, Peres de Cuellor, the eight years war of uncomp-
romising at t i tude of both sides came to end in 1988. 
These are various major problems, the UN 
Secretariat has beening facing since i t s creation some of 
these problems are studied in coming chapter V. 
20. M. W. / The United Nation?, International Organization 
and Administration, p.148, 
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C H A P T E R - V 
MAJOR PROBLEMS 
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1, RECRUITMENT AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT 
Any international body by its very nature 
experiencies recruitment and organizational problems, 
which are more complex than its national counterpart. In 
the case-^ of the United Nations, the root problems are 
accentuated by others, which are unique to it. Any study 
of UN Secretariat must begin with the realization of 
the fact that its development over the last forty five 
years has affected, in many respects, its present structure, 
methods of work, recruitment and staffing problems. 
It must be recognised in the beginning that 
perhaps the most sever challenge lies in recruitment to 
the professional grades and above. The solitary most 
urgent need of the Secretariat is to improve the quality 
of the officials in the lower professional grades, who 
would, in course of time, become the senior executives of 
the Organization, 
The problem reduced to its roots, is one of 
attracting and retaining the most competent staff for 
international service Recruitment, although the most impor-
tant, is also the most complicated and difficult of the 
functions assigned to the personnel administration of an 
93 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l organiza t ion . There are many hindrances in 
addi t ion to the geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n requirements 
which ser ious ly affect recrui tment p o l i c i e s . The reason i s 
t h a t in most of the na t iona l s e rv i ces , there are accepted 
s tandards of entrance and the majority of r e c r u i t e d s ta f f 
begin t h e i r career on the ba s i s of c e r t a i n c l ea r l y specified 
p o i n t s . I t i s upon these root standards and common out set 
po in t s t h a t t h e i r subsequent career i ? based. None of these 
f ac to r s apply in the case of the UN Sec re t a r i a t , 
There are two aspects of problems, which the UN 
S e c r e t a r i a t has been facing in the f i e ld of recrui tment , 
since i t s es tabl ishment . The f i r s t i s methods and the second, 
which i s most important , concern the nature of the career 
t h a t i s being offer<-d. Regarding the quest ion of r e c r u i t -
ment method i t must be noted t h a t , in genera l , recrui tment 
to the Sec re t a r i a t has been conducted in an unimaginative 
and adhoc manner, a c r i t i c i s m , which has been " ra ised 
by many Reports on S e c r e t a r i a t r eorgan iza t ion , time 
and again. These problems can be b e t t e r understood with 
the study of the basic p r i n c i p l e s governing the recruitment 
1, Rumki Basu, Fersotnnel Administration in United Nations, 
pp 49-50. 
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pol icy of the United Nations, which are mentioned in 
Ar t i c l e lOl of the Charter . Paragraph 1 of tha t Ar t i c le 
r evea l s t h a t ; 
"The staff shal l be ^ p o i n t e d by the 
Secretary General under r egu la t i ons 
es tab l i shed by the General Assembly. " 
The two major p r i n c i p l e s which govern the employment of the 
s taf f under Ar t i c l e lOi are mentioned in i t s paragraph 3 as 
follow: 
"The paramount cons idera t ion in the 
employment of the staff and in the 
determinat ion of the condi t ions of 
service sha l l be the necess i ty of 
securing the h ighes t s tandards of 
e f f i c iency , competence and i n t e g r i t y . 
Due regard sha l l be paid to the impor-
tance of r e c r u i t i n g the s taff on as _ 
wide a geographical b a s i s as p o s s i b l e " . 
These p r i n c i p l e s are applicable to the whole s taff of the 
Organizat ion, whether appointed by the Secretary General 
or by o ther o f f i c i a l s to whom such author i ty has been 
delegated by or with the approval of the General Assembly. 
Trygve Lie, the f i r s t Secretary General of the 
United Nations, observed in h i s r epo r t to the t h i r d session 
2. See Doc. A/C 5/35/36 Agenda Item 98(a) p . 2. 
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of the General Assembly on the compo s i t i on of the secre-
t a r i a t and the p r i n c i p l e of geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , 
t h a t 
"Rightly understood, the ca rd ina l 
p r i n c i p l e of geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n 
i s not t h a t nationals of a pai r t icular 
na t ion shouldihave a spec i f ied number of 
p o s t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r grade or grades , or 
t h a t they should receive in salary as a 
group a p a r t i c u l a r percentage of the t o t a l 
out lay in s a l a r i e s , but t h a t , in the f i r s t 
p lace , the adminis t ra t ion should be s a t i s -
f ied tha t the Sec re t a r i a t i s enriched by 
the experience and cu l tu re which each 
Member nat ion can furnish and t h a t each 
Menber nat ion should, in i t s t u rn , be 
s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t s own cu l tu re and philosophy 
make a fu l l con t r ibu t ion to the S e c r e t a r i a t " . 3 
In 1976, Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary General 
of the United Nations submitted a r epo r t to the General 
Assembly in which he examined the Implementation of various 
proposals of J o i n t Inspect ion Unit(JlU) and the Adminis-
t r a t i v e Management Service (AKS), I t was concerning to 
recrui tment including a long-term recrui tment p lan, the 
r o s t e r ( i . e . l i s t showing work with t h e i r du t i e s in turn) 
of candidates and the use of competi t ive examinations and 
Select ion procedures . The repor t observed t h a t a long-
term recrui tment plan was prepared to serve as a tool for 
es t imat ing the annual recrui tment requirements for 
consuming the number of na t iona l s of each Member S ta tes , 
3. Off ic ia l Recrods of the General Assembly, Third Session, 
Annexes, agenda item 40(.V'652), para 7. 
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in post subject to geographical distribution, within 
its desirable range within a five year period. However, 
its utility proved to be limited due to its political 
and technical reasons: many of the states, whose members 
were over-represented continued to seek the recruitment 
of their nationals. And it was technically difficult to 
predict the number of posts required over the succeding 
five years/ could not be forecast actually due to budget 
size, scale of assessments changes and increases in member-
ship were uncertain. In addition, a number of delegates, 
including those of the west Germany and Japan opined that 
the recruitment process was too slow, sometimes prompting 
qualified candidates to withdraw their applications, as had 
happened with some successful candidates in recent compe-
titive examinations for junior Professional Posts. J^an 
held the view for it that, as the Office of Personnel 
Services deemed to have difficulties in finding the data 
relating posts for these candidates. And to 
make it possible, there was need for a change in the rela-
tionship between the substantive departments and the 
office of Personnel Services, which must be strengthened,^ 
4, See Y,U,N., 1976 ,pp. 70-72, 
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The primary means to achieve a Sec re t a r i a t in 
conformity with the requirements of the Charter and the 
purposes set before by the General Assembly, i s the form-
u l a t i o n and appl ica t i on of a systematic approach to 
recrui tment on both a long-term and a short- term b a s i s . 
The long-term approach i s se t by measures designed to 
meet continuing ob jec t ives and to develop methods aimed 
at enhancing and modernizing recrui tment a c t i v i t i e s . The 
shor t - term approach i s taken pr imar i ly to the urgent 
purposes es tab l i shed by the General Assebly with respec t 
to the recrui tment of n a t i o n a l s of Member S ta tes which 
are unrepresented or under-represented, and of women. 
The fundamental aspects of recrui tment a c t i v i t i e ; 
are described as follows: 
a) Vacancy p ro jec t ion ; 
b) Recruitment monitoring system; 
c) vacancy announcement and p u b l i c i t y , 
d) Methods to achieve balanced d i s t r i b u t i o n by 
n a t i o n a l i t y and by sex; and 
e) Establishment of pools of su i t ab le candidates 
by occupational group. 
The p ro jec t ion of vacancies i s seemed to be the 
most important of recrui tment methods. I t s object ive i t to 
iden t i fy , in advance, the nature and approxliiate number 
of p o s t s in the p rofess iona l category and above to be 
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f i l l e d by recrui tment each year, taking in to account the 
nature of human resources required for the Sec re t a r i a t , 
This system has been used since 1979, in confirmation of 
r e so lu t i on 33/143 of the General Assembly, to issue semi-
annual vacancy b u l l a t i n s containing a statement of a l l 
ex i s t i ng vacancies including a l l those expected to a r i s e 
in the course of the following year . 
To make the planning of recrui tment procedure 
e f f ec t i ve , complete information i s required r e l a t i n g to the 
number and nature of vacancies , t h e i r recrui tment s t a t u s , 
and the n a t i o n a l i t y and sex of prospect ive candida tes . This 
information i s cu r r en t l y avai lable only through a manually 
maintained r epor t on the s t a t u s of rec ru t i tment t ha t does not 
make su f f i c i en t to monitor ove r - a l l recrui tment a c t i v i t i e s . 
To Improve monitoring system, a new computerized system 
i s being designed to produce the r epo r t on the s t a tu s of 
recru i tment . 
A vacancy announcement with a summary of the 
corresponding job desc r ip t ion i s issued by the Office of 
Personnel Service as soon as a pos t l i e s vacant for r ec ru -
i tment, except in cases in which a su i t ab l e candidate from 
the r o s t e r i s i d e n t i f i e d or when the pos t i s reserved for 
spec i f ic purposes such as the recrui tment of na t i ona l s of 
unrepresented and under-represented Member s t a t e s and 
women or for competi t ive examinations for pos t s at the P-1 
99 
and P-2 levels . The system of announcement and publici ty 
of vacancies is seemed to be an extremely important means 
for the Secretariat to receive applications from suitable 
candidates, par t icular ly those fu l f i l l ing the specific 
needs of the General Assembly. 
To make i t working* l i s t s have been prepared of 
research ins t i tu t ions and univers i t ies which could serve 
as the means of candidates and vacancy announcements are 
sent to them. Publicity at un ivers i t i es is meant for students 
without work experience who are predominantly suitable for 
posts at the P-1 and P-2 levels and as per rule , these posts 
are f i l l ed through competitive examinations organized on a 
national basis , 
Ihe General Assembly in resolution 35/210, reque-
sted the Secretary General to continue to make a target of 
4O per cent of a l l vacancies arising in professional posts 
subject to geographical d is t r ibut ion during 1981-82 period 
for the appointment of nationals of unrepresented and under-
represented s ta tes to achieve the i r desirable ranges while 
maintaining the desirable ranges already achieved by other 
countries. And to take necessary steps to increase the 
number of women in posts subject to geographical dis tr ibut ion 
to 25 per cent in accordance with the principle of equitable 
geographical d is t r ibut ion . There are many problems which 
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make hindrance in the system. As many member s t a t e s at 
p resen t can offer b e t t e r service condi t ions than the 
United Nations, In addition^ there i s also a number of s ta te 
whose requirements for t h e i r own qua l i f i ed personnel to 
a s s i s t in t h e i r development are so g rea t t h a t recrui tment 
of t h e i r na t i ona l s must be conducted with extreme care to 
secure the se rv ices of t h e i r bes t cadres . For 
t h i s / the S e c r e t a r i a t should t ry to reach some mutually 
bene f i c i a l arrangement with the Governments of the s t a t e s . 
In the context of recrui tment the concept of 
occupations and occupat ional groups i s used to ident i fy 
and e s t a b l i s h pools of candidates with conparable q u a l i f i -
ca t ions / experience and s k i l l s ^ s u i t a b l e for p o r t s within 
a given occupational group. However, the Secretary General 
has considered t h a t the actual recrui tment should continue 
to be done on a post-by pos t b a s i s , to ensure the special 
requirements of each p o s t for p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
experience or s k i l l s . 
The s taf f unions and assoc ia t ions of the United 
Nations S e c r e t a r i a t made i t c l ea r in a r epo r t to the Fifth 
Committee through the secre tary General, t h a t 1981 competitive 
examinations had experienced some recur r ing problems such 
5. See Doc, A/36/495, Agenda Item 107 pp,16-19. 
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as de lays in marking papers , r e s i s t a n c e from departments in 
accepting successful candidates , in t roduct ion of ejfpost-
facto requirements, and encumbrance of some pos t s reserved 
for the candidates by General Service Staff with Special 
pos t allowances. 
The In te rna t iona l Civi l Service Commission at i t s 
20th session held in New York from 5 to 27 July 1984 
examined and considered i s sues r e l a t i n g to recrui tment 
po l i cy for the employment of the UN o f f i c i a l s . The f i r s t 
s tep which the Commission took was to ensure a l l provis ions 
of A r t i c l e 101 of the Charter , To make i t pos s ib l e , the 
Commission considered tha t communication s k i l l s , empathy 
towards o ther cu l t u r e s and an i n s t i t u t i o n bui lding o r i en -
t a t i o n were q u a l i t i e s tha t could con t r ibu te e f fec t ive ly 
to the success of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l se rvan t s , and i t 
concluded t h a t the use of in te rv iews was an e f fec t ive 
means of e s t ab l i sh ing the presence of such q u a l i t i e s 
in candida tes for employment. They fur ther recommended 
t h a t academic equivalencies proposed by UNESCO be made 
ava i lab le to recrui tment s p e c i a l i s t in a l l o rganiza t ions . 
I t a lso considered a document prepared by CCAQ in which, 
i t was c l a r i f i e d t ha t the ro l e of Select ion bodies in 
6. See YUN, 1982, p . 1462. 
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the recruitment and promotion of staff was to provide a 
balance between the filling of posts from internal and 
external sources, taking into account both the broad 
interests of the organizations as well as the career 
interests of staff. Further, the Commission recommended 
that the orgainzations conduct formal examinations for 
the recruitment of all interpreters, translators, editors 
and proof readers against continuing established language-
related posts, with the full involvement of both the sub-
stantive office and the personnel depai'tment concerned. 
The International Civil Service Commission at 
its 22nd session held in New York from 8 to 26 July 1985, 
considered the document prepared by CCAQ in which it was 
stated that such examinations which deemed to be a recruit-
ment tool would not be feasible for the common system 
as a whole. The Chairman of CCAQ opined that all selections 
were the result of some competitive process. Ke mentioned 
that many organizations held competitive examinations for 
language staff. He asserted that among the reasons why 
examinations in many of the agencies were the exception 
.rather than rule were the following- the agencies' ' 
6.See Doc. A/39/30 pp.52-53. 
103 
functions were spec ia l i zed ; s taff s u i t a b l e for t h e i r 
pos t s were very few in number, with highly technica l 
s k i l l s and often considerable experience and sen io r i t y ; 
and competit ive examinations as a means of r e c r u i t i n g 
for j u n i o r - l e v e l p o s t s could be d i sp ropor t iona te ly cos t ly . 
The f e a s i b i l i t y of producing an examination free from 
7 
c u l t u r a l b i a s was also r a i sed . 
In March 1986, the Chairman of CCAQ held h i s 
views regarding the r o s t e r system as well as the obs tac les 
to e f fec t ive r o s t e r bui ld ing tha t most o rgan iza t ions would 
not consider i t useful to e s t ab l i sh a l ink between t h e i r 
individual r o s t e r codes and the Common C la s s i f i c a t i on of 
Occupational Group (CCOG)/ the reason was t h a t they did not 
find the CCOG re l evan t to t h e i r needs. The organiza t ions 
also found problemat ical the recommendation regarding 
recording an appl ican ts wi l l ingness to serve to a p a r t i c u l a r 
duty s t a t i o n , since i t might pre judice oppor tun i t i e s at 
8 a l a t e r da t e . 
The suspension of recruitment introduced on 21 
March 1986 as part of the response to the financial difficu-
lties of the Organization had left temporarily the Secretary 
7. see Doc, A/40/30, 1985, p. 64. 
8, See Doc. A/41/30, 1986, p. 51. 
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General without h i s most important means to influence 
d i r e c t l y the conposi t ion of the s ta f f by n a t i o n a l i t y and 
9 
sex. 
The key to successful recrui tment i s ca reer 
development/ which i s l i k e l y to be taken for c r i t i c a l 
comparative s t u i e s in the next t op i c -ca ree r versus fixed 
term appointments. 
9.See Doc A/42/636/ Agenda Item 122(a) p . 8 . 
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2. CAREER VERSUS FIXED TERK APPOINTMENTS 
In t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s S e c r e t a r i a t , t h e o f f i c i a l s 
a p p o i n t e d on p e r m a n e n t b a s i s t o make t h e i r c a r e e r s t a b l e 
a r e t e r m e d a s c a r e e r b a s e d s t a f f a p p o i n t e d f o r p e r i o d s of 
l e s s t h a n f i v e y e a r s a r e r e f e r r e d t o a s " f i x e d t e r m " s t a f f . 
The v a r i o u s a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o u r of p e r m a n e n t 
a p p o i n t m e n t s were f i r s t c o n c i s e l y s p e l l e d , o u t by t h e 
p r e p a r a t o r y Commission a s e a r l y as i n 1945 t h a t : 
U n l e s s members of t h e s t a f f c a n be o f f e r e d 
some a s s u r a n c e of b e i n g a b l e t o make t h e i r 
c a r e e r s i n t h e S e c r e t a r i a t , many of t h e 
b e s t c a n d i d a t e s from a l l c o u n t r i e s w i l l 
i n e v i t a b l y be k e p t away. Nor c a n members of 
t h e s t a f f be e x p e c t e d f u l l y t o s u b o r d i n a t e 
t h e s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r c o u n t r i e s t o 
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i f t h e y a r e m e r e l y 
d e t a c h e d t e m p o r a r i l y from n a t i o n a l a d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n s and r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t upon them f o r t h e i r 
f u t u r e . F i n a l l y , i t i s i m p o r t a n t t h a t t h e 
a d v a n t a g e s of e x p e r i e n c e s h o u l d be s e c u r e d and 
sound a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t r a d i t i o n s e s t a b l i s h e d 
w i t h i n t h e S e c r e t a r i a t . 2 
Thus f o r t h e r e a s o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r and l o y a l t y 
of t h e o f f i c i a l s and i n d e p e n d e n t from n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s , 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e m a j o r i t y Of t h e s t a f f s h o u l d be 
c o n s i s t o f p e r s o n s who w i l l make t h e i r c a r e e r i n t h e 
S e c r e t a r i a t . However, r e q u i r e m e n t s of g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u -
t i o n of t h e s t a f f , t h e n e e d f o r t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e i n 
1 . R o b e r t W.Gregg and M i c h a e l B a r k u n , The U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
5 v s t e m and i t s F u n c t i o n c: ( A f f i l i a t e d E a s t -Wes t P r e s s 
P v t . L t d . , N e w D e l h i , 1968) p . 228 , : 
2 . See UN Doc. F C / 2 0 , p , 9 2 . 
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c e r t a i n f i e l d s and the d e s c r i a b i l i t y o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g 
r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e S e c r e t a r i a t and n a t i o n a l a d m i n i s -
t r a t i o n s , were t h e a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d i n f a v o u r o f f i x e d 
t e r m a p p o i n t m e n t s . I t was a l s o a c c e p t e d from t h e v e r y 
b e g i n n i n g t h a t t h e s e n i o r mos t a s s i s t a n t s o f t h e S e c r e t a r y 
G e n e r a l s h o u l d be f i x e d t e r m a p p o i n t e e s o n l y . 
The p r o p o r t i o n s of S e c r e t a r i a t s t a f f w i t h f i x e d 
t e rm c o n t r a c t s i n 1950s was l e s s t h a n 20 p e r c e n t / 1960s 
saw t h e p r o p o r t i o n i n c r e a s e c j s t e a d i l y and by 1 9 7 5 , i t was 
o v e r a t h i r d o f t h e t o t a l , At p r e s e n t i t v a r i e s b e t w e e n 
31 and 38 p e r c e n t . 
By R e s o l u t i o n 1 3 ( 1 ) / t h e G e n e r a l Assembly a c c e p t e d 
a l m o s t t h e g u i d e l i n e s made by t h e P r e p a r a t o r y Commiss ion . 
The g u i d e l i n e s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t s t a f f members who c o m p l e t e d 
t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d wer^ t o be p r o v i d e d c o n t r a c t s f o r 
an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d , s u b j e c t o n l y t o a r e v i e w eve ry f i v e 
y e a r s on t h e b a s i s of r e p o r t s by t h e i r s u p e r v i s o r s . A s s i s -
t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s G e n e r a l and o t h e r p r i n c i p a l h i g h e r o f f i c e r s 
w e r e , however , t o be a p p o i n t e d u n d e r c o n t r a c t s , f o r a 
maximum p e r i o d of f i v e y e a r s i n t h e b e g i n n i n g , w i t h t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y of r e n e w a l , hJoreover t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s 
p r a c t i c e h a s been t o r e c r u i t s h o r t - t e r m p e r s o n n e l t o 
a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t from u n i v e r s i t i e s , r e s e a r c h i n s t i t u -
t i o n s , and p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l f i r m s and t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t 
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from na t iona l c i v i l se rv ices on the b a s i s of spcondment. 
Dag Hammarskjold^ the second Secretary General 
of the United Nations made h i s emphasis in 1955 on the 
need to appoint the majority of o f f i c i a l s on a permanent, 
career bas i s for maintaining high s tandards of ef f ic iency 
in the S e c r e t a r i a t . At the same moment, he also agreed to 
a provis ion for a fixed number of p o s t s being f i l l e d by 
short term appointments of s taff made ava i lab le from 
na t iona l service and o ther i n s t i t u t i o n s to f u l f i l the 
ob jec t ives of Ar t i c l e 101(3) of the Char ter . He also 
opined t h a t the fixed term appointments would give the 
S e c r e t a r i a t the advantages of a quicker turnover , without 
s ac r i f i c i ng the elements of s t a b i l i t y provided by a 
career se rv ice . 
The Salary Review Committee es tab l i shed in 19 55 
by General Assembly Resolution 975(x) a lso made I t s view 
to the advantages to be gained by having a group of 
Civi l Servants working in government se rv ices a f te r having 
4 
served for some time in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t . 
U. Thant, the t h i r d Secretary General of the 
United Nations, in a r epor t to the General Assembly in 
3. Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United Nations 
pp. 58-59. 
4. see A/3209, 11 GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 51 pp. 14-15, 
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1963 expressed t h a t the steady increase in the propor-
t ion of fixed term s t a f f was due to the concentrated 
rec ru i tmen t s e f f o r t s in under or unrepresented 
member s t a t e s , where candidates for ca reer appointments 
had been d i f f i c u l t to ge t . However, some fixed term 
appointments of these count r i es , converted subsequently 
5 
to ca ree r appointments. On the o ther hand, the United 
State r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the F i f th Committee s ta ted in 
19 63 t h a t : 
"The proport ion of fixed-term c o n t r a c t s 
was not a matter of percentage only: i t 
was a v i t a l l y se r ious mat ter , as i t 
could eventual ly destroy the career 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s taff , which must be the , 
backbone of an e f fec t ive United Nat ions" , 
However, the r ep resen ta t ions of develop4-ng 
n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y , African gave t h e i r view from 
the same platform of F i f th Committee, while j u s t i f y i n g 
shor t - te rm appointments t h a t a t the presen t stage 
of t h e i r development, when g rea t e f f o r t s to improve 
economic and soc ia l condi t ions required the con t r ibu t ion 
of a l l ava i l ab le human resources , they hardly could make 
i t poss ib le to r e l ease t h e i r o f f i c i a l s to be appointed 
7 
as a permanent careers in the United Nation Secretariat. 
5. See A/C 5/987 18 GACR, Agenda Item 66.p.5. 
6. General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Committee 
(18th session),p. 162 
7. Ibid, p.189. 
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At the same point, P.M. Charnyshev of the Soviet 
Q 
Union made it clear in 1962 that his delegation 
was against the whole principle of permanent contracts 
and A. A. Roschin also the Soviet representative on 
the Fifth Committee gave proposal in 19 63 that 25 per 
cent of the Secretariat should be permanent and 75 per-
9 
cent fixed term. 
Moreover, some senior staff members of the 
Secretariat who pa-rticipated in the sixth Annual 
Stanely Foundation Conference on United Nations 
Procedures, in 1975, challenged the traditional view 
that Immunization from outside influences was guaranteed 
by the Security of tenure under permanent service. They 
made it clear that dedication to the purposes of the 
international organization was evident both in officials 
holding career appointments, as well as those who were 
serving on a fixed term basis. Ihere was no unity of 
view on the question of the correlation between efficiency 
and appointments policy while some participants argued 
that a higher rate of reduced efficiency among career 
staff over time, partly for the reason of the difficulty 
8. Fifth Committee (17th Session) p.216. 
9. Ibid. (18th session) p.168. 
no 
of reass igning such s taf f to new f i e l d s work and to the 
p ro t ec t i on provided them through secur i ty of t enure , 
o the r s emphasised the inev i tab ly slow process of s e t t l i n g 
in a new job, and the lov;ered ef f ic iency inherent in 
10 
a f ixea term appointment, 
CCAQ made i t c l e a r while p resen t ing a document 
giving the o rgan iza t ions general views on the matter 
of career development, t h a t considerable v a r i a t i o n s in the 
p ropor t ions of fixea -term and permanent s taf f ex i s ted 
among the o rgan iza t ions r e l a t i n g to t h e i r d i f f e r ing needs. 
The reason being t h a t some programmes needed a cont inual 
input of up- to-date t echn ica l s k i l l s bes t provided by 
fixed term s taf f , while po l i cy , adminis t ra t ion and regul -
atory functions were bes t performed with the body of 
knowledge, information and experience acquired only by 
career s ta f f . Thus i t seemed to be impract ical to lay 
down any immutable r u l e s on t h i s subjec t . 
The In t e rna t i ona l Civ i l Service Commission 
expressed i ts views at i t s 13th session held in 1981 
10, Report of the s ix th Annual Stanley Conference on United 
Nations Procec.ures 1975, pp. 11-12. 
11 . See UN Doc. A/34/30, p ,64 . 
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t h a t the In te r -o rgan iza t ion Transfer Agreement served 
well as a mechanism for f a c i l i t a t i n g the adminis t ra t ive 
aspects of i n t e ro rgan iza t ion exchange and should 
cont inue to be applied as an adminis t ra t ive instrument. 
However, the commission concluded t h a t the Agreement 
did not promote i n t e r organizat ion exchange, an object ive 
which the Commission had previously se t / and t h a t some 
instrument which would p o s i t i v e l y promote auch exchange 
was requi red . 
At s ix teen th session of the In t e rna t iona l Civi l 
Service Commission held in 1982, the coordinator of 
CCISU pointedout while present ing a statement on career 
development and r e l a t e d items t h a t ca ree r development 
had to be seen as a fundamental p a r t of human resources 
planning to increase the pool of s k i l l s , ef f ic iency 
p r o d u c t i v i t y ana out put of the organ iza t ion . For t h i s 
a system wide approach should be made to increase the 
pool of resources and fur ther the uniformity of 
p r a c t i c e s and allow for long-range so lu t ions to the 
problems of ine f f i c iency , misa l loca t ion of resources 
and decreasing s ta f f morale. The CCISU also expressed 
12. see, UN Doc, V36 /30 , p , 73. 
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i t s alarming concern at the growing use of fixed term 
c o n t r a c t s over extended per iods of time , Consequently/ 
the r e s u l t being uncer ta in ty and lack of long-range 
planning ivhich was detr imental to both the s taf f and 
management. To improve system, the committee confirmed 
the recommendation of the ICSC s e c r e t a r i a t t h a t a career 
appointment be granted to s taf f members completing five 
13 yea r s of s e r v i c e . 
The key to successful recru i tment i s career 
development and when the organiza t ion of the United 
Nations system had been setup, i t had been expected tha t 
the S e c r e t a r i a t s v/ould be pr imar i ly a career serv ice , 
on the p a t t e r n of the pre-war league of Nations and 
In t e rna t i ona l Labour Office, However, a genuine career 
system had in p r a c t i c e never ex i s t ed in the organizat ions 
of the un i t ed Nations family, i t being accepted t h a t 
high l e v e l p o s i t i o n s would for the most p a r t be f i l l e d 
by non-career o f f i c i a l s and some pos t s being always 
reserved for s t a f f serving on a shor t term b a s i s . In 
recen t years var ious f a c t o r s had reinforced tha t t rend, 
such as the increas ingly spec ia l i zed and technica l nature 
13. See UN Doc A/37/30, 1982, pp. 76-77. 
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of the a c t i v i t i e s of many of the o rgan iza t ions , the 
admission of a large number of new I'^ ernber S ta tes 
which got r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the S e c r e t a r i a t s and the 
unv/il l ingness of some Member S ta tes t o allow t h e i r 
t a l en ted n a t i o n a l s to serve on a permanent b a s i s . 
A decreasing propor t ion of s taf f was serving on 
permanent appointments and the concept of t rue career 
development was fur ther l imi ted by such tendency of 
en t ry in to the s e c r e t a r i a t s to be made increas ing ly 
a t the middle, r a t h e r than lower l e v e l s and for 
ou ts ide appointments to be made not only a t the highest 
l e v e l s but increas ing ly a t the next lower l e v e l s . 
lb make the system e f f e c t i v e , some t e n t a t i v e 
suggest ions i s deemed to be f r u i t f u l on t h i s i s sue . The 
s e c r e t a r i a t s should ident i fy the areas in which the 
advantages of s t a b i l i t y and con t inu i ty are most important 
of 
and must keep the appointment^econded o f f i c i a l s in these 
area to a minimum, and in the l i k e manner, in the areas 
where seconded o f f i c i a l s might be aijle to play a more 
useful r o l e , ca reer o f f i c i a l s appointments should be 
kept to a minimum. Fur ther , the scope of secondment 
should be widened to include i n s t i t u t i o n s in addi t ion 
to na t iona l c i v i l s e rv i ces , such as u n i v e r s i t i e s and 
i n d u s t r i e s . 
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In the case of securing high performance by 
the staff collectively, it can be achieved through 
higher standards , and better methods of recruitment 
and the use of efficient management practices. That is 
the reason why a five year rotation of posts has been 
suggested as one of the methods for recruitment of 
officials. It will give the Secretary General more flexi-
bility in terminating or minimising programmes which are 
obsolete, marginal or of limited use, and in not exten-
ding contracts of officials whose performance is not 
upto the mark required. There will aJ.so be no need for 
costly training of permanent contract holders, so as to 
make them fit for new programmes since fresh talents 
who meet the job description and requirements could be 
easily recruited. 
Five year rotation of personnel will . also 
make it possible to end post levels and thus eliminate 
"grade creep" . The long traditional practice of 
upgrading the levels of posts without the expansion 
of the incjumbents functions has become as grade-creep' 
In most cases such promotions are the only rewards for 
long service. And the Secretariat has estimated some 
93 million additional costs over the last 20 years on 
this practice. 
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The b ra in -d ra in issue from developing 
c o u n t r i e s wi l l also be solved by five year r o t a t i on 
of personnel . And if five year r o t a t i o n i s applied 
p re fe rab ly , i t would s trengthen na t iona l c i v i l services 
with s p e c i a l i s t s enriched by i n t e r n a t i o n a l experience. 
These conclusions are r e l a t i v e l y easy to 
reach/ t h e i r implementation i s fa r more complex .And 
the United Nations must a t t r a c t t a l en t ed new r e c r u i t s 
than i t does at p re sen t , both for p^rmaraent and fixed 
term se rv i ce , however, i t must never forget i t s 
ob l iga t i on to provide a ca ree r s t r u c t u r e , in which 
the career o f f i c i a l s are given as fu l l an opportuni ty as 
14 poss ib le for the flowering of t h e i r t a l e n t s . 
14. Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United 
Nations pp. 61-63. 
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3 . MERIT VERSUS EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 01 
STATE 
On t h e b a s i s of demands o f Member s t a t e s as 
e x p r e s s e d i n UN d o c u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e e q u i t a b l e g e o g -
r a p h i c a l - d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s t a f f / and c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e 
S e c r e t a r i a t from t i m e t o t i m e , i t may be c o n c l u d e d t h a t 
r e c r u i t m e n t s h o u l d p u r s u e t h e f o l l o w i n g g o a l s * 
a) To r e c r u i t s ta f f who meet the h ighes t 
standards of e f f ic iency competence and 
i n t e g r i t y , 
b) To ensure a balanced q u a n t i t a t i v e represen-
t a t i o n of a l l member s t a t e s so as to have 
a l l of them a t the mid p o i n t of t h e i r de s i r a -
ble range so t h a t no country wi l l be under 
or over represented, 
c) To ensure a balanced r ep re sen ta t ion of a l l 
member s t a t e s so as to give a l l of them 
appropr ia te number of pos t s in every grade 
br t h e i r equivalent ; 
d) To ensure a balanced q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a -
t i ve r ep resen ta t ion of a l l member s t a t e s , not 
only in the S e c r e t a r i a t as a whole, but a lso 
in i t s departments, d i v i s i o n s ' and u n i t s . 
l.Rumki Basu, Personnel Administration in United Nations r . 5 1 . 
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(In t h i s connection, i t may be noted tha t 
where the at tainment of t h i s goal i s not 
poss ib le at count 'y l eve l , i t can be done 
at reg ional l e v e l ) . 
The r ep re sen t a t i on ot member s t a t e s i s consicered 
on the b a s i s of a "System of des i r ab l e ranges" es tab l i shed 
by the General Assembly when the number of t h e i r na t iona l s 
i n p o s t s subject t o geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n i s compared 
with t h e i r de s i r ab l e ranges . Member s t a t e s are put in to four 
2 
categories. Unrepresented (when none of their nationals 
are in such posts , Under represented ( when the number 
of their nationals in such posts is lower than the lower 
limit of their ranges. Within ranges (when the number of 
their nationals in such posts coincide v/ith the lower or 
upper lim.its of their ranges is between them) , and Over-
represented (when the number of their nationals serving 
in such posts exceeds the upper limits of their ranges). 
This system of desirable ranges is the first and most crucial 
obstacle to satisfactory recruitment and if continued to 
be applied, would never.result in equitable geographical 
distribution, 
A particular group of staff of the United Nations 
Secretariat are covered by the system of desirable ranges 
2. See UK Doc. A/41/627 (1986) p. 3. 
l i e 
used a guide l i n e for es t imat ing the comparative represen ta -
t i o n of na t i ona l s of each Member S ta t e , This system has 
been e s t a b l i s h e d by the General Assembly on the bas i s of 
three fac to r s , namely , membership , con t r ibu t ion and 
popula t ion . The s t a f f concerned are r e f e r r e d to as "Staff in 
pos t s subject t o geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n " , v/hich was 
introduced in General Assembly r e s o l u t i o n 1559(XV) of 18 
December I960. The spec ia l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h i s croup 
of s taf f , v^ ho are 2,608 in number based on 1992 data i s tha t 
they are d i r e c t l y appointed by the Secretary General and 
respons ib le to him for a t l e a s t one year or are appointed 
i n i t i a l l y for a l e s s e r per iod and then have t h e i r appoint-
ment extended t o one year or more of t o t a l service to 
pos t s in the Profess ional category and above. 
Since the group c o n s i s t s o f s t a f f members only , 
the Secretary General and other o f f i c i a l s of the organizat ion 
who are not s t a f f in the eye of Ar t i c l e 97 of the Charter 
have never been counted within the group. Staff who are 
not appointed by the Secretary General but by other o f f i c i a l s 
are a l so excluded from t h i s group. I t i s for the reason 
tha t these o f f i c i a l s have appointing author i ty granted by 
the General Assembly in r e spec t of t h e i r organiza t ions , 
which are UN subsidiary organs. These subsidiary organs 
are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the 
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Office of the United Nations High commissioner for 
Refugees (Ul'iHCR) , the United Nations Ch i ld ren ' s Fund 
(UKICEF); the United Nations Relief and ;.orks Agency 
for Pa l e s t i ne Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); the 
In t e rna t iona l Trade Centre (ITC); the S e c r e t a r i a t of 
the In t e rna t i ona l Civi l Service Commission (ICSC) ; the 
United Nations University(UKU); and Regis t ry of the 
In t e rna t i ona l Court of Ju s t i c e (ICJ), 
The l a r g e s t groups excluded within the Ul\ 
S e c r e t a r i a t are s t a f f in pos ts with spec ia l language 
requirements , s t a f f in the Field Service and the General 
Service and r e l a t e d ca t egor i e s such as Trades and Crafts , 
Securi ty and Safety and Public Information A s s i s t a n t s . 
Other groups c o n s i s t of s ta f f spec i f i ca l l y appointed for 
service l imi ted t o the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) or to the United Nations cent re on Human Settlements 
(UNCHS), s t a f f appointed af ter inter-agency consul ta t ion t o 
pos t s financed on an inter-agency b a s i s , t echn ica l cooperation 
p ro jec t personnel , and National Officers serving at United 
Nations Information Centres. 
Also excluded are s taf f with appointments for 
l e s s than one year ; s ta f f on specia l leave without pay; 
s t a f f on secondment to other agencies, and s ta f f members 
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who are permanent r e s i d e n t s in the country of there duty 
3 
s t a t i o n without being na t iona l of t h a t s t a t e . 
On 30 June 1980 there were 2769 s ta f f in the appro-
ximately 3/500 pos ts which would have been subject t o geo-
graphical d i s t r i b u t i o n i f not vacant or f i l l e d by s t a f f on 
shor t term appointments. For the purpose of des i rab le 
ranges" the populat ion fac tor has been maintained a t 240 
as before or a weight of 7.5 percent of the new base figure 
of 3200 pos t s ; Membership fac tor was given a weight of 
50 per cent and remaining 42.5 per cent t o the con t r ibu t ion 
f ac to r . In order t o provide a more balanced d i su r ibu t ion of 
the a d i t i o n a l pos t s , i t i s proposed t h a t in future whenever 
the base figure i s r a i s e d by lOO p o s t s , 7.5 sha l l go to 
the populat ion fac tor and the remaining pos t s sha l l be d i s t r i -
buted equal ly on the bas i s of membership and con t r ibu t ion 
fac to r . 
The major con t r i bu to r s r e j e c t e d proposal sought 
by r e s o l u t i o n 3 4/219 which was the d i r e c t appl ica t ion of the 
populat ion of the Member S ta tes ins tead of the population of 
the region, mainly on the grounds t h a t i t had been adopted 
without taking i n t o account t h e i r fundamental i n t e r e s t s , 
and they could not accept any changes in the ranges t h a t 
3. See UN Doc. ^/C 5/35/36, Agenda Item 98(a ) , 1980, pp. 3-5. 
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were based on e i t h e r a weight of 50 per cent in the membership 
factor or a p a r i t y between the membership and cont r ibu t ion 
f a c t o r s . While other Member States mainly the Group of 77 
supported the r e so lu t ion by expressing t h e i r view t h a t the 
e x i s t i n g c r i t e r i a for determining the ranges v.'ere incompatible 
with t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and so they demanded a change as l a i d 
down in the r e s o l u t i o n . The percentage d i s t r i b u t i o n of t o t a l 
populat ion between the regions on 30 June 1980 was as follows: 
Region Per cent 
1. Africa 10.50 
2. Asia and the Pac i f i c 54.24 
3. Europe (Eastern) 9.53 
4. Europe (Western) 8.23 
5. Latin America 8.09 
6. Middle East 3.45 
7. North America and the Caribbean 5.9 6 
The comparative f igures of number of s t a f f and 
Member State by region and degree of r ep re sen t a t i on in the 
4. Ibid pp. 10-12. 
12, 
S e c r e t a r i a t based on five year da ta from 30 June 1983 to 
30 June 1987 i s mentioned in t ab le A. And the evolut ion in 
the comparative r ep resen ta t ion of Kember Sta tes in pos t s 
based on geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n over the period from 
30 June 1988 to 30 June 1992 i s i l l u s t r a t e d in f igure 1. 
Moreover, a considerable d i s t r i b u t i o n of s ta f f 
seems tha t a l l members s t a t e s should be at the mid-point of 
t h e i r quotas without leaving out a s ingle vacant pos t . In 
other v/ords, the number of pos ts required for unrepresented 
and under represented member - s t a t e s t o reach t h i s goal 
should be taken from the member coun t r i es above t h e i r mid-
po in t s of t h e i r quotas . However, the present system of de s i r a -
ble range allows every member-states to have 15 per cent 
of p a r t s in addi t ion t o t h e i r mid-points , which can be f i l l e d 
only a t the cos t of making other coun t r i e s un-represented or 
under-represented. As of 30 June 1987, 90 coun t r i e s were 
within the range, 34 were Over represented and 10 were unre-
presented. 
Another hurdle,making equi table geographical 
d i s t r i b u t i o n d i f f i c u l t to a t t a i n i s the fac t tha t i t i s 
aimed at d i s t r i b u t i o n of pos t s by number, while leaving 
aside d i s t r i b u t i o n by grade. For t h i s spec i f i c reason, i t 
has con t r ibu ted considerably t o c rea t ing the present s i t u a t i o n . 
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T d O l e A 
Numbec of s t a t t and Han\u«r S t a t e s by tog ion ana dagca* ot r«pr«aai i t«t lon 
In the S e c r e t a r i a t as at 30 June lyuJ , 1984, iStiS, XUH6 and iyu? 
Keg ton 
Africa 
Asia and 
tne Pacific 
Europe 
(Eastern) 
Europe 
(Western) 
Latin 
America 
Middle East 
Nortn America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Others 
Total 
Vear 
ly83 
19B4 
198b 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
198S 
1986 
1987 
19 8 J 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
198b 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
liii; 
Staff 
481 
4'^ 5 
489 
44i! 
428 
506 
503 
508 
46U 
426 
319 
313 
319 
273 
261 
696 
685 
713 
619 
583 
265 
272 
263 
224 
20 2 
148 
147 
153 
131 
125 
624 
640 
620 
561 
542 
3d a/ 
35 a/ 
37 a/ 
30 a/ 
27 a/ 
3 077 
3 090 
3 102 
2 740 
2 5^4 
Hem ber 
States 
51 
51 
51 
51 
51 
26 
26 
27 
27 
27 
11 
11 
11 
11 
11 
18 
18 
18 
18 
IB 
21 
21 
21 
21 
21 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
13 
14 
14 
14 
14 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
157 
158 
159 
159 
159 
b/ 
b/ 
y 
(100%) 
(loot) 
(1UU«) 
(1001) 
(100%) 
Untcpre 
sented 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
u 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
2 
U 
1 
0 
14 (8 
15 (9 
1J (11 
12 (7 
to ((> 
9%) 
5%) 
2*) 
6%) 
it) 
Under-
repre-
sented 
25 (15 
24 (15 
15 ( 9 
24 (15 
25 (15 
9%) 
2%) 
4») 
1») 
7%) 
Within 
range 
30 
30 
31 
31 
28 
10 
10 
11 
10 
10 
5 
6 
8 
6 
8 
11 
13 
14 
IJ 
11 
16 
14 
18 
16 
16 
8 
7 
8 
10 
9 
7 
7 
10 
8 
8 
b7 (55 
8J (55 
100 ((.2 
94 (59 
9(1 (56 
4%) 
0%) 
9%) 
1%) 
6%) 
Over-
rupco-
sented 
12 
12 
13 
12 
14 
8 
8 
7 
9 
9 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
31 (19 
32 (20 
31 (19 
29 (18 
34 (21 
U«) 
3%) 
5«) 
2») 
4») 
a/ Including s t a t e l e s s p e r s o n s , 
b/ Non-Mcmr>er S t a t e s . 
Figure 1 
Representation of Mef"ber States 
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Consequently some member-states have an excessive number 
of pos t s at higher l e v e l s , while some o the r s , have not 
had a s o l i t a r y post a t P-5 or higher for 40 yea r s . I t 
should be r e c a l l e d t h a t there are many s t a t e s which are 
over- represented both by number and by grade, v^hich might 
be c a l l e d double over - represen ta t ion or double inequa l i ty . 
On the bas i s of above analys is of the major 
fac to rs obs t ruc t ing the at tainment of equi tab le geographical 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s t a f f in the S e c r e t a r i a t leads to t t e concl-
usion t h a t despi te a number of General Assembly r e so lu t i ons 
severa l recrui tment p l ans , and the secretary Generals 
personal experiment to improving the composition of the 
S e c r e t a r i a t , the r e s u l t remained to be unsa t i s f ac to ry . 
The obsession of the Fi f th committee to achieve 
a more equ i tab le geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n in the Secre ta r ia t 
had become one of the dominant des i r e s in the UN, from the 
1960's onwards., which has cons i tu ted problems not only 
in the process of recru i tment and career developments, 
a lso in the cons idera t ion of meri t . I t seems to be an 
issue t h a t has frequently been seen merely in terms of the 
recrui tment of young persons; in p r a c t i c e , the inf luences 
5. Rumki Basu , Personnel Administration in United Nations 
pp.52-53. 
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are mounted over the appointments r e l a t i n g t o specif ic 
senior pos t s and p a r t i c u l a r persons. I t i s accordingly, 
l o s s an Over a l l problem than a combination of a number 
of indiv idual problems, which affect p a r t i c u l a r ind iv idua ls , 
spec i f i c posts, and the urgings of p a r t i c u l a r governments, 
which often act ing toge ther , as a r e s u l t of p r iva te agreements. 
A "patronage" system in e f f ec t , operates and involves 
na t i ona l governments, na t iona l missions and head of depar t -
ments. Among these complex processes , the a b i l i t y , merit 
and experience of candidates are not always the deciding 
fac to r s in mat te rs of recrui tment for a p a r t i c u l a r pos t . 
The cha r t e r of the UN makes i t c l e a r in Ar t ic le 
101 (3) t h a t "the paramount considera t ion in the employment 
of the s taf f sha l l be the necess i ty of securing the highest 
s tandards of e f f i c i ency , competence and in tegr i ty .Due regard 
s h a l l be paid t o the importance of r e c r u i t i n g the staff 
on as wide a geographical bas i s as p o s s i b l e " . There i s 
nothing in t h i s Ar t i c l e of the char te r t h a t revea ls in 
favour of equ i t ab le geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n . The years of 
1950's and 1960's have seen a major problem of geographical 
imbalance in the S e c r e t a r i a t composition, which has not yet 
been ful ly solved. Insp i te of a l l these unsa t i s fac to ry r e s u l t s , 
the p r i o r i t i e s of the Charter have been reversed, t o the 
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poin t t h a t the paramount cons idera t ion in recrui tment has 
become geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n . While the highest 
s tandards of e f f i c i ency , competence and i n t e g r i t y have become 
secondary in s ign i f i cance . Moreover, the re fusa l of many 
member s t a t e s to send t h e i r mer i tor ious na t iona l candidates 
to the S e c r e t a r i a t has been even most important fac tor , 
which has r e s u l t e d in a de f i n i t e lowering of en t rance , standa-
r d s , and the consequent lowering of ef f ic iency and morale 
in the s e c r e t a r i a t as a whole. 
The 1986 was the year when the f inanc ia l emergency 
of the UlC threa tened to bankrupt and enfeeble the United 
Nat ions . I t was the year , when for the f i r s t time since 
ex is tence of the organizat ion , the Secretary General and 
the General Assembly decided to apply cos t reduct ion measures 
in c a p i t a l expendi tures , programmes a c t i v i t i e s and s taf f ing 
l e v e l s . This c r i s i s i s under discussion in the next chapter 
Vlth . "The Financia l c r i s i s and the r epo r t of the Group of 
Eighteen". 
6. Ib id . pp. 55-56, 
C H A P T E R - VI 
THE FB'JANCIAL C R I S I S 
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THE Ul^ l "FH^ANCIAL CRISIS" AND THE REPORT OF THE " GROUP OF 
EIGHTEEK ; P>. REVIE W 
1986 was d e c l a r e d a s t h e " I n t e r n a t i o n a l Y e a r of 
p e a c e " by t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . The d e c l a r a t i o n was n o t o n l y 
f o r t h e w o r l d , however f o r t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f . 
For t h e r e a s o n , i t t u r n e d o u t t o be c r u c i a l j u n c t u r e - t h e 
y e a r of i t s own s u r v i v a l . 
I t was t h e y e a r when t h e f i n a n c i a l emergency of 
t h e UK, had t h r e a t e n e d t o b a n k r u p t and e n f e e b l e t h e U n i t e d 
N a t i o n s , I t was p e r h a p s t h e w o r s t c r i s i s i n i t s f o r t y - y e a r 
o l d h i s t o r y . I t was t h e y e a r , v;hen , f o r t h e f i r s t t ime 
s i n c e e x i s t e n c e of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l 
and t h e G e n e r a l Assembly d e c i d e d t o a p p l y c o s t - r e d u c t i o n 
m e a s u r e s i n c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s , p rogrammes a c t i v i t i e s 
and s t a f f i n g l e v e l s . 
The c r i s i s was m a i n l y t h e r e s u l t of r e f u s a l of 
many I n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s t o c o n t r i b u t e t h e i r s h a r e of 
UN b u d g e t l e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 
The VU F i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s had i t s o r i g i n i n 1960s , 
when c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s r e f u s e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e e x p e n s e s 
1. "Yves B e i g b e d e r , Management . P r o b l e m s in U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
O r g a n i z a t i o n s (Reform o r D e c l i n e ) ( F r a n c e s P i n t e r P u b l i s h e r ^ 
London , 1987) p . 147 . 
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of peace keeping opere t ions . The Soviet bloc and se^/eral 
Arab coun t r i e s refused to cont r ibu te for rhe functions of 
the UK Emergency Force (Ul^ EF) e s t ab l i shed in 19 5 6. The 
Soviet Union and France also refused to con t r ibu te for 
the operat ion of the UN Forces in the Congo(UHUC) . The 
t o t a l budgets requi red for the operat ion of UNEF from 1956 
to 1967 were approximately $ 200 mi l l ion , and those of 
OKUC from I9 60 to 19 64, more than $ 400 mi l l ion . 
Though the problem v;as of l ega l and c o n s t i t u t -
ional na tu re , the Key issue was p o l i t i c a l . The Soviet 
Union wished to assess a l l peace keeping expenses against 
the agressors : France, the United Kingdom and I s r a e l in 
the Suez c r i s i s of 1956, and the Belguim in the Congo. 
Inaddi t ion, the Soviet Union and France did not ^ r e e with 
the independent p o l i t i c a l stands taken by Secretary General, 
2 Dag Hammarskjold during the Congo C r i s i s . 
In 1961, the General Assembly authorized an 
emergency measure, the issuance of $ 200 mil l ion value 
of UK bonds, to be repaid in ins ta lments over a tv^enty 
five year per iod. Of which, the United Sta tes purchased 
50 percent." This stop-gap measure seemed t o be f a i l ed to 
2. A Le Roy Bennett, I n t e rna t iona l Organization (Prentice 
Hall I n c . , 1980) pp.98-103. 
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"3 
so lve the c r i s i s , which remained as severe as b e f o r e . 
The Ad Hoc Committee of E x p e r t s t o Examine the 
F i n a n c e s of the Ul^  and the S p e c i a l i z e d Agencies was e s t a b l i -
shed in 1965 t o examine c r i t i c a l l y the f i n a n c i a l problem 
because of peace -keep ing a c t i v i t i e s . And the N e g o t i a t i n g 
Committee on the F i n a n c i a l Emergency of th2 Uli was e s t a b l i s h e d 
by t h e Genera l Assembly in 1975 t o t ake measures fo r the 
S e t t l e m e n t of c u r r e n t f i n a n c i a l p roblems. The committee 
submi t t ed i t s r e p o r t in December 1976 and in l a t e r on i t 
proved t o be unable t o r e a c h a consensus on a s o l u t i o n t o 
4 
the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s f i n a n c i a l p rob lems . 
The XJK Shor t - t e r m d e f i c i t fo r the y e a r s 197 6 t o 
1985 i s as fo l lows : 
Year D e f i c i t a t yea r end ( in m i l l i o n s of US d o l l e r ) Amount 
of UK 
r e g u l a r 
budget 
394.7 
394,7 
542.1 
542 ,1 
670.6 
670.6 
734,8 
734,6 
80 4.4 
80 4. 4 
4. Yves Be lgbecer , Management Problems in Uni ted Nation^ Orga-
n i z a t i o n s p , 1 4 8 . 
5 . i : o:.7 : .L' 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
120.9 
129.5 
168, 1 
210.4 
238.7 
274 .1 
306.6 
336.8 
362,5 
390.7 
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The General Assembly reso lu t ion regarding the 
f i nanc i a l problem u n t i l 1986 had no f r u i t f u l r e s u l t , the 
reason being tha t they were genera l , p la ton ic exhor ta t ions 
urging a l l member coun t r i e s to meet t h e i r f i nanc i a l shares 
and appealing to them to make voluntery con t r i bu t ions . 
However, the General Assembly reso lu t ion of 1981 deemed 
to be helpful upto some extent to the Secretary General as 
i t increased the amount of the Working Capi ta l Fund, as 
from 198 2, from $ 40 to $ 100 mi l l ion . The; decis ion was also 
taken regarding any budget surpluses that,, t ha t could be used 
to compensate the budget d e f i c i t , and not to be surrendered 
6 to member c o u n t r i e s . 
The General Assembly r e so lu t i ons concerning thf 
"Financia l Energy " a lso requested the member s t a t e s to pay 
r e a d i l y as ea r ly as poss ib le each year , t h e i r fu l l assessed 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s and advances to the working c a p i t a l Fund. 
The reques t was made for the reason t h a t delayed payments of 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s and cash-flow d i f f i c u l t i e s to those , caused 
by the more basic s e l e c t i v e , p a r t i a l , payments. 
Cut of the 154 member coun t r i e s , only 50 had 
paid t h e i r f u l l assessed con t r ibu t ion by September 30,1982, 
6. Resolution 36/116 B, 10 December 1981. 
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and only 30 more had paid any p a r t of i t . On the same da te , 
the Soviet Union s t i l l had to pay $ 37 mi l l ion on i t s 
1982 con t r ibu t ion . The United Sta tes had paid only $ 30 mil l ion 
of i t s $ 180 mi l l ion assessed con t r i bu t i on . In 1983 / 17 
member s t a t e s were with holding from the UK a t o t a l of 
$ 84.9 mi l l ion on p o l i t i c a l grounds/ almost half r e l a t e d 
7 
to the repayment of the 19 62 bonds. 
There were only 50 member s t a t e s , who had paid 
t h e i r f u l l con t r ibu t ions on 30 September for 1985 and 
35 had paid i t in pact ; 22 c o u n t r i e s had not paid any 
p a r t of t h e i r 1985 share, and 54 c o u n t r i e s were l a te in 
paying t h e i r assessments for 1985 and previous years . The 
t e n t a t i v e amount of with holdings by memljer count r ies 
on p a r t i c u l a r expenditures of the regulai: budget was 
est imated at $ 99.7 mi l l ion , while the short- term d e f i c i t 
of the organizat ion was est imated a t $ 390.7 mil l ion on 
31 Decem,ber 1985/ the amount ever reached in i t s h i s to ry , 
c 
of which $ 116.3 mi l l ion r e l a t e d to the regular budget. 
Although member-countries were respons ib le for the present 
f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s , some t r i e d t o prove the Secretary 
General responsible for the c r i s i s . As the Japanese r ep re -
sen ta t ive made i t c l e a r t ha t the Secretary General shoula 
7. The M. Franck, National agains t Nation (New York, Oxford 
Univers i ty Press , 1965) pp.262-63. 
8. Yues Beigbeder, Management Problem in United Nations 
Organizat inn, p.149. 
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display g rea te r firmness and take concrete measures to 
persuade member s t a t e s to pay t h e i r assessed con t r ibu t ions 
and a t the same time be should not t o l e r a t e delays in payment 
of more than one year . However,could i t be poss ible for 
the Secretary General to pursuade the member- coun t r i e s to 
9 do what they did not wish to do? 
However, the root cause which made the UK finan-
c i a l c r i s i s worse was the American l e g i s l a t i o n passed 
in 1985. Pres ident Reagan gave h is consent on the "Foreign 
Relat ions Authorizat ion Act" in 1985 for the f i s c a l years 
1986 anc 1987 Under the Kassebaum Amendment to t h i s Act, 
the United S ta tes was committed to seek weighted voting 
on budgetary ques t ions in the United Nations and i t s 
spec ia l i zed agencies. I t was c l a s i f i e d t h a t if such 
weighted voting was not achieved by f i s c a l year 1987, the 
United Sta tes would only con t r ibu te 20 per cent of the 
UN budget, ins tead of the required 25 per cen t . V.'hile 
h i s t o r i c a l l y i t was very l e s s than the share fixed in 
19 46. The Committee on Contr ibut ions had proposed in the 
autumji of 1946, t h a t the United Sta tes pay 49.89 per cent 
of the UN budget, on the bas i s of i t s capac i ty to pay. 
9. See, UN Doc A/C 5/40/SR.p. 46. 
134 
t h a t i s r e l a t i v e gross income, the United Sta tes r e l u c t a n t l y 
agreed to pay 39,89 per cen t . In 1954, the American 
con t r ibu t ion came down to 33.33 per cent , and in 1972, 
25 per cen t . This measure was a breach of American 
ob l iga t i ons under th-e UN Charter . 
The change in the provis ion of Che country-one 
vote (Ar t ic le 18.1 of the UN Charter) by weighted voting 
in the f inanc ia l mat ters , was not l i k e l y to be adopted 
in the UN system. 
For the purpose of reform, and not of blackmail 
J . Perez de cue l i a r had prpposed t h a t the top con t r ibu t ion 
of any gOK?ernment to the U'N regular budget should be reduced 
to 20 or 15 per cent and at the same time s. Aga Khan and 
M.F. Strong proposed 10 per cent only would be the maximum 
for any country. The UN Secretary Genera l ' s argument 
was t h a t no s ingle country should be in a pos i t ion t o 
threa ten or to blackmail the UN, However for the Aga 
Khan and Strong, the difference would b€' made up by middle 
s t a t e s thereby encouraging them to play a bigger role in 
the United Nat ions . ^ -^  
Other cuts in the US con t r ibu t ion to the 
10. Th. M.Prank, Nation against Nation o p . c i t . p . 256 
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United Nations Budget was r e su l t ed from the United Sta tes 
Budget Def ic i t Reducing Act, the Gramxn-Rudman-Kollings 
law, t h a t made a cut of 4.3 per cent in 19S6 for the 
non-defence i tems. And the over a l l shor t f a l l r e s u l t i n g 
from these two Acts in the payment of the American assessed 
con t r i bu t ions for 1985 was est imated t c be in a range of 
$ 90.5 to 10.25 million.-'-^ 
The decreasing value of the American do l l a r 
which i s the budgetary and f inanc ia l currency of the 
UN, made the U^ f i nanc ia l c r i s i s worse, t h a t compelled 
the member coun t r i e s in to action and tl"ie Secretary General 
was forced to announce a s e r i e s of economic measures in 
a l l f i e l d s including personnel mat te r s . 
The Secretary General informed the \Jh s taff 
on 17 January 1986 of a 20 per cent reduct ion to be 
applied t o t r a v e l c o s t s , t o the h i r ing of consu l t an t s , 
temporary ass i s tance and over-t ime; the deferr al of a 
number of a l t e r a t i o n and maintenence p r o j e c t s ; s t r i c t 
con t ro l and l i m i t a t i o n of documentation. 
On 24 February 1986 the Secretary General 
made i t c l e a r t o the s taf f tha t a t l e a s t one- tenth of 
11. Yves Beigbeder, Management Problems in United Nations 
Organization p.150. 
1 2 . See UN DOc, A / 4 0 / 1 1 0 2 , p . 2. 
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the funds r e q u i r e d for the r e g u l a r budget in 1986 v;ould 
not be a v a i l a b l e . To make i t c o n v e n i e n t , he asked a l l 
heads of depar tments and o f f i c e s t o make i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
fo r the sav ings which cou ld be r e a l i s e d in 1986, amounting 
u p t o to pe r c e n t of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , 
Cn 26 February 1966 the s e c r e t a r y General t r i e d 
h i s b e s t t o pursuad a l l the member c o u n t r i e s for vo lun t a ry 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s . And on 20 March, he made knov.'n t o the s t a f f 
t h a t the U:; was a s h o r t f a l l of $ 100 m i l l i o n , ancamount 
which was needed t o meet the o p e r a t i n g c o s t s of the o rga-
n i z a t i o n and of which $ 15 m i l l i o n s av ings would r e s u l t 
frcxn the 17 January d e c i s i o n s , Ke now announced a d d i t i o n a l 
measures in p e r s o n n e l m a t t e r s as fo l lows x 
a) A f reeze in r e c r u i t m e n t 
b) n o n - e x t e n s i o n of c o n t r a c t of s t a f f members 
beyond 60 y e a r s of age 
c) suspens ion of a l l p romot ions for s ix months, 
d) deferment of the implementa t ion of c o s t of 
l i v i n g ad jus tments in the s a l a r i e s of 
g e n e r a l s e r v i c e s t a f f a t the e i g h t main 
duty s t a t i o n s and o t h e r s t a f f and house 
keeping economies . 
He b i s o c a l l e d for t o reconvene the 40th s e s s i o n of the 
Genera l Assembly on 28 A p r i l 1986 in o rde r t o cDsider the 
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13 urgent s teps to crea te the required amount. 
The Secretary General made emphasis in h i s 
r epor t t o the General Assembly in April 1986 tha t the 
Ul^  was confronted by f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s of such 
magnitude as to have profound impl ica t ions for the 
v i a b i l i t y of the organizat ion , In out look, the c r i s i s 
was f i n a n c i a l . But i t was above a l l a p o l i t i c a l one. 
I t arosed from disregard of ob l iga t ions l a id down by the 
Charter and from lack of agreement among member count r ies 
on how to finance and make use of the organizat ion and 
for what purpose. The Secretary General did a good job 
by l ink ing the f inanc ia l and p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s to the 
need for management improvement- a sharper focus on 
prgramme ob jec t ives , a more na t iona l use of s ta f f resources , 
a s t reamlining of i t s s t ruc ture ana i t s operat ions could 
14 help in making c l ea r budgetary problems. 
In addi t ion to e a r l i e r approximately $ 30 
mi l l ion savings measures, the Secretar^j- General submitted 
another measures to the General Assembly expected to 
provide another $ 30 mi l l ion . There we're 
13. Yves Eeigbeder,Kanagen-.ent Problems in UN Organizations 
p . 1 5 1 . 
14. Ib id , 
15. Ib id . p. 152. 
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a) defer/Tient of major c a p i t a l expendi tures ; 
b) modi f ie a t ion .'in the calendar of rreetings 
and conferences and reduct ion in the provi -
sion of verbat ion and summary records j . 
c) general reduct ion in the acqu i s i t ion of 
fu rn i tu re and equipment/ 
d) cur ta i lment of the 1986 pub l i ca t ions 
prgrammes and deferment of c e r t a i n pro -
gramme a c t i v i t i e s . 
The European Ccxnmunity r ep re sen ta t i ve during 
the f u l l debates time and again repeated the Twelve's 
commitment t o sound f inanc ia l management and f i s c a l check 
V;hile the Group of 77 ' s r ep resen ta t ive considered the 
p o l i t i c a l aspect of the c r i s i s . They r e s i s t e d the new 
proposal of US for weighted vot ing, t h a t was nothing 
but an u n i l a t e r a l ac t ions designed t o force changes in the 
decis ion making p rocess . The r e s u l t would be abandoment 
of the democratic p r i nc ip l e of sovereign equa l i ty of a l l 
s t a t e s . These coun t r e i s supported the au thor i ty of the 
UN beyond expec ta t ion for reason t h a t the UN was the p l a t -
form they came to when t h e i r sovereignty was being threatened 
and when they required support for the j u s t causes concerning 
se l f -de te rmina t ion and development. They needed a s tronger 
and b e t t e r UN to make i t pos s ib l e . The Group supported cost 
reduct ion proposal Belect ively on the b a s i s of merit of 
each one. 
13S 
The secre tary General ' s proposals was ful ly 
supported by the soviet r ep resen ta t ive by asking some 
more such measure . However/ the United s t a t e s was made 
respons ib le fully on the b a s i s of f inanc ia l as well as 
p o l i t i c a l s t e p s , which i t had taken u n i l a t e r a l l y . While 
the American represen ta t ive defended h is side with the 
argument t h a t the United S ta tes was being blamed now only 
for the reason tha t i t was l a t e in jo in ing the member 
coun t r i e s who had not paid t h e i r assessed con t r ibu t ions 
in the p a s t . 
The reconvened General Assembly on 9 May 1986, 
allowed the Secretary General to implement most of the saving 
measures he had proposed . However made i t c l e a r t o the 
Secretary General tha t they were temporary measures r e l a t i n g 
t o 1986 and no p ro j ec t or programme would be eliminated 
for which adequate f inanc ia l resources were ava i l ab le . On 
7 July 1986, the Secretary General was required again 
t o go to the General Assembly t o inform t h a t the f inanc ia l 
c r i s i s remained severe and t h a t the economy measures had 
t o be maintained, 
on 26 November 1986, a debate began in the F i f th 
Committee on the f i nanc i a l c r i s i s . The Committee had 
before i t a r epo r t of the secretary General , in which the 
16, Ibid. pp. 152-53. 
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f i nanc i a l short f a l l pro jec ted to 31 December 1986 was 
es t imated at $ 76 mi l l i on , plus $ 30 mi l l ion for currency 
loss due t o the deprec ia t ion of the Ainerican d o l l a r . To 
meet day-to-day needs, the organizat ion had determined to 
u t i l i z e and thus exhaustea i t s $ 100 mi l l ion working c a p i t a l 
Fund as well as the funds avai lable in the Special Account. 
In add i t ion , i t had re so r t ed to borrowing, temporarily from 
peace keeping funds. The some ex t r a amounts r e a l i s e d from 
the suspension of f inanc ia l r egu la t ions which had a lso 
been u t i l i s e d . J . Richard Foran. Ass is tan t Secretary 
General for Financia l Services , introducing the r e p o r t , 
said t h a t the combined t o t a l of withholdings and arear 
was expected t o be $ 284 mil l ion by the beginning of 1987, 
as compared t o $ 242.4 mi l l ion at the beginning of 1986. 
That f igure s u b s t a n t i a l l y exceeded the resources of the 
organ iza t ion . He appealed t o member coun t r i e s t o make spe«—-« 
c i a l con t r i bu t i ons to the Special Fund, as a l l members 
had a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o find so lu t ions to t l ^ f inanc ia l 
problems of the United Nations. 
Two years l a t e r , the Secretary General made 
i t c l e a r in 1988 t h a t economies i n s t i t u t e d in 1986 would 
remain in force u n t i l such time as the s i t ua t i on requi red . 
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This l ed t h e f r e e z e on r e c r u i t m e n t t o be con t inued along 
wi th a ban on employment e x t e n s i o n s beyond the mandatory 
r e t i r e m e n t age of 60; Implementa t ion of p romot ions would 
be d e f e r r e d aga in , temporary he lp and t r a v e l would be 
c u r t a i l e d , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l lowances for D - 2 ' s and above 
c u t by 50 p e r c e n t . 
Perez ce c u e l l a r , the Eecretairy Genera l p o i n t e d 
out i n 1988 t h a t a l l v a c a n t p o s t s would he examined c r i t i c -
a l l y t o de termine which were e s s e n t i a l t o meet prpgramme 
mandates . He made i t c l e a r t h a t the numlser of v a c a n c i e s to 
] 7 be f i l l e d would be an a b s o l u t e minimum. 
The long range o b j e c t i v e , the S e c r e t a r y General 
s a i d , was t o b r i n g about a more comprehensive and funda-
menta l reform of t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e S e c r e t a r i a t by 
s t ream l i n i n g i t , making i t l e a v e r and more e f f i c i e n t , and 
improving the management of human r e s o u r c e s . These a l l 
long term o b j e c t i v e s would be r e a l i s e d wi th t h e he lp of 
Group of H i g h - l e v e l I n t e rgove rnmen ta l E x p e r t s t o Review 
the F i n a n c i a l and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Func t ion ing of the UN, 
or "Group of Eighteen! ' 
The c r e a t i o n of the Group of E igh teen was fo r 
t h e f i r s t t ime proposed by the Fore ign M i n i s t e r of Japan . 
17. See DOC ST/Al/338 of 22 December, 1986. 
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on 24 September 1985, In the General Assembly, debate 
While the Group of Experts , f i na l l y e s t ab l i shed by 
the General Assembly on 18 December 1985 through .Resolu-
t ion 40/ 237 for one year term. The Group began work in 
February 1986, holding 67 closed meetings during four 
sess ions over a six months per iod . I t s mandate was not 
t o address the immediate and short term f inanc ia l problem 
of tne United Nations, however t o iden t i fy medium and 
long term measures for fur ther improving the ef f ic iency of 
the adxiilnistrative and f inanc ia l functioning of the VH, 
which would cont r ibute t o s t rengthening the e f fec t iveness 
of the UN in dealing with p o l i t i c a l economic and soc ia l 
. 18 
I s s u e s . 
The Group of Experts presented the for ty pages 
r e p o r t to the Secretary General, J av i e r Ferez de Cuel lar 
on 18 August 1986 by i t s Chairman Tom Eric Vraalsen of Norway. 
r epo r t was 
The/'considered by the General Assembly at the forty f i r s t 
sess ion. Through the r epo r t , the Group recommended t h a t 
the Secretary General be requested t o implement the r e c -
ommendations within h i s purview as soon as poss ib le , and 
within a se t time, and t h a t r epor t t o the Assembly by 1 May 
1987 on them. 
18. See UN DOC. A/C 5/3S/SR, p . 24. 
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The Group did not be able t o reach a consensus 
on a reform of the planning and budget mechanigras. I t 
viewed th=t member coun t r i e s were not fu l ly involved in 
the medium term plan nor in the programme budget. However, 
i t s members could not agree on the ro le which should be 
played by the Committee for Programme and Coordination 
(CFC) in r e l a t i o n t o ACAB(i. 
The Group formulated 71 recommendations to s t r ea -
mline thie s t ruc tu re of the organizat ion which the exper ts 
described as too complex, fragmented and top heavy. 
The Group came to know t h a t the UK's own 
i n t e r governmental machinery for deal ing With p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and soc ia l problems, including opera t ional a c t i -
• v i t i e s , has an overly complex s t r u c t u r e , lacking in cohesion 
19 and making co-ord ina t ion d i f f i c u l t . 
The wide ranging proposals of the Group, covered 
personnel measures. S e c r e t a r i a t s t r u c t u r e , inter-govecnmental 
machinery, and monitoring budget and implimentation 
procedures. 
The Expert Group recommended tha t the Committee 
on Conferences be strengthened to make i t e f fec t ive for 
19. Sec. Doc. GA0A!SlAD-8b p . 141. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t reduct ions in the number of United Nations 
Conferences, meetings, and of r e s o l u t i o n s , r epo r t s and 
other documents; consol ida t ion of United Nations depar t -
ments and off ices throughout the world, UN bodies should 
meet at t h e i r respec t ive es tab l i shed headquarters . In 
order t o strengthen the coordinat ion of operat ional 
a c t i v i t i e s a t the na t iona l l e v e l , the c e n t r a l coordinat ing 
ro le of UNDF should be re-af f i rmed. I t a lso recommended 
for a few h i e r a r ch i ca l l aye r s t o be suppressed. 
The Group proposed t h a t the ove ra l l number of 
regular budget pos t s should be reduced by 15 percent 
within three years and 25 per cent cu t in the number of 
Under Sec re ta r i e s and Ass i s tan t Sec r e t a r i e s General e i t h e r 
paid from regular budget or ex t ra budgetary sources within 
a period of three years or l e s s . I t a l so recommended tha t 
p o l i t i c a l departments and the economic and soc ia l sec to r s 
should be r e s t ruc tu red , The Group a l so made i t c l ea r 
t h a t the Management Advisory Service, which was es tab l i shed 
t o advise on manangement techniques and t o evaluate 
management s t ruc tu res and weaknesses, was of l i t t l e use-
fulness and should be abolished. The department of 
Administration and Management should be streamlined and the 
l eve l of o f f i c i a l t r a v e l should be reduced by 20 per cent 
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The Group also proposed t h a t the In t e rna l Audit Division, 
p a r t of the Department of Administration and Managernent 
20 
be declared an independent u n i t . 
The Group fur ther recommended for more involve-
ment by member coun t r i e s in s e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s for uni ted 
Nat ions a c t i v i t i e s , and in developing budget procedures. 
P a r t i c u l a r a t t en t ion had to be made for r e s t r u c t u r i n g 
in the area of economic and soc ia l a c t i v i t i e s , which the 
expe r t s pointed out, requi red 31 per cent of assessed 
con t r i bu t i ons under the regular budget more than any 
ca tegory . '"'-
The Group of Eighteen made i t c l e a r t h a t 
personnel maxidgement and pol icy was affected as a r e s u l t 
of the considerable p o l i t i c a l and other p ressu res t ha t 
had influenced the se l ec t ion of staff . The secre tary 
General was d i rec ted t o exerc ise g r ea t e r leadership In 
personnel mat te r s and p r o t e c t the author i ty of the o f f i c i a l 
incharge of personnel . I t proposed t h a t the recrui tment 
of s ta f f at the F. 1 t o P-3 Levels should be done through 
na t i ona l competit ive examinatlonsi^- and for F-4 and P -5 
l e v e l s , ind iv idual t e s t s should evaluate the dra f t ing 
20. Yves Beigbeder, Management Problems in Un Organiza-
t ion g, p . 154. 
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a b i l i t y of candida tes . The Group made emphesis for more 
recrui tment a t the enterance of the door t ha t i s at junior 
profess iona l l eve l (P-1 to F-3) in order to ensure a 
vigorous S e c r e t a r i a t . 
The Group recornmended t h a t the measures should 
be ca l l ed for t o ensure the recrui tment of more wcsnen 
and persons from developing c o u n t r i e s and s taf f members 
should be e l i g i b l e for permanent appointments a f t e r three 
years service in the UN. A job r o t a t i o n system among the 
var ious duty s t a t i o n s should be developed for profess ional 
s taff members. The In t e rna t iona l c i v i l Service Ccmmission 
should not only e s t a b l i s h personnel standards also 
monitor t h e i r implementation by the organiza t ions . 
The Group also recommended t h a t the service 
of Under Secre ta r ies General and Ass i s tan t Sec re t a r i e s 
General not to exceed ten year in order t o renew p e r i o -
d i c a l l y the leadership of departments and o f f i ces . Staff 
unions and a s soc i a t i ons should not v io l a t e the managerial 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the Secretary General and they should 
u t i l i z e there own funds t o finance and t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
As the s t a f f en t i t l emen t s being excess ive , the education 
grant for pos t secondary s tud ies should be e l iminated, the 
mandatory re t i rement age of 60 should be s t r i c t l y applied 
aiid the annual leave c r e d i t reduced from 6 t o 4 weeks. 
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The Group proposed tha t the J o i n t Inspection 
Unit (JIU) should be d i rec ted t o give more emphasis on 
eva lua t ion and i t s name should be changed in " jo in t 
Inspect ion and Evaluation Unit". The appointments of the 
inspec to r s should be made on the ba s i s of meri t and there 
must be a copperat ion between JIU and the ex terna l aud i to r s . 
The Group c l a r i f i e d t h a t i t had only begun a 
reform proce ES, which would have to be continued by other 
21 i n t e r governmental bodies and by the Secretary General, 
The General Assembly seemed t o have warded off 
the impending breakdown in the United Nations Sec re t a r i a t 
for the reason of f inanc ia l c r i s i s . The so lu t ion , however, 
seemed to be more a comprcmise than a major reform. I t 
could be helpful in the short run, perhaps by persuading 
the USA to r e l ea se the $ 110 mil l ion which i t had withheld, 
or by encouraging the Soviet to give one t h i r d of t h e i r 
assessed con t r ibu t ion in advance, thereby enabling the 
employees t o ge t t h e i r s a l a r i e s . In the long run, i t might 
emerge as a t i c k l i s h problem, with 21 coun t r i e s having 
veto power over the UN programmes, which might r e s u l t in 
con s tar t b icker ing over the budget formulat ions. 
21, Ib id . pp. 154-155, 
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I t does aj--pear strange t h a t the United Sta tes 
had agreed to such an unwcrkable so lu t ion . I s i t for the 
reason, i t did not r e a l l y want the United Nations to 
col lapse and tha t i t needed a p r e t e x t to re lease the $ 110 
mi l l i on ? Or i s i t because i t did not want the Soviet 
Union to s t e a l a march on i t as the Saviour of the United 
Nations by r e l eas ing the money requi red ? One can not say 
any thing with c e r t a i n t y . 
Whatever the pa t t e rn of the budget for the fu ture , 
one could not overemphasise the need for r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
and economy advocated by the "Group of Eighteen " to review 
the United Nations" adminestrat ive and f inanc ia l functioning. 
The proposals were examined by the F i f th Corrjnittee which 
seemed very r e l u c t a n t to agree to even modest economy d r ives 
such as staff reduct ion, or r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the procedures 
of the General Assembly, However, the General Assembly did 
adopt in r e so lu t ion 41/213 of December 1986, the repor t of 
the high l eve l exper t group a s a sound foundation on which 
reform could be implemented within the next three years . 
On the eve of h i s r e - e l e c t i o n in 1986, the 
Secretary General Perez de Cue l i a r seemed to agree cin 
p r i n c i p l e with most of the recommendations of the 'Group of 
Eighteen • and had even t r i e d to demonstrate h i s ser iousness 
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by c u t t i n g of pos t s of Under secre tary General and 
Ass i s t an t Secretary General. However, he changed h i s 
stand l a t e r , when he ca l l ed for g rea te r f l e x i b i l i t y in 
implementing reforms.He expressed concern at the danger 
t o c a r e e r s and the r i g h t s of employees, he doubted the 
mer i t of amalgamation of agencies handl-Lng s imi lar 
subjec ts or the d i scont inua t ion of the functions of any 
organ r ega rd le s s of whether i t was of use or not • He 
a l so complained of inadequate research or consensus in 
r e spec t of the budget .The Secretary General again reversed 
h i s pos i t ion at the moment when the "Group of Eighteen ' 
proposals were brought before the Plenary meeting by s t a t i ng 
in h i s r epor t t ha t he was firmly convinced tha t the 71 
recommendations should be ea rnes t ly pursued, and t h a t they 
provided a foundation on which the expenses of the organiz-
a t i o n s could be put on a second ba s i s in addi t ion of 
stream l in ing and consol ida t ing the S e c r e t a r i a t machinery 
22 
and General Assembly procedures. 
The Secretary General was almost convinced by 
the speeches a t the F i f th Committee t ha t delay in imple-
menting reform might mean d i s a s t e r for the United Nat ions . 
22. UN Doc. A/41/663. 
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The west Europeans, o ther groups as well as Japan, made 
i t c l e a r t h a t they were no longer ready to t o l e r a t e delay 
and incanpetence in f inanc ia l m a t t e r s . 
What had r e a l l y been done by the United Nations 
in the f i e l d of reforms recommended by the Expert Group? 
To cu t down the Sec re t a r i a t s taff of 11423 with a concen-
t r a t i o n in the higher ranks , the group advised a 25 per 
cent reduct ion in the number of Ass is tan t Sec re t a r i e s 
General and Under Secre ta r ies General t ha t had r i s en to 
the f igure of 87. While they advised recruitment of more 
jun io r p ro fess iona l s t o make the organizat ion dynamic anc 
more e f f i c i e n t . 
I t seemed to be a small strange tha t the lower 
ranked employees had been the r e a l v ic t ims of the f inan-
c i a l c u t s . Those who were seijving water in the conference 
rooms, whose combined s a l a r i e s amounted not more than 
$ 100,000 a year which was l e s s than tha t of one Ass is tan t 
Secretary General at $ 107,000, suddenly found themselves 
tejsminated under an executive order which deprived even 
Pres iden t s and Prime Minis ters of the customary g las s of 
water during the meetings. The jun io r profess iona ls of the 
Department of Public Information, the technica l personnel 
aiid c l e r k s who c o n s t i t u t e the i n f r a s t ruc tu r e of the 
o rgan iza t ion , had also been thrown away than other higher 
ranking o f f i c i a l s . 
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Moreover/ a t the time of wri t ing the r epo r t , 
the dec is ions of the General Assembly was not known to the 
Group regarding i t s recommendations. Any how, the croup 's 
r e p o r t announces a turning po in t In the evolut ion of the 
23 o rgan iza t ion . However, the reform I t recommended was not 
an end in i t s e l f but a means of improving the se rv ices 
the organiza t ion renders to member c o u n t r i e s . The emerging 
world scenar io , with the major c o n f l i c t s on the way to 
so lu t ion , i s bound to impose e x t r a r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on 
the United Nations, such as p o l i t i c a l economic and human , 
I t would be paradoxica l , and d i scordan t if the organiza-
t ion faces f inanc ia l emergencies p rec i se ly at the moment 
when i t has to meet the demands of a more cons t ruc t ive 
phase of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . 
To maintain the equa l i ty of the purchasing 
power of United Nations s a l a r i e s for s ta f f in the profe-
ss iona l and higher ca t egor i e s in duty s t a t i o n s throughout 
the world, ACC and FICSA requested the ICSC to take up the 
problem of pos t Adjustment system under a r t i c l e 11 of 
i t s s t a t u t e . This problan has been s tudied in the next 
chapter (V l l ) . 
C H A P T E R - VII 
PROBLEM OF GRADING OF POSTS IN THE UK SECRETARIAT 
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Though , the problem concerning the grading 
of post in the S e c r e t a r i a t ex i s t ed from the very beginning^ 
the c rea t ion of a new body to solve the adminis t ra t ive 
and personnel problems r e l a t i n g t o the United Nations common 
system mace the issue ac t ive . The new body was the 
In t e rna t iona l C iv i l Service Commission, which was 
recognized by the General Assembly through the Resolution 
3357 on 18 December 1974 at twenty ninth session. 
The In t e rna t iona l c i v i l Service Comnission 
s t a r t ed i t s funct ions under i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from 1 July 
1975 for publ ica t ion of the monthly r ev i s i ons of the 
schedules of da i ly subsistence allowances and the gradiug 
of pos ts adjustment. 
The Administrative Committee on Coordination 
(ACC) and the Federation of I n t e rna t i ona l Civi l servants 
Association (FICSA) requested the Commission at i t s second 
sess ion held a t Geneva (Switzerland ) from 11 to 29 August 
1975 to consider , as a matter of urgency the pess ib le 
changes in the post grading,. The pos t Adjustment System 
was, according to t h i r d repor t of ICSC designed to ; 
1. See YIJN_ , 1975, p .920. 
153 
"maintain equa l i ty of purchasing power 
of united Nations Sa la r i e s for s taf f in 
the profession^ii and higher ca t egor i e s 
in duty s t a t i o n s throughout the world; 
consequently, i t r e f l ec t ed changes both 
in cos t of l i v ing and in the exchange 
value of the United S ta tes do l l a r in 
r e l a t i o n t o loQal cu r r enc i e s . "2 
The Administrat ive committee on coordinat ion 
pointed out in a r epo r t to the Commission t h a t the 
ques t ions regarding the increase in the cos t of l i v i n g 
and f luc tua t ions in the ej^change r a t e s of a magnitude 
were never considered at the time of the adoption of the 
pos t adjustment system. Nor was the system capable of 
maintaining the r e a l value of emoluments/ p a r t i c u l a r l y 
where the loca l currency had appreciated markedly in 
r e l a t i o n to the United S ta tes d o l l a r . This led t o heavy 
l o s s e s for s taf f members without dependents in comparison 
to staff with dependent:s ; the reason being tha t the former 
received post adjustment ^ t only two t h i r d s of the f u l l 
"with dependents" r a t e s . 
At the Commission's second session, the AGO 
offered i t s suggest ions for two poss ib le remedies to 
solve the problems faced by the s taf f without dependents in 
the ex i s t i ng pos t adjustment system , The remedies v^ere : 
2. YVK^ , 1977, p .988, Ser in f ra . Footnote 10. 
3. lUN , 1975, p .921 . 
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to remove the recogni t ion of dependency s t a tus from the 
pos t adjustment system and to r e f l e c t i t elgswhere in the 
sa l a ry system, and the second one was to d i s t i n g u i s h 
between movements in the post-adjustment index due to 
r i s e s in cos t of l iv ing expressed in loca l currency and 
those due to f l u c t u a t i o n s in the exchange r a t e . In addi t ion, 
the ACC suggested a t h i r d so lu t ion to over come the problem 
through a provision of a temporary supplement to the post 
adjustment r a t e for staff without dei,endents at c a l s s e s 
above a ce r t a in threshold l eve l c l a s s was to be d e t e r -
mined according t o the base for cos t of l i v ing adjustment 
4 
a t d i f f e ren t duty s t a t i o n s . 
The Commission agreed for an interim solut ion 
to the problem of pos t adjustment af ter hearing the views 
of the executive heads and the s taf f . However, i t made 
c l e a r t h a t such a so lu t ion would not prejudice the 
long term conclusions which the commission might come 
to l a t e r . 
The Commission provided tha t the interim remedy 
would be applicable to the c l a s s e s of the post adjustment 
above c l a s s 7. The reason was t h a t the c l a s s of pos t 
4. Ibid. 
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adjustment in New York was taken as 7 at the time of the 
l a s t increase in s a l a r i e s i . e . approved by the General 
Assembly in 1974, e f f ec t ive from 1 January 1975. The 
Commission fur ther made i t c l e a r t h a t the r a t i o of remu-
nera t ion of s taff without dependents would not f a l l below 
90 per cent of t h a t of s t a f f with dependents. I t means, 
the pos t adjustment r a t e for the s taf f without dependents 
would be fixed at 85 per cent of the f u l l r a t e at c l a s s e s 
8 and above, and no changes were recommended for duty 
s t a t i o n s c l a s s i f i e d a t c l a s s 7 and below. This interim mea-
sure recommended by the Commission , could be e f fec t ive 
frcm 1 January 1976 and va l id only u n t i l a general long-
term solut ion was approved, A d ra f t r e so lu t ion incorpor-
a t ing t h i s interim solut ion was recommended by the Commission, 
and the F i f t h Committee approved i t on 2 December,1975, 
proposed by Austr ia , Germany (FRG) , Ghana, India, Japan, 
Moxico and Poland by 72 voteg to 10, with 2 abs ten t ions . 
The General Assembly adopted t h i s r e so lu t ion on 8 December 
1975 by 97 votes t o 9, with 3 abs ten t ions , under i t s 
r e s o l u t i o n 3418 B(XXX). 
At the t h i r d session held at the United Nations 
Headquarter, New York, from 8 to 26 March 1976, the Carunisslon 
6. UN Monthly Chronicle , Jan. 1976 vol . XI I I , P, 69 
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went through the repor t of an ad-hoc meeting of consu l tan ts 
held in November 1975. The commission a lso approved the terms 
of reference of a permanent subsidiary body on post adju-
stment mat te r s authorized by the General Assembly to be 
e s t ab l i shed by Resolution 3818 A (XXX.). The Commission 
proposed tha t the body should be c a l l e d as the Advisory 
Committee on post Adjustment Questions (ACPAQ). The 
Commission decided t h a t the Committee would cons i s t of six 
members on the ba s i s of equi table geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n 
in accordance with the General Assembly's r e s o l u t i o n s , 
including one member of the Corimission designated as i t s 
e.x-officio Chairroan/ other members were to come from the 
following geographical reg ions ; Africa, Asia, Latin*America, 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe and other S ta tes , Howeveri 
the Comrrission inv i ted the former members of the previous 
Expert Committee on Post adjustment of 1975 to continue 
t h e i r membership in the new body. At the same time the 
Commission was looking for a su i t ab le candidate from the 
7 Committee 
Latin American region . The, was thus cons t i t u t ed as follows: 
/ 
"Mr, pascal Frochacex (Switzer land) , Chairman, 
Mr, Youri Batovrin(USSR); Mr. Geoffrey H.Moore 
(US); Mr. E.N. Omaboe (Ghana); Mr, B , Ranamurti 
( Ind ia ) ; and one member from the Latin American 
region , to be appointed,"8 
7. UN Doc, A/31/30, p . 5, 
8, Ib id , 
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The p rofess iona l s taf f Association of FAO 
submitted a quest ion to the Cormnission a t i t s four th 
session held a t the headquarters of the Food and Agricu-
l t u r a l Organization (FAO) from 28 June to 16 July1976 
regarding the pos t adjustment index fcr Rone ( I t a l y ) . 
The problem voiced by the s ta f f arose under the circumstan-
ces of heavy devaluat ion of the loca l currency in r e l a t i o n 
to the US d o l l a r , accompanied by rappid i n f l a t i on in 
I t a l y . Thus the normal operat ion of the pos t adjustment 
System could not be successful in p ro tec t ing the s ta f f 
agains t heavy lo s se s . Hov.«ver, the Commission , a f te r 
having exanined the i ssue month by month over the 
pas t two yearfi,reached the conclusion t h a t in general there 
was no undue lag between the actual r i s e in the pos t 
adjustment index and the c l a s s of pos t adjustment . 
Following i t s review, the Commission made i t c l e a r t ha t no 
9 
spec ia l act ion in r e spec t of Rome was requi red . 
The Commissioin's Advisory Committee on Post -
Adjustment Question (ACtAQ) held i t s second session from 
13 to 19 July a t the headquarter of the In t e rna t iona l Civi l 
Aviation Organization in Montreal, Canada. The Comjnittee 
noted t h a t the major i ty of the Commission's members had 
agreed in 1976 t h a t there was no need to define a p rec i se 
9. Ibid. 
158 
optimum margin, and there was no need of any modificat ion 
in the pos t Adju£t7;ent system to maintain a r i g i d margin. 
The Commission approached ACFAQ to review and 
submit a f u l l report in 1977 on the impl ica t ions of bas i : 
changes in c lasses (c lass r e f e r s to the bases for cos t 
of l i v i n g adjustments a t d i f f e r e n t duty s t a t i o n s ) of Post 
Adjustment on index moverr.ent of 5 per cent in r e l a t i o n 
to the preceding c l a s s , r a t h e r then, as cu r r en t l y , on 
movements of 5 p o i n t s in r e l a t i o n to the base 100 (current ly 
New York, Nov. 1973) • This proposed 5 percent ru le would 
f a c i l i t a t e cont ro l over the evolut ion of the margin between 
United Nations remuneration and t h a t of the comparator^ 
country . However, the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Civ i l Servants Asso-
c i a t i o n opposed 5 per cen t method before both ACPAQ and 
Commission on the ground t h a t new system would introduce 
an extension of the wait ing per iod in qual i fying for a 
new c l a s s and tha t the d i f f e r e n t i a l treatment imposed on 
s ta f f a t d i f f e ren t duty s t a t i o n s would be disadvantageous 
to those in high post adjustment a reas . However, the consu-
l t a t i v e Committee on Achiinistrative Questions , the subs i -
d ia ry body of ACC, agreed with ACPAQ, 
11, Ib id . 
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The Commission recommended t h a t the General 
Assembly should consider with e f f ec t from 1 July 1978, 
t h a t the system of pos t adjustments be revised to provide* 
" tha t changes in c l a s s e s of post adjustment 
be based on index movements of 5 per cent 
r a t h e r than of f ive p o i n t s ; amend the s taff 
Regulat ions of the United Nations, with 
e f f ec t from the same da ta , replac ing the 
e x i s t i n g schedule with new t a b l e s , . . . showing 
the amount of pos t adjustment for one index 
po in t at each grade and s t e p . . . . , and authorize 
the Commission to take a l l necessary measures 
to Implement the change".12 
Member of Belgium, Canada, prance, I t a l y , japan, 
the P h i l i p p i n e s , ^ a i n , the USSR, and the United Kingdom 
supported the proposal of new formula of post-adjustment . 
The General Assembly adopted a three p a r t 
d ra f t r e s o l u t i o n on 21 December 1977 by a vote of 125 to 9 
which became r e s o l u t i o n 32/200. I t was presented by Ghana, 
the chairman of the ad-hoc working group and sponsored 
by 30 Member s t a t e s from a l l reg iona l groups except Eastern 
Europe, This d ra f t r e s o l u t i o n was approved by the Fi f th 
Committee on 9 Dec, 1977 by 81 votes to 8, 
The General Assembly approved the recommendation 
of the Commission by s e c t l o n l l of the three pa r t r e so lu -
t ion 32 /200 with e f f ec t from 1 Ju ly 1978. The system 
of pos t adjustment t h a t i s change in c l a s s of po3t 
adjustment were to be based on index movements of 5 per 
13 cent r a the r than of f ive p o i n t s . The; Commission also 
12. Ibid. 
13. YUN, 1977, p .992. 
160 
approved the in t roduct ion of a plan for r e n t a l subsidy 
for each depencent upto a t o t a l of four persons including 
the s taff only a t duty s t a t i o n s outs ide Europe and Korth 
America, This was meant be a p a r t of the pos t adjustment 
system on a t r i a l b^s i s for one year from 1 July 1978, 
There were var ious aspects of the e f f e c t s of the 
i n s t a b i l i t y of cu r renc ie s on the United Nations Common 
system of s a l a r i e s and allowances. The i n s t a b i l i t y of 
cu r r enc i e s were the r e s u l t of deprec ia t ion of the United 
S ta tes d o l l a r ( the u n i t of the account of the system) in 
r e l a t i o n to cur renc ies of a number of o ther coun t r i e s / 
p a r t i c u l a r l y at the Genera duty s t a t i on where the l a r g e s t 
concen t ra t ion of s taff of the common system ex is ted .Al l 
o ther duty s t a t i o n s were a lso affected including those 
where deprec ia t ion of loca l cunency against the do l l a r 
ex i s t ed . This led to a high leve l of pos t adjustment 
c l a s s in Geneva, consequently i t r e f l ec t ed obs t ruc t ions in 
the functioning of the pos t adjustment system. However, 
the Commission arranged to study the ex ten t to which the 
pos t adjustment system could p r o t e c t the remunerations 
15 of the p rofess iona l and higher c a t e g o r i e s . 
I t was adopted by the General Assembly under 
paragraph 2 of Section I I of Resolution 33/119, as recommended 
by Fi f th committee on 19 December 1978, meeting 88, by the 
1 4 , YUN, 1 9 7 8 , p . 9 9 3 . 
15. Ib id . 
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recorded vote of 126 to 0, with 10 abs ten t ions . The 
Commission also concluded in paragraph 1 of sect ion I I 
of the r e so lu t ion , t h a t safeguards should be made agains t 
undue widening of the margin between the l eve l s of the 
remuneration of the p ro fess iona l and higher ca tegor ies of 
the United Nations Common System and the Comparator na t iona l 
ci-yil se rv ices ( i . e . United s t a t e s Federal C iv i l Service) 
1 7 r e s u l t i n g from the opera t ion of the post adjustment system. 
The U.K. r ep resen ta t ive proposed t h a t the United S t a t e s 
Nation Civ i l Service^regarded as comparator se rv ice . The 
reason i t gave was t h a t t h i s se rv ice remained the bes t paid 
18 na t iona l c i v i l s e rv ice . 
The Commi^ion had compared in 1978 the funct ions 
and l eve l s of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of jobs in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c i v i l service and the United S ta tes federa l c i v i l service 
as comparator upto the p r i n c i p a l o f f i ce r (D-l) l e v e l , 
work-ing out a se t of grade equiva lenc ies for use in i t s 
sa l a ry comparisons. While the Commission dn i t s 1979 r epo r t , 
recommended the extension of comparison upto the Director 
(D-2) l eve l on the reques t of General Assembly in 1978, i t 
a lso reserved the approximate equiva lenc ies for the l e v e l s 
of Ass i s tan t Secretary General (ASG) and Under secre tary 
16 . Ib id . 
17. UN Doc, V34/30 p a r a i l S p .B . 
18 . YUN, 1978 , p . 9 9 4 . 
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Genera l ( U S G ) . I t took two or t h r e e Uni ted S t a t e s g r a d e s 
as the b a s i s for comparison wi th each Uni ted Na t ions grade 
19 For example ; 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l Serv ice 
D- 2 ( D i r e c t o r ) 
ASG ( A s s i s t a n t Sec re ta ry 
General ) 
USG (Under Sec re t a ry 
Genera l ) 
Uni ted S t a t e s C i v i l Serv ice 
fGS = 17 weight Of 67 
CS - 18A-V , , 
E - IV 
E-IV 
E- I IT 
,E- I I 
67 
33 
17 
63 
20 
Here GS s t a n d s fo r g r a d e s in t h e Genera l Schedule and E 
for Grades i n t h e Senior Execut ive S e r v i c e . 
The ccfnmission had p r e s e n t e d the l a t e s t f i g u r e 
of t h e margin between the s a l a r y l e v e l s of two s e r v i c e s 
i n t h e y e a r ended September 1979 i . e . s a l a r i e s in New York 
had averaged 13.9 p e r c e n t above t hose in Washington,D.C. 
( i . e . c o m p a r a t o r ) , a f t e r a d j u s t i n g f o r c o s t of l i v i n g 
d i f f e r e n c e s betvi'een New York and Washington ,D.C. This 
margin was 9 .3 pe r c e n t in 1978. 
19. UK Doc. V 3 4 / 3 0 ,1979, p . 5. 
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The Commiss ion recommended an i n c r e a s e m e n t i n 
s a l a r y s c a l e s r a n g i n g from 12 t o 19 p e r c e n t (15 p e r c e n t 
a v e r a g e ) f o r t h e 150 G e n e r a l s e r v i c e e m p l o y e e s of t h e 
I n t e r G o v e r n m e n t a l M a r i t i m e C o n s u l t a t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n 
(I^3CC) i n London and f o r 405 G, S. w o r k e r s of t h e I n t e r n a -
t i o n a l C i v i l A v i a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n ( I C A O ) i n M o n t r e a l . T h i s 
was done by r a i s i n g 3 t o 5 p e r c e n t (4 p e r c e n t a v e r a g e j 
by IMCO w i t h e f f e c t from 1 J a n u a r y 1979 cind by ICAC c o u n c i l 
20 
e f f e c t i v e 1 A p r i l 1979/ b a s e d on l o c a l s a l e r y s u r v e y s 
I t was a d o p t e d by t h e G e n e r a l Assembly on 17 Dec. 1979 
r e s o l u t i o n 3 4 / 1 6 5 by 133 t o 0 v o t e s , s u b s i q u e n t l y i t was 
a p p r o v e d by t h e F i f t h Commit tee on 98 Nov.1979 by 88 t o 0 
21 
v o t e s w i t h 3 a b s t e n t i o n s . 
The r e v i s e d s a l a r y and s t a f f a s s e s s m e n t s c a l e s 
were recommended by t h e Commission f o r t h e G e n e r a l S e r v i c e 
c a t e g o r y and c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f 3O p o i n t s of p o s t a d j u s t m e n t 
i n t o t h e b a s e s a l a r y of s t a f f i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l and h i g h e r 
c a t e g o r i e s i n o r d e r t o c o r r e c t c e r t a i n o b s t r u c t i o n and 
r e c t i f y t h e d e f i c i t e s e s t i m a t e d f o r 1980 a t some 3O 
22 
p e r c e n t . The U.K. s u p p o r t e d t h e ICSC f o r r e d u c i n g s l i g h t l y 
t h e c o s t of l i v i n g a l l o w a n c e f o r p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f . O t h e r 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who s u p p o r t e d t h e ICSC p r o p o s a l were t h o s e 
of t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of Germany, Ghana , J a p a n , P a k i s t a n , 
20.YUK, 1979 p . 1167 . 
2 1 , I b i d . p . 1 1 6 8 . 
22 . YUN, 1980, p . 1167 . 
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and t h e U.K. They were i n f a v o u r s h i f t i n g p a r t of t h e 
23 p o s t a d j u s t m e n t component o f pay i n t o t h e b a s e s a l a r y , 
e f f e c t i v e from 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 8 1 , The G e n e r a l Assembly a d o p t e d 
i t u n d e r S e c t i o n IV of t h e R e s o l u t i o n 3 5 / 2 1 4 A on 17 December 
1980 by 125 V o t e s t o 0, w i t h 12 a b s t e n t i o n s . T h i s was app-
r o v e d by t h e F i f t h Commit tee on 9 December 1980 by 8 4 v o t e s 
O A 
to 0, with 14 abs t en t ions . The United S ta t e s voted against 
sec t ion IV and abstained in the vote on the reso lu t ion , I t 
could not favour the consol ida t ion of 3C po in t s of pos t 
25 adjustment i n t o base sa la ry as i t was de fec t ive . The 
r ep re sen ta t i ve f e l t t h a t the proposed r e so lu t ion applied 
cos t of l iv ing adjustmentsto almost the e n t i r e net sa lary , 
and United Nations s taff members were over compensated 
for i n f l a t i o n , as the cos t of l i v i n g adjustments c l e a r l y 
took in to account extraneous expendi tures . 
The Commission continued to exariine r e l a t i o n -
ship made annually between United Nations staff in New 
York a t l eve l s P-1 through D-2(Director ) and United States 
c i v i l servents at corresponding l e v e l s in Washington ,D,C, 
were based on the net pay of o f f i c i a l s with a dependent 
spoese but no ch i ld ren , adjusted for the cos t of l i v ing 
di f ference between the two c i t i e s . The Commission found 
t h a t the margin between the two se rv ices , by which UN 
s a l a r i e s exceeded US s a l a r i e s ranged from 16 percent 
23. Ibid p, 1168 
24. U.N, Monthly Chronicle, Feb. 1981, p. 50. 
25. YUN, 1980. p.1173. 
26. Ibid, p. 1168 
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In 1979/1880 (lO, Oc tober - 30 September 1980) t o 17 
p e r cen t i n 1980/1981 (1 October 1980-30 Sept . 1981)?'^ 
However, the t o t a l compensat ion r a t i o ad jus t ed f o r 
c o s t of l i v i n g d i f f e r e n c e s was 114.2 of UN s a l a r i e s t o 100 
US s a l a r i e s * due t o s a l a r i e s increasemer. t of US C i v i l 
Servant on 1 October 1980. 
The Commission p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e p r o g r e s s 
made towards improving the methodology for c o s t of l i v i n g 
measurement s u r v e y s , was slow. Much more; remained t o be 
done wi th r e g a r d t o t h i s and o t h e r a s p e c t s of the p o s t 
adjus tment sys tem. For t h i s purpose a d a i t i o n a l funds was 
approved by the F i f t h Committee on 7 December 1981 t o 
> 
St reng then t h e c o s t of l i v i n g s e c t i o n of t h e Commission 
s e c r e t a r i a t f o r 1982-1983, so t h a t i t could improve the 
28 
methodology of c o s t of l i v i n g measurements . 
The ICSC recommended the p r o c e d u r e s r e g a r d i n g a 
s p e c i a l c o s t of l i v i n g index f o r p e n s i o n e r s for a d j u s t i n g 
c o s t of l i v i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l f a c t o r s a p p l i c a b l e t o r e t i r e e s 
from t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l and h i g h e r c a t e g o r i e s and where the 
r a t e s of t e x a t i o n were ze ro o r lower t han these i m p l i c i t 
in t h e amount of base p e n s i o n s p r o v i d e d under the u n i t e d 
N a t i o n s s t a f f p e n s i o n s scheme. 
27. YUN_ , 1981, p. 1337. 
28. Ibid, p. 1323 
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The Commiss ion r e q u e s t e d t h e G e n e r a l Assembly 
t h a t Compar i son of t o t a l c o m p e n s a t i o n c o m p a r i s o n .of 
n o n - e x p a t r i a t e b e n e f i t s p a i d t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o f f i c i a l s 
i n New York (g rade p - i t o D-2) and t o e m p l o y e e s of t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l C i v i l S e r v i c e i n W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . 
( g r a d e s GS-9 t o GS-16 and SES-1 t o SES-.6 ) . SES means 
S e n i o r E x e c u t i v e S e r v i c e . I t was b a s e d on t h e c o s t o f 
29 l i v i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l . 
The Commiss ion c a l c u l a t e d t h e m a r g i n b e t w e e n 
t h e r e m u n e r a t i o n of t h e o f f i c i a l ? of t h e UN C i v i l S e r v i c e s 
and t h a t o f US f e d e r a l C i v i l S e r v i c e s a t t h e i r h e a d q u a r t e r s 
f o r t h e p e r i o d of 1 O c t . 1 9 8 1 t o 30 S e p t . 1982* D i f f e r e n c e s 
i n c o s t of l i v i n g b e t w e e n t h e two c i t i e s were a l s o t a k e n 
i n t o a c c o u n t i n t h e m a r g i n c a l c u l a t i o n s and 2 6 . 1 p e r c e n t 
m a r g i n was n o t e d f o r a v e r a g e r a t i o of n e t r e m u n e r a t i o n a t 
m a t c h i n g g r a d e s , 6 . 7 p e r c e n t m a r g i n i n c a s e of c o s t of 
l i v i n g r a t i o of New York o v e r Washington , D . C . and 1 8 . 2 
p e r c e n t i n c a s e of a v e r a g e r a t i o a d j u s t e d f o r c o s t of 
?0 l i v i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l of New York o v e r W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . 
a v e r a g e n e t r e m u n e r a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l s e r v i c e s , 
a d j u s t e d f o r c o s t of l i v i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l b e t w e e n New York 
and Wash ing ton , D.C. f o r t h e p e r i o d of 1 O c t o b e r 1982 t o 
30 S e p t . 1 9 8 3 , 1 6 . 5 p e r c e n t above t h a t of t h e m a t c h i n g 
g r a d e s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e s . 
2 9 . UN Month ly C h r o n i c l e . J a n . 1 9 8 3 # p . 8 8 . 
3 0 . UN Doc. A / 3 8 / 3 0 . 
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The Commission pointed out t h a t the decrease in 
margin since 1982 ( i . e . from 18.2 per cent to 16.5 per cent) 
was due t o ; 
a) 4 percent increase in the base salary' of employees of the 
United s t a t e s federa l C iv i l service^ e f fec t ive from 
1 Oct. 1982. 
b) Reduction in the r a t e s of f edera l income taxes , 
c) Changes in bon uses and performance awards received by 
those in SES.^^ 
At i t s e igh th session of 30 Kay to lO June 
held at Rome ( I t a ly ) and the n in th session resumed in 
New York from 31 October to 10 November , 1983, the IC£C's 
Advisory Committee on Post -Adjustment Questions (ACPAQ) 
under took a de ta i l ed examination of case s tud ies prepared 
by the ICSC Sec re t a r i a t a t six headquarters located in 
coun t r i e s j Austr ia , japan , the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Venezuella and with Washington, D.C. I t was examined with 
r e l a t i v e l y high post adjustments in comparison to t h a t 
for i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l service a t New York, while the 
AC PAQ, noting the pensioner? were in general very c lose 
to the post adjustment i nd i ce s applicable at the same 
loca t ion expressed the view t h a t since those f indings were 
based on only six headquarter s t u d i e s , the ACPAQ was in a 
31. YUN, 1983, p . 1187. 
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p o s i t i o n t o draw any d e f i n i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n ? concern ing the 
t r e n d a t t h e c u r r e n t s t a g e . Hence t h e ICSC a t i t s s p e c i a l 
s e s s ion in Nov.1983 took no d e c i s i o n on p o s t - a d j u s t m e n t 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of t h e main duty S t a t i o n s in t h e UN system. 
Moreover, i t r e q u e s t e d the ACPAQ t o raaxe f i n a l recommen-
d a t i o n s in 1984 on the examinat ion of case s t u d i e s , a f t e r 
32 
which commission would take i t s d e c i s i o n s . 
The ICSC noted the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e E i f t h 
Committee a t the 38th s e s s i o n 198 3 of t h e General Assembly, 
t he comparison of t h e p e n s i o n a b l e remunera t ion amounts 
which for the US f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e employees i nc reased 
by between 93 and l08 p e r c e n t for the p e r i o d from 1971 t o 
1983 a g a i n s t a c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n c r e a s e of between 218 and 
234 pe r c e n t in t h e same p e r i o d for the u n i t e d N a t i o n s 
o f f i c i a l s . The Commission opined t h a t t h i s type of compa-
r i s o n was i n a p p r o p r i a t e . The reason i t gave was t h a t in 
the US f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e system, p e n s i o n a b l e remunera-
t i o n amounts were reviewed on an annual b a s i s , whereas on 
the Uni ted N a t i o n s s i d e t h e s e were reviewed every four t o 
f i v e y e a r s until 1975 and have not been changed wi th the 
e x c e p t i o n of c o n s o l i d a t i o n of a p a s t of p o s t adjustment 
33 
since that date. 
The commission pointed out that pensionable 
remuneration in the United Nations increased during 1971 
32, YUN,1983/P.1187. 
33 . UN , DOC V 3 9 / 3 0 p . 7. 
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t o 1980 due t o d e p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e US d o l l a r ^ . Th i s 
d e v o l a a t i o n of US d o l l a r r e s u l t e d i n s h a r p i n c r e a s e s 
i n p o s t a d j u s t m e n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e o u t s i d e 
34 t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s . 
Moreover , t h e Conuniss ion m a i n t a i n e d t h a t any com-
p a r a b l e l e v e l s s h o u l d n o t b e l i m i t e d t o n e t r e m u n e r a t i o n , 
however i t s h o u l d a l s o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t o t h e r e l e m e n t s of 
35 
c o m p e n s a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g p e n s i o n b e n e f i t s . 
The ICSC a g r e e d on t h e n e e d t o c o n s o l i d a t e 
20 p o i n t s of p o s t a d j u s t m e n t i n t o n e t b a s e s a l a r y w i t h 
e f f e c t from 1 J a n u a r y 1985 a t i t s J u l y 1984 s e s s i o n . The 
Commiss ion recommended t o t h e G e n e r a l Assembly t h e r e s u l t -
i n g g r o s s s a l a r y s c a l e s and a m o u n t s o f p o s t - a d j u r t m e n t 
p e r i n d e x p o i n t s . I t a l s o recommended t h e m o d i f i e d r a t e s 
of s t a f f a s s e s s m e n t f o r t h e s t a f f i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l 
and h i g h e r c a t e g o r i e s wh ich t o o k e f f e c t from 1 J a n u a r y 
1 9 8 5 . ^ ^ 
The ICSC d e c i d e d t o c o r r e c t t h e o b s t r u c t i o n s i n 
t h e p o s t a d j u s t m e n t i n d e x f o r New York on t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s 
34. Ibid. p.8. 
35. Ibid. p.9 
36. yjN , 1984, p. 1160. 
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of ACPAQ r e l a t i n g to the cos t of l i v ing surveys in major 
duty s t a t i o n s through a 9.6 percent i nc rease . The connni 
ssion also viewed t h a t the adjusted index for New York 
should be used for determining post-adjustment c l a s s i f -
i c a t i o n s of a l l duty s t a t i o n s e f fec t ive from 1 August 
1984. I t also gave i t s consent for cos t of l iv ing r e l a t i v e s 
between New York and the six other heacquarters duty 
s t a t i o n s and Washington, D.C. These recommendations made 
by the ACFAQ and dec is ion taken by the ICSC were welcomed 
by ACC and were endorsed by CCISUA. 
The ICSC examined the margin between the net 
remuneration of UN se rv ices and t h a t of comparator at 
i t ? 21st and 2nd sess ion held in 1985 in London ( l i to 29 
March ) and in New York X8 t o 26 J u l y ) . The Commission 
recommenced to the Geheral Assembly in i t s eleventh annual 
r e p o r t , the range of llO to 120, with average 115 , for 
the margin between the net renumeration of o f f i c i a l s in 
the p rofess iona l and higher c a t ego r i e s of the UN in 
New York and of comparator in Wahington, D.C. The commiss-
ion a l so reported t h a t the leve l of the margin cur ren t ly 
37 stood at 121.3. This recommendation was adopted by the 
General Assembly on 18 December 1985 by Resolution 40/244, 
without vote . 
37.YUN« 1985, pp. 1245-46. 
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The Commissions Advisory Committee on Pos t 
Adjustment Ques t ions (ACPAQ) made s u g g e s t i o n s t o the 
Commission a t i t s t e n t h s e s s i o n he ld in v iene ( A u s t r i a ) 
from 7 t o 17 May 1985 on m a t t e r s l i k e maintenance of 
e q u i v a l e n c e of p u r c h a s i n g power between New York and 
o t h e r du ty s t a t i o n s , the o p e r a t i o n of the p o s t a d j u s t -
ment system w i t h i n a de f ined margin range problems 
r e l a t i n g t o duty s t a t i o n s wi th low or n e g a t i v e p o s t -
Adjus tments , s e p a r a t i o n of the e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n and 
c u r r e n c y f l u c t u a t i o n s w i t h i n the p o s t ad jus tment system 
38 
and the methodology f o r c o s t of l i v i n g s u r v e y s . 
The ICSC a t i t s twenty t h i r d se s s ion he ld i n 
o f f i c e of t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s a t N a i r o b i (March 1986) r e c o -
mmended a range of l lO t o 120, wi th a d e s i r a b l e m i d - p o i n t 
of 115, for the margin between t h e n e t r emunera t ion of 
o f f i c i a l s i n the p r o f e s s i o n a l and h i g h e r c a t e g o r i e s of 
t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s i n New York and t h a t of o f f i c i a l s i n 
comparable p o s i t i o n s i n the US f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e 
under Genera l Assembly R e s o l u t i o n 40/244 of 18 Dec .1985. 
The Commission a l s o recommended a methodology f o r t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p e n s i o n a b l e r emunera t ion of Uni ted 
N a t i o n s o f f i c i a l s i n g r a d e s F-1 th rough D-3, the p rocedure 
o f^pens ionab l e r emunera t ion amounts a t t h e A s s i s t a n t 
38. I b i d , p .1246 . 
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S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l and Under S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l l e v e l , t h e 
s c a l e Of s t a f f a s s e s s m e n t f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w i t h e f f e c t 
from 1 A p r i l 1987, t h e s c a l e s of p e n s i o n a b l e r e m u n e r a t i o n 
a n o u n t s f o r t h e P r o f e s s i o n a l and h i g h e r c a t e g o r i e s f o r 
b o t h b e n e f i t and c o n t r i b u t i o n p u r p o s e s f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
w i t h e f f e c t from 1 A p r i l 1987 a n d - t h e i n t e r i m a d j u s t m e n t 
p r o c e d u r e f o r a d j u s t i n g p e n s i o n a b l e r e m u n e r a t i o n amounts 
39 
b e t w e e n c o m p r e h e n s i v e r e v i e w s . 
In 1986 t h e ICSC a p p l i e d a r e m u n e r a t i o n c o r r e -
c t i o n f a c t o r (RCF) a t t h e s i x h e a d q u a r t e r s l o c a t i o n s , o t h e r 
t h a n New York t o s e p a r a t i n g t h e e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n and 
c u r r e n c y f l u c t u a t i o n s i n t h e p o s t - a d j u s t m e n t sys tem on an 
i n t e r i m b a s i s w i t h e f f e c t from 1 Sep t ember 1986, T h i s 
was a l s o t o be a p p l i e d i n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s w i t h f u l l y 
c o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n c i e s and i n J a p a n t o o f f s e t t h e e f f e c t s 
of upward and downward movements of e x c h a n g e r a t e f l u c t u a -
t i o n s on t a k e home p a y . The Commiss ion r e q u e s t e d ACFAQ 
t i m e and a g a i n t o c o n t i n u e i t s s t u d y of t h e i s s u e w i t h 
40 
a v i ew t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a l o n g - t e r m s o l u t i o n . 
The C a n m i s s i o n a f t e r r e v i e w t h e ACPAQ r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , 
a p p r o v e d i t a t i t s 2 4 t h s e s s i o n h e l d a t New York ( J u l y 1986) 
The ACPAQ r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s was r e l a t e d t o t h e me thodo logy 
3 9 . UN Doc A / 4 1 / 3 0 p . I x , 
40 , I b i d p . 3 5 . 
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for the conduct of cos t of l i v i n g surveys looked for t o 
achieve a balance between the need for S t a t i s t i c a l accuracy 
and for s impl ic i ty in da ta c o l l e c t i o n and ana lys i s procedures 
and to provide s implif ied methods which would be e f fec t ive 
in cases of high i n f l a t i o n and / o r subs t an t i a l devaluat ion 
41 of the loca l currency. 
The Commission in 1987 took some dec is ions for 
a r iv ing a t margin of remuneration, which would be accepta-
ble to the o f f i c i a l s of the United Nations Common System 
in comparison of the United S t a t e s federa l c i v i l s e rv ice . 
The commission for above ob jec t ive? used average senior 
Executive Service s a l a r i e s in remuneration comparisons,; 
the equivalency of Ass i s tan t Secretary General /Under 
Secretary General l e v e l s was kept under study. The commission 
did not applied remuneration comparisons to t r a n s l a t o r 
p o s i t i o n s . The Commission concluded the review r e l a t i n g 
t o the e f f ec t of ca ree r l eng ths on average s a l a r i e s and 
noted the lack of da ta on which to base cin appropriate 
evalua t ion . The Commission applied the square root weighting 
technique in the c a l c u l a t i o n of the United Nations Common 
System grade averages. The Commission opined t h a t the 
approval of the recommended changes would r e s u l t in the 
margin dropping below 115 in f i s c a l year^ 1988. This 
41 , Ibid p . 34. 
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42 
would r e s u l t i n an expense of $ 2 .85 m i l l i o n f o r 1988. 
The ICSC a t i t s 26th s e s s i o n held in New York 
( Ju ly 1987) approved c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the r e p o r t of i t s 
Advisory Committee on p o s t Adjustment Quest ion (ACPAQ), 
The Commission approved the Commit tee ' s recommendations 
on me thodo log ica l changes/ which were d e a l i n g with educa t ion 
c o s t s , domest ic s e r v i c e and housing c o s t S / measurement of 
ou t Of a r e a non-consumption e x p e n d i t u r e s and automobile 
p u r c h a s e s t o be used t o c a r r y o u t f u t u r e c o s t of l i v i n g 
survey s. 
The Commission a f t e r r e v i e w i n g the r e n t a l 
subs idy scheme f o r h e a d q u a r t e r s and n o n - h e a d q u a r t e r s 
l o c a t i o n s p o i n t e d ou t t h a t a l l ext reme r e n t s would be 
r e p l a c e d by t h o s e r e n t s i n the i n t e r v a l de f ined as the 
average r e n t p l u s or minus two s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n for 
t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of r e n t a l subs idy t h e s e ho lds a t 
f i e l d du ty s t a t i o n s . The Ccxiimission a l s o recommended 
t h e e x c l u s i o n of r e n t s of s t a f f members who had been 
a t the du ty s t a t i o n fo r l e s s than f i v e y e a r s for the 
c a l c u l a t i o n of average r e n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g r e n t a l subs idy 
t h r e s h o l d s a t du ty s t a t i o n s i n Canada, the United s t a t e s , 
as we l l a s a t a l l h e a d q u a r t e r s and some of the o t h e r 
duty s t a t i o n s i n Europe. The Commission a l s o approved 
42. UN Doc. A / 4 2 / 3 0 p . XlV. 
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the app l ica t ion of a maximum margin of 20 per cent to 
rent-to-income r a t i o s on a graduated scal^^ in order to 
a r r ive a t r e n t a l subsidy th resho lds in a l l l oca t i ons . 
The ICSC decided t h a t a t the duty s t a t i o n s in Canada^ 
the USk, as well as a t a l l headquarters anc some of the 
other duty s t a t i o n s in Europe, the reimbursement r a t e s 
would be frozen during the period of a freeze on the 
post-adjustment in the New York. All the above dec is ions 
would become e f fec t ive as a t 1 August 1987. 
The other long term issue assigned to the Commi-
ssion under a r t i c l e 13 of i t s s t a t u t e was job - c l a s s i f i -
c a t i o n . The Commission began working or t h i s jissue in 
1976 and covered many sub-areas t o make the J o b - c l a s s i f i c -
at ion system more e f fec t ive and convenient for the s ta f f 
of the United Nations Common System. This issue i s taken up 
for the next chapter VI I I . 
43. Ibid, pp 47-49. 
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The need for job-grading s t ruc tu re was f e l t in 
1976 by the Secretary General and the Jo in t Inspect ion Unit 
(JIU) with a view to reforming the personnel po l i cy of the 
UK S e c r e t a r i a t . The main purposes of e s t a b l i s h i n g the j ob -
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system were to cover a l l p ro fess iona l c a t e -
gory, p o s t s in the S e c r e t a r i a t , with the aim of providing 
equ i tab le grading to ensure cons i s t en t r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the du t i e s of a pos t and the grade t o which i t was a l located. 
The other purpose was to r e s t r u c t u r e the General Service 
category by replac ing the e x i s t i n g five grades with a seven-
grade s t r u c t u r e s . This proposal , drawnup for the United 
Nations Headquarters, r e fe r red to the ICSC. However, at the 
United Nations Office a t Geneva, General service s ta f f 
led a s t r i k e for the s a l a r i e s . This s t r i k e compelled the 
Secretary General t o make proposa ls for pe rmi t t ing the 
immediate implementation of a Job-grading s t r u c t u r e study 
of the General Service category at Geneva, which la te ron 
would cover a l l o ther duty s t a t i o n s . 
During the per iod of d iscuss ion concerning the 
implementation of personnel pol icy reforms in the Fi f th 
(Administrative and Budgetary) Committee of the General 
Assembly, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of France, the Federal Republic 
l.YUN, 1976, p . 870. 
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of Germany, the USA, Belgium and Canada, among o the r s , 
were in favour of proceeding immeaiately with the job-
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n programme to make a sound grading of job 
s t ruc tu re which was required for good s t a f f / management 
r e l a t i o n s . The r ep resen ta t ive of Japan opined tha t the 
job-grading programme a f t e r completing i t s task might 
avert the s t r i k e of s taff a t Geneva in February -March 
1976.^ 
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l C iv i l Service Commission at 
i t s 5th session held at the UN Headquarter frcm22 Feb. 
to 11 March 1977, considered a p lan for the assumption 
of i t s funct ions concerning job-grading s t roc tu re . The 
Commission main ob jec t ives in taking t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
were to c rea te ful ly uni f ied i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l service 
and to remunerate the s ta f f on the b a s i s of equal pay for 
equal work which would u l t ima te ly be helpful in corrmissions 
work in r e l a t i o n to recrui tment s tandards and t o career 
3 development. The Commission pointed out t h a t i t s f i r s t 
t a sk under a r t i c l e 13 was to e s t a b l i s h standards in f i e l d s 
of work, common to severa l of the organizat ions and to 
2. Ib id . p . 8 7 l . 
3. UM Doc A/32/30 (Report of the ICSC 19 77) General Assembly 
32nd s e s s i o n Supp. No. 30 , p . 69, 
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t o monitor t o the appl ica t ion of those standards under ar t ic le 
17 of i t s s t a t u t e , However, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y res ted with 
each organiza t ion to apply the s tandards in^ c l a s s i fy ing i t s 
Own p o s t s . The Commission considered i t s second function to 
be t o advise organiza t ions on the development of cons i s t en t 
j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p lans in other f i e l d s of work. 
The Commission ^proved the d iv i s ion of t a sks 
between i t s e l f and the CCAQ* The CCAQ was given the respon-
s i b i l i t y to coordinate the information concerning the organi-
za t ion ' s needs, views and proposals t o the Commipsion , which 
would act as gu ide l ines for common c l a s s i f i c a t i o n standards . 
The other r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was t o develop a common c l a s s i f -
i c a t i o n of Occupational groups in both ca t ego r i e s i . e . 
p ro fes s iona l and General Service Category, (which was needed 
for s t a t i s t i c a l as well as job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n purposes ) , 
The Commission a lso gave an assurance to s taff r ep resen ta t ives 
t h a t they would be given every opportunity to presen t t h e i r 
views before any common standard were e s t ab l i shed by the 
4 
Commission. 
The ICSC at i t s e ighth session held in 1978 
analysed the u s e s , t o which a common c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 
occupat ional groups was to be pu t . The Commission pointed 
out t h a t t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would provide a meaningful 
4. Ibid pp. 69-70. 
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exchange of information and compilat ion of personnel s t a t i s -
t i c s t o the organiza t ions of common ^s te-n . This was a lso 
necessary for the comnission and other i n t e r n a t i o n a l bodies 
in car ry ing out t h e i r func t ions . The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n was 
necessary for the es tabl ishment of ca ree r development and 
helped in the function of recrui tment by ident i fying those 
occupations for which recrui tment could be conducted j o i n t l y 
and by f a c i l i t a t i n g the prepara t ion where poss ib le , s tanda-
5 
rdized no t i ce s of vacancy. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would also 
be helpful in car ry ing out General Service salary surveys. 
However, the most deservable area which required t h i s 
exerc i se was t ha t of j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , by means of which 
a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would iden t i fy the f i e l d s of work, common 
to several of the o rgan iza t ions and j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
stabdards be e s t ab l i shed . 
The commission approved pre l iminary a global 
scheme for the common c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of occupational groups 
to be brought within the common system. The global scheme 
was a l i s t i n g of the occupations, grouped by ca t egor i e s 
of work on the b a s i s of s i m i l a r i t y of funct ions . This scheme 
provided four l e v e l s of c a t e g o r i z a t i o n : 
a) The "Occupational Group" (e .g . Profess iona l , Managerial, 
Technical and Related works"); 
5. UN Doc. .A/33/30 (Report of the ICSC) 1978 General 
Assembly 33rd Session, p.lOO. 
leo 
b) The "Family" (e.g. Arch i t ec t s , Engineers, and Related 
Technicians) ". 
c) The "Field of V>ork" (e .g . C iv i l Engineers); 
d) The "Occupation" or "Spec ia l i ty" (e .g . sani ta ry Engineers) . 
The Commission recommendec a point fac tor of 
j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n for the comparative study which measured 
the r e l a t i v e value of jobs in wide va r i e ty of occupational 
groups by awarding p o i n t s according to fac tors of work which 
were supported to make up the jobs . The fac to rs were p ro fe -
ss iona l knowledge requi red , d i f f i c u l t y of work, work r e l a t i -
onships required both ins ide and outside the organiza t ion , 
7 
supervisory r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the impact of work. 
At i t s lOth session held in New York from 13 to 31 
August 1979, the Commission approved a plan for the prepara-
t ion of a common system j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n standards, which 
was t o be used in determining the grade of each job within 
the var ious occupational groups, Thr plan helped in developing 
a t h r e e - t i e red system. 
Tier f would be a "MASTER STANDARD" applicable 
to a l l p rofess iona l jobs in the organiza t ions belong t o 
6. Ib id , pp. 100-101 
7. YUN, 1978, p .991 , Report of the ICSC. 
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t o the common system. I t was also to be grade jobs accord-
ing to an ana lys is of s k i l l s / r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , experience 
and o ther requirements, with d i f f e r i n g numbers of po in t s 
assigned to each fac to r . This t i e r was to be applied t o jobs 
in a l l f i e l d s of work and so named as "HCRIZCKTAL •• standard, 
Tier I I was to c o n s i s t of "GRADE-LEVEL STANDARDS 
FOR SPECIFIC FIELDS OF WORK" , such a s economist or e d i t o r , 
providing specif ic examples of the types of du t i e s t y p i c a l l y 
c a r r i e d out at a given grade l e v e l . This standard was ca l l ed 
"VERTICAL" standards as separate standards would be e s t a -
bl i shed for f i e ld of work and as such they would be more 
spec i f ic than the master standard in t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
to ind iv idua l cases . 
Tier I I I cons i s ted of "BENCHMARK JOBS", which 
was to be e s t ab l i shed by each organiza t ion separa te ly , 
iden t i fy ing ac tual jobs in terms of the standards se t 
out in the f i r s t and second t i e r s . The bench mark standards 
was t he most spec i f i c , the most d i r e c t l y applicable of the 
three t i e r s . However, i t was appl icable to gnaller numbers 
of jobs . 
The ICSC at i t s e leventh session held at New 
8. YUN, 1979, pp, 1167- 1168. 
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York (19 Feb-14 March 1980) approved the programme ca r r i ed 
out by a t e s t i n g team on the development and t e s t i n g of 
T i e r - I , the MASTER Standard of job grading. This t e s t i n g 
team was a technica l body with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of de t e r -
mining whether or not the po in t s factor eva lua t ion system 
was su i t ab le for adoption as the Master standard of job-
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s tandards . The team was a composition of six 
members which included j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s p e c i a l i s t s 
from agencies of the common system , r ep resen ta t ive of 
FICSA and members of the commission's S e c r e t a r i a t . The 
team performed i t duty in carrying out a de ta i l ed t e s t i n g 
programme of seven weeks' durat ion in three duty s t a t i o n s , 
Geneva, New York, and Bangkok and 179 jobs examined. In 
the end of completing the work, the members of the team 
concluded tha t the p o i n t s fac tor evaluat ion system would 
be ad op. ted by the Commission. They gave following reasons 
for t h i s ^ . 
a) The po in t s f ac to r method of job evaluat ion i s ana ly t i ca l 
q u a n t i t a t i v e , and ob jec t ive . 
b) I t had worked well on s c i e n t i f i c , t echn ica l , adminis t ra-
t i v e , r e l a t i o n s and language jobs , on supervisory and 
jobs , on opera t iona l and support jobs , on headquarters 
and f i e ld j o b s . 
9. UM Doc. A/35/30 (Report of the ICSC, 1980) pp.57-58. 
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c) The system had been applied by c l a s s i f i e r s having 
d iverse experience and background. 
The Commission decided to approve the po in t 
fac to r eva lua t ion system as revised during the recent t e s t 
programme and Ins t ruc ted the Sec re t a r i a t t o prepare , a f te r 
consu l t a t i on with organiza t ions and s taff , and to submit 
to the Commission at i t s 12th sess ion, a plan for progreesive 
implementation fcom 1 January 1981 of the Master standard. 
At the 12th session of the ICSC, the gec re t a r i a t 
put before the commission a document having a plan for 
the progress ive implementation of the Master standard from 
1 January 1981. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of CCAQ in giving the i r 
consent t o the p lan pointed out t h a t the re was a large 
measure of agreement among the o rgan iza t ions concerning 
the way i n which the Master standard would be implemented. 
However, each organizat ion prepared to Implement the 
standard in accordance with I t s own requirements and a 
pace c o n s i s t e n t with i t s resources . 
The r ep re sen ta t i ve of FICSA opined t h a t the staff 
agreed with the p r i n c i p l e t h a t j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n p l ans 
be implemented in the p rocess . However, they pointed out 
t h a t the timing planned for implementing the standard* 
Moreover, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Organizat-
ions and of the s ta f f welcomed the in t roduc t ion of the 
Master Stsuidard, and taking account of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
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arrangements, resources and s taf f consul ta t ion procedures . 
Organ!2^11ions began implementing the Master Standard 
from 1 January 1981. 
The represen ta t ive of Japan commenting on the 
r epo r t of the ICSC pointed out t h a t the Master standard 
of j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n would cont r ibu ted to realiz^^tion of 
the objec t ive of equal pay for equal value. The Federal 
Republic of Germany opined t h a t j b b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ^ o u l d 
not be too r i g i d in lower p rofess iona l grades, Austr ia 
pointed out t h a t the system was complex and far removed 
from r e a l i t y . Whereas Afghanistan and the USSR did not 
accepted the plan on j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the Corrmission, 
The Commission announced at i t s 12th session i t s 
i n t en t ion t o consider and promulgate a t i t s session the 
T i e r - I I s tandards for Trans la tors and personnel Management 
^ e c i a l i s t s . The Cotnmission a l so prepared a programme of 
work for 1981 which included the development and promul-
gat ion of T i e r - I I standards for the Economists and Elect ronic 
12 Data Processing S p e c i a l i s t s f i e l d s of work. 
The Commission at i t s 13th session held at New York 
(23 Feb. 13 March 198l) accepted the request of t he United 
10. Ib id .pp . 59-62. 
11. YUN, 1980, p , 1169. 
12. UN Doc A/3 5/30 (Report of the ICSC, 1980) pp. 66-67, 
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Nations for a delay in promulgation the Tier_I I standards 
for personnel management s p e c i a l i s t s and requested i t s 
S e c r e t a r i a t to hold fur ther c o n s u l t a t i o n s with the organi -
za t ions to review job -desc r ip t i ons , organiza t ion c h a r t s 
and other r e levan t information to be provided by the 
uni ted Nations, The Commission a lso consul ted CCAQ to 
provide for the 14th sess ion i t s f i na l wr i t t en proposals 
for changes in these s tandards before t h e i r adoption and 
promulgation by the Commission. 
At i t s 14th session held a t New York from 6 t o 
31 Ju ly 1981, the Commission considered a repor t on the 
fur ther consu l t a t ion t h a t had taken place following the 
l 3 th session , The r e p o r t _ ind ica ted t h a t the United 
Nations had produced t o the ICSC s e c r e t a r i a t job-desc-
r i p t i o n s for the work of personnel management s p e c i a l i s t s 
in the areas of recrui tment (profess ional ) recrui tment 
(expert I and personnel adminis t ra t ion . Thl5 was confirmed 
by the Chairman of CCAQ, The p r e s iden t of FICSA appreciated 
the Commission's dec i s ion for delaying the promulgation, 
however, he r eg re t t ed t h a t the c o n s u l t a t i o n s had not included 
FICSA*S fu l l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The Commission decided to 
e s t a b l i s h and promulgate the T i e r - I I grade leve l standards 
for personnel management s p e c i a l i s t s within the organi -
za t ions of the common system as set fo r th in annex IV to 
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the ICSC'S r epor t of the four teenth sess ion . These s tandards 
were to have immediate e f f ec t and to be used in conjunction 
13 with each o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s use of the Master standard. 
At the 13th session the represen ta t ive of the 
United Nations c{>proached the Commission to delay the appro-
val of T ie r^ I I s tandards for t r a n s l a t o r s and r ev i so r s for 
fur ther c o n s u l t a t i o n s . The r ep re sen ta t i ve pointed out t h a t 
s teps had been taken t o modify the work of t r a n s l a t o r s and 
r e v i s o r s and the General Assembly, by i t s r e so lu t ion 35/225 
of l7 Dec.1980, had approved the proposa ls of the Secretary 
General for r e c l a s s i fy ing some 576 t r a n s l a t o r s ' and r e v i s e r s ' 
j^osts in the United Nations S e c r e t a r i a t , which wa? t o be 
implemented over the three year per iod from 1981 to 1983, 
on the b a s i s of the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the t r a n s l a t i o n s 
funct ions . 
The Commission at i t s 14th session also approved 
a method which was l e s s c o s t l y for making consu l ta t ions 
with organiza t ions and s taff , required for the development 
of Tier I I s tandards . 
The Commission was s a t i s f i e d at i t s 13th session 
with the p l a n s formulated by the majori ty of the organiza t ions 
13. Report of the ICSC, 1981, pp. 56-57. 
14. Ib id . 
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for implementation of the Master Standard as at 1 January 
19S1 and considered the fur ther progress a t i t s 14th Session 
made by those organiza t ions which had not sutmit ted de f in i t ive 
p l ans for the implementation of the Master standard. Hovjever, 
GATT informed tha t i t had not yet developed a p lan for the 
implementation of the Master s tandard. The reason i t gave 
was t h a t the executive head of that-^organization and the head 
of personnel was secu r i ty appointed and had not ye t had 
15 an opportuni ty to study the mat ter . 
The Commission was requested by the Chairman of 
CCAQ t h a t a number of o rganiza t ions had l imited s taff resources 
ava i l ab l e , which caused d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the implementation 
of the Mastarc Standara and l e s s number of personnel t r a inee 
for performing job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n d u t i e s . 
The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of ILO and IAEA c l a r i f i e d to 
the commission t h a t t h e i r o rganiza t ions had implemented the 
Master standard. The Commission a lso noted the s t a t u s 
of implementation of the Master standard in UKESCO, UPU, 
GATT, UNICLF, UNHCR, the UN Univers i ty , the In t e rna t i ona l 
Court of Jus t i ce and ITC, The Commission also approved a 
format at i t s 14th session on which organiza t ions would 
r epo r t s t a t i s t i c s to the commission a t i t s 15th session on 
15. YUN p,1327 (1981) 
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t h e i r app l ica t ion of the ICSC Master standard during 
1981. I t also recommended to i t s Sec re t a r i a t to issue 
a manual on j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and to conduct addi t ional 
t r a i n i n g workshops at headquar ters duty s t a t i o n s on the 
1 f\ 
subject of IC£C j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s tandards . 
S t a t i s t i c s provided by organiza t ions at the 
15th session held a t Geneva from 1 to 19 March 198 2 of 
the Corrmission ind ica ted t h a t 80 per cent of profess ional 
pos t s in the United Nations system had been covered and the 
Master standard of J o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n had been a5)plied t o 
about 15 per cent of the t o t a l p o s t s . The Commission f e l t 
the progress was s a t i s f a c t o r y taking i n t o account d i f f i c -
u l t i e s encountered by some o rgan iza t ions . The Commission 
also i n s t ruc t ed the S e c r e t a r i a t to car ryout a comprehensive 
study on the implementation of the Master Standard a f te r 
the f i r s t th ree yea r s (1981-1983).'' ' ' ' 
In 1982 the Commission covered two more f i e l d s 
of work-technical cooperat ion adminis t ra t ion and e l ec t ron ic 
da ta process ing under the Tier I I of job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and 
approved t h e i r promulgation. The ICSC a lso considered the 
work of the sub-committee on j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a sub-
committee of the CCAC. The sub-committee at i t s Geneva 
1 6 . UN Doc A / 3 6 / 3 0 ( R e p o r t of t h e ICSC, 1981 ) . p c 5 4 - 5 5 . 
17 . YUN 1982 , p p . 1 4 6 0 - 6 1 . 
189 
sess ion (from 24 to 28 May 1982) proposed for a study of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of General service Pos t s in non-headquarters 
duty-St at ions . At i t s 8th session held at Viena, Austria 
from 8 t o 12 Nov.1982, the sub-committee reviewed a 
d ra f t T i e r - I I standard for c i v i l Engineers and decided 
to separate the s tandards , which was t o be developed for 
the f i e l d s of accounting and finance o f f i c e r s , aud i to r s 
18 
and budget ana ly s t s . 
The Secretary General reported to the General 
Assembly in September 1982 t h a t a t 30 June, i054 p ro fe s s -
iona l p o s t s had been c l a s s i f i e d , of which 896 (85%) had 
been confirmed at t h e i r previous l e v e l s , 79 (7,5 per cen t ) 
up graded and 79 down graded. The Secretary General informed 
t h a t the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of new and vacant posts according 
to the Master Standard (Tier I) and occupational s tandards 
(Tier I I ) continued at the r a t e of approximately 65 pos t s 
each month. 
The ICSC approved s tandards for c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
• of General Service p o s t s at Headquarters in seven l e v e l s , 
which was t o be applied beginning in 1983; Job-desc r ip t ions 
and pos t eva lua t ions for a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme for the 
General serv ice a t United Nations Offices at Geneva were 
19 nearly completed, 
18, Ibid, p , 1461 
19, Ib id , 
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The Commission c o n s i d e r e d d r a f t T i e r - I I 
j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t a n d a r d s a t i t s 17th s e s s ion held a t 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a t Vienna, 
7-24 March 1983 fo r C i v i l E n g i n e e r i n g , which was developed 
i n accordance with t h e c o n s u l t a t i v e p r o c e s s . During 
c o n s u l t a t i o n f o r d r a f t i n g T i e r - I I f o r C i v i l Eng inee r ing , 
the views of the o r g a n i z a t i o n s and s t a f f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 
had been f u l l y t aken i n t o account , which was confirmed 
by the chairman of CCAQ and the P r e s i d e n t of FICSA. After 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of d r a f t , the commission dec ided t o e s t a b l i s h 
and promulgate fo r use w i t h i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n s of the 
Common System, with immediate e i f e c t , the T i e r - I I s t a n d a r d s 
20 
fo r C i v i l Eng inee r s i n c o n j u n c t i o n with Master Standard(Tie&I) 
The Commission a t i t s 18th ses s ion held a t New 
York (18 J u l y - 5 August 1983) had t aken the d e c i s i o n t o 
e s t a b l i s h and promulgate the T ie r I I s t anda rd fo r pu rcha -
s ing and c o n t r a c t i n g s p e c i a l i s t s fo r immediate a p p l i c a t i o n 
by o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Common System. The Commission had 
a l s o t aken i n t o account the c u r r e n t s t a t u s of t h e d r a f t 
T i e r I I s t a n d a r d s fo r a u d i t o r s , a c c o u n t a n t s and f i n a n c i a l 
a n a l y s t s and r e q u e s t e d i t s s e c r e t a r i a t t o submit d r a f t 
s t a n d a r d s fo r t he se f i e l d s of work t o i t a t i t s l 9 t h 
20. UN Doc. A/38/30 (Report of the ICSC. 1983) p . 3 1 . 
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session. The Commission also considered joint job-
classification standards developed by the coordination 
committee for workers in the trades and crafts in New 
Y O E k . ^ ^ 
The S e c r e t a r i a t of t h e ICSC p r e p a r e d a p l a n 
and p u t before t h e Commission a t i t s 19th s e s s i o n he ld 
i n P a r i s from 5 t o 23 March 1984. The P l a n was c o n s i -
de red by the Commission as i t d e s c r i b e d f u r t h e r work under 
t aken by a CCAQ /ICSC t e s t i n g team on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n ' of 
the Master S tandard t o c l a s s i f y p r o j e c t p o s t s . The Commi-
s s i o n p o i n t e d b u t t h a t i n s p i t e of p r o g r e s s had been made, 
the work had t aken longe r d u r a t i o n t h a n expec ted and 
r e q u e s t e d i t s S e c r e t a r i a t t o p r e p a r e the supplement t o the 
Master Standard and be p r e s e n t e d t o i t s twenty f i r s t 
22 s e s s i o n , 
A d r a f t T ie r I I s t a n d a r d s was c o n s i d e r e d by 
the Commission f o r a c c o u n t a n t s , f i n a n c i a l a n a l y s t s and 
f inance o f f i c e r s a t i t s 20th s e s s i o n he ld a t New York 
from 5 t o 27 J u l y /1984 . The Commission a l s o had t aken 
i n t o account the problems which became h indrance with the 
c o n c e p t of c a t e g o r i z a t i o n on the b a s i s of q u a n t i t a t i v e 
i n d i c a t o r s , and the Commission came t o know t h a t t h i s 
21. Ibid, pp. 31-32. 
22. UK Doc. A/39/30 (Report of the ICSC, 1984)p.50 
192 
c o n c e p t had a l s o c a u s e d d e l a y s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of 
T i e r I I s t a n d a r d s f o r t r a n s l a t o r s , f o r p e r s o n n e l 
management s p e c i a l i s t s and f o r a u d i t o r s . At t h e same 
t h e ICSC came a t a p o i n t and t o o k t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t 
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n , i f p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d , would f a c i l i t a t e t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e M a s t e r s t a n d a r d by c l a r i f y i n g d i f f -
e r e n c e s i n scope arxi c o m p l e x i t y t h a t migh t n o t be d i r e c t l y 
e v i d e n t from j o b - d e s c r i p t i o n a l o n e . 
The Commission a t i t s 2 0 t h s e s s i o n d e c i d e d 
t o p r o m u l g a t e t h e T i e r - I I s t a n d a r d f o r f i n a n c i a l manage-
ment s p e c i a l i s t s a t i t s 2 1 s t s e s s i o n a f t e r a f u r t h e r 
23 
e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e p r o p o s e d c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . The 
Commission a l s o t o o k a d e c i s i o n f o r r e q u e s t t o t h e o r g a -
n i z a t i o n s f o r d e v e l o p i n g a q u a n t i t a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s j o i n t l y 
which t h e y c o n s i d e r e d t r u l y m e a n i n g f u l and be h e l p f u l 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g b e t w e e n t h e r e l a t i v e scope of t h e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s f i n a n c i a l p rogrammes and t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g 
scope and c o m p l e x i t y , t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e j o b s i n t h e f i e l d 
of f i n a n c i a l management . The Commiss ion a l s o r e q u e s t e d 
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o submi t t h e s e q u a n t i t a t i v e i n d i c a t o r s 
a t i t s 2 1 s t s e s s i o n a l o n g w i t h on a n a l y s i s of how t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h o s e i n d i c a t o r s would l e a d t o g r e a t e r 
c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h t h e M a s t e r S t a n d a r d s t h a n t h e u s e of 
2 3 . I b i d . 
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t h e i n d i c a t o r s developed by t h e S e c r e t a r i a t in t h e 
24 C o n s u l t a t i o n p r o c e s s . 
The S e c r e t a r y Genera l r e p o t t e d in December 
1985 on c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of p o s t s i n t h e General Serv ice 
began i n 1982. He p o i n t e d ou t t h a t the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
Review Group- a J o i n t s taf f /management body submi t ted 
recommendations on t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l e v e l s of 3065 p o s t s , 
of which 300 were accepted by t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y 
Genera l fo r p e r s o n n e l s e r v i c e s . The S e c r e t a r y General 
a l s o gave f a c t s i n t h e r e p o r t about the p r o v i s i o n s 
made for a l l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s w i t h i n the General s e r v i c e 
c a t e g o r y i n h i s i n i t i a l budget p r o p o s a l s for 1986-87 . 
He s p e c i f i c a l l y gave some, assumption about the budget 
needed fo r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of j o b s q u a n t i t a t i v e l y as the 
proposed r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of 11 p o s t s from General Service 
t o the P - l / P - 2 l e v e l would r e q u i r e an a d d i t i o n a l $ 118000.^^ 
The ICSC a t i t s 21s t s e s s i o n held a t the 
head q u a r t e r of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Mari t ime Organ iza t ion 
(IMO) i n London from 11 t o 29 March 1985 c r i t i c a l l y 
examined a r e p o r t on the imp lemen ta t ion of the Master 
s t anda rd du r ing the p e r i o d 1981-1983. The r e p o r t c o n s i s t e d 
of Over a l l a n a l y s i s a s wel l a s the r e s u l t s and s t a t u s 
24. I b i d . 
25. y i ^ / 1985 p . 1241. 
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for each organiza t ion . In the absence of s t a t i s t i c s 
r e f l e c t i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n of d i f f e r en t types of 
work in the common system, the ICSC pointed out t h a t 
the common c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of occupational groups, 
s e t up t o enable the development of such s t a t i s t i c s , 
had not been ful ly implemented, however , i t concluded 
t h a t the Master standard was being general ly applied 
throughout the system. In the view of r epor t s from 
the organiza t ions and i n the l i g h t of the ana lys i s 
presented by i t s S e c r e t a r i a t , the Comnission noted t h a t 
the r a t e of implementation achieved by organ iza t ions 
ove ra l l (32.4 per cent) exceeded the r a t e t h a t would 
have been achieved i f a l l o rgan iza t ions had chosen the 
job-by-job approach, which would have led to an est ima-
ted implementation r a t e 27 percen t , requested organizat ion 
with implementation r a t e s lower than t h e i r accumulated 
r a t e of turn over for 1981-1983 t o put before the Commission 
27 
a t i t s 23rd session held in 1986. 
In 1985 the CoiT.mission considered the f i n a l 
r epo r t of the t e s t i n g team on the appl ica t ion of the 
26, UK Doc A / 4 0 / 3 0 (Report of the ICSC, 1985) p .49 . 
27, Ib id , p .50 . 
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Master s t anda rd t o p r o j e c t p o s t s . The Corrrnission decided 
t o promulgate a suppl iment t o t h e Master s t andard p r o p -
osed by the t e s t i n g t e a n i , which was t o be used when 
g r a d i n g the c o n t e n t of p r o j e c t j o b s . The Cormnission a l s o 
recommended the use of a j o b - d e s c r i p t i o n format in t ended 
t o p r o v i d e guidance i n g a t h e r i n g in fo rma t ion r e q u i r e d 
28 t o grade p r o j e c t p o s t s c o r r e c t l y . 
The commission a t i t s 2 1 s t s e s s i o n p o i n t e d out 
t h a t the o r g a n i z a t i o n s had not submi t t ed any p r o p o s a l s a t 
the P-1 grade l e v e l f o r i n c l u s i o n i n the s t anda rd . The 
Commission a l s o came t o know t h a t t he T i e r - I I s t a n o a r d s 
for a u d i t o r s / t r a n s l a t o r s , economis t s and c i v i l e n g i n e e r s 
had not i nc luded a grade l e v e l d e s c r i p t i o n for the F-1 
l e v e l . The re fo re , F-1 was s t r e s s e d by the Conrnission as 
29 
an e n t r y l e v e l f o r a l l o c c u p a t i o n s . The ICSC decided 
t o promulgate the T i e r - I I s t a n d a r d s for p u b l i c in fo rmat ion 
s p e c i a l i s t s and fo r the f i e l d of work of f i n a n c i a l management 
J -, ' ^ 3 0 s p e c i a l i s t s . 
The Commission considered a document a t i t s 
23rd session (March 1986) prepared by i t s s e c r e t a r i a t 
and votes prepared by the United Nations and by the 
United Nations Staff Union on the implementation of 
28. Ibid, pp. 50-51. 
29. Ibid, p.52. 
30. YUN, 1985, p.1242. 
j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the General Service and r e l a t e d 
ca tegor ies in New York UlSilCEF informed the Commission 
t h a t i t had implemented the r e s u l t s of the j o b - c l a s s -
i f i c a t i o n of the General service and r e l a t ed ca t egor i e s 
in NOV. 1985. The Governing Council of UNDP had decided 
at i t s session held i n February 1986, to implement the 
r e s u l t s of the exerc i se with e f fec t from 1 January 1986, 
At i t s 23rd sess ion, the Commission expected for the 
Secretary General t h a t he would subsequently implement 
the r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s recommended for the secur i ty service 
and t r ades and c r a f t s c a t ego r i e s and for those General 
Service p o s t s t h a t had been c l a s s i f i e d i d e n t i c a l l y by 
the United Nations C l a s s i f i c a t i o n sec t ion , CRG and the 
Jo in t Advisory Committee (JAC) and approved by the Secretary 
General . 
The Commission at i t s 23rd session while 
consider ing a p rogress r epor t on the development of 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s tandards for General Services/ pointed 
out t ha t the p rogress was slow in Baghdad and in Santiago, 
the Jo in t Inter-Agency Committee was adhering t o the 
re levant guide l i n e s and c r i t e r i a e s t ab l i shed by the 
Commission, The ICSC a l so repeated i t s request to the 
31. m^ Doc. A/41/30 (Report of the ICSC, 1986)pp. 45-4o. 
197 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o a r r a n g e f o r t h e t i m e l y s u b m i s s i o n of d r a f t 
s t a n d a r d s f o r S a n t i a g o and Baghdad, t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r i m 
r e p o r t s on t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t . 
The c o r m i i s s i o n a f t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t i t s 23rd 
s e s s i o n b e n c h mark j o b d e s c r i p t i o n s p r o p o s e d f o r G e n e r a l 
S e r v i c e i n s m a l l and medium s i z e d f i e l d d u t y s t a t i o n s , 
d e c i d e d t o p r o m u l g a t e i t w i t h i m m e d i a t e e f f e c t . The commiss ion 
a l s o p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s were w o r k i n g on t h e 
d e v e l o p m e n t of a s u p p o r t ( m a s t e r ) s t a n d a r d t o t h a t would be 
u s e d t o complement t h e b e n c h m a r k s i n t h o s e c a s e s where t h e y 
32 d i d n o t p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e c o v e r a g e . 
The Commiss ion c o n s i d e r e d t h e f i n a l r e p o r t a t 
i t s 2 4 t h s e s s i o n h e l d i n J u l y 1986 on t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of J o b -
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e G e n e r a l S e r v i c e and r e l a t e d 
c a t e g o r i e s a t V i e n n a , wh ich a l s o i n c l u d e d 22 benchmark j o b 
d e s c r i p t i o n s and d e c i d e d t o p r o m u l g a t e i t . The commiss ion a l s o 
r e q u e s t e d t h e V i e n n a b a s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o d e v e l o p some 
a d d i t i o n a l bench mark j o b d e s c r i p t i o n s f o r p o s t s a t t h e G-8 
l e v e l . ^^ 
The ICSC a t i t s 2 5 t h s e s s i o n (March 1987) h e l d 
a t New York had gone t h r o u g h r e p o r t s on t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n 
32 . I b i d , p . 4 8 . 
3 3 . I b i d , p p . 4 9 - 5 0 . 
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of t h e Master Standard by o r g a n i z a t i o n s p r e p a r e d by i t s 
s e c r e t a r i a t on the b a s i s of d e t a i l e d s t a t i s t i c s p rov ided 
by FAO, UNDP, UKICEF, W'HC and UNHCR. The Commission a f t e r 
f i n i s h i n g the rev iew, had noted the r a t e of implementa t ion 
of the Master Standard and Conf i rmat ion of the l e v e l s i n 
UNLP, UNICEF, and UNHCR and t h a t no f u r t h e r d e t a i l e d s t a t i s t i c s 
were r e q u i r e d from those o r g a n i z a t i o n s , the Commission a l s o 
no ted the high con f i rma t ion r a t e of c l a s s i f i e d l e v e l s of 
p o s t s i n FAO and r a t e of i n p l e m e n t a t i o n of the Master 
S tandard of 3 0 p e r c e n t and the high o v e r a l l c o n f i r m a t i o n 
r a t e i n WHO of P r o f e s s i o n a l l e v e l p o s t s , i n c l u d i n g p r o j e c t 
p o s t s . 
The ICSC a t i t s 26th s e s s i o n (July 1987) a t 
New York, c r e t i c a l l y examined t h e d e f i n i t i o n of Genera l 
Serv ice work l a i d down by i t s s e c r e t a r i a t wi th the he lp of 
the CCAG sub-commit tee on- J o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n (SCJC). Th is 
d e f i n i t i o n was as f o l l o w s i "^  
"General s e rv i ce work i s p r o c e d u r a l , o p e r a t i o n a l 
o r t e c h n i c a l i n n a t u r e and s u p p o r t s the e x e c u t i o n 
of the programmes of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t r a n g e s 
from s imple , r o u t i n e or r e p e t i t i v e d u t i e s based 
on fo l lowing d e t a i l e d i n s t r u c t i o n t o v a r i e d 
and complex a s s ignmen t s r e q u i r i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n 
based on e x t e n s i v e and i n d e p t h p r a c t i c a l knowledge 
34. UN Doc A/42/30 (Report of the ICSC, 1987) p . 7 4 
35. I b i d , p p . 74-75 . 
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of a spec i f ic subject area. The assignments 
are general ly performed on a counting b a s i s . 
The knowledge of the subject f i e l d and higher 
leve l s k i l l s are general ly developea through 
long experience and f a m i l i a r i t y with 
applicable procedures , r egu l a t i ons and p rece -
aen ts or p r o j e c t s of the organiza t ion in a 
narxow t echn ica l f i e l d or in an adminis t ra t ive 
support a c t i v i t y " . 
The Corrtnission a f t e r some c l a r i f i c a t i o n s given 
by i t s S e c r e t a r i a t , promulgated the d e f i n i t i o n of General 
service work and adopted the two step procedure for the 
determinat ion of t h i s l eve l of work. 
The Commision at i t s 25th session (March 1987) 
af te r f in i sh ing the review of a d ra f t j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
standard for s taff i n the General Service category at 
Baghdad, delegated the authorty to i t s chairman to promulgate 
i t and t o approve the development of bench mark job d e s c r i -
p t i o n s to supplement the s tandard. The Comrrisslon also consid-
ered a t i t s 25th session a r epo r t on progress i n the develop-
ment of c a l s s i f i c a t l o n s tandards for General Service at Santiago 
and had shown the lack of progress a t i t duty s t a t i o n . The 
ICSC a lso considered a note prepared by itJ> S e c r e t a r i a t 
provid ing the l a t e s t information received from t h e United 
Nations on the implementation of j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the 
General Service and r e l a t e d ca t ego r i e s i n New York and a f t e r 
cons ide ra t ion , the Commission reaffirmed the need for benchmark 
job-desc r ip t ion and repeated i t s reques t to t he three organiza-
t i ons based in New York to develop common benchmark 
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job - d e s c r i p t i o n s . The Corrmission also considered and 
decided to implement the J o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s tandards , 
including a proposal for three add i t iona l benchmark job-
d e s c r i p t i o n s at the G-8 l eve l for the General Service 
and r e l a t e d ca tegor ies a t Vienna a t i t s 25th session (March 
1987) held a t New York. The Commission also undertook the 
task of reviewing progress r e p o r t s provided by several organi-
za t ions on the in^lementation of the j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
s tandards of the General Service a t Addis .^aba. After 
reviewing the reports* the Commission requested those orga-
n i za t i ons t h a t had not ye t done so, l o implement the common 
grading standards promulgated in 1985. 
In t h i s way, the commission s t a r t ed i t s work 
r e l a t i n g to the grading s tandards of job s t ruc ture in 1976, 
Though the area wa-s wide and d i f f i c u l t , the Commission, with 
the help of CCAw t e s t i n g team on j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , FlCSA 
and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n Review Group, addressed i t s e l f solving 
a number of fundamental adminis t rat ive# f inanc ia l and other 
problems with energy, speed and Sc i en t i f i c method. 
Though i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rganiza t ions general ly have 
the au thor i ty t o : e s t a b l i s h adminis t ra t ive t r i b u n a l s or submit 
employment d i spu tes to t r i b u n a l s e s t ab l i shed by other organi -
za t ions , the question remains whether i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o e s t a -
b l i s h them. This issue i s studied i n the next chapter ( i x ) : 
"The nature .^n^ rpl^^-Of ^the UN Administrat ive Tribunal" 
36, Ibid, pp, 75-79, 
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In te rna t iona l - o rganiza t ions are the evidence of 
the growth and development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l socie ty during 
the 20th century. As a r e s u l t , there came i n t o exis tence the 
League of Natior.s, which was born and died, the United 
Nat ions , and a host of o ther i n t e r n a t i o n a l agerxries of 
d iverse na tu re . Their functions are to achieve a var ie ty 
of goals ranging from the p rese rva t ion of pe^ace t o the p ro -
t e c t i o n of human r i g h t s , the promotion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d e , economic development, and t echn ica l a s s i s t a n c e . 
However, they a l l have one important feature in common. They 
are a l l e s tab l i shed as corpora te bodies . Their corporate 
nature has been acknowledged both by the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community and indiv idual s t a t e s in t h a t both i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law and s t a t e s as members of i n t e r n a t i o n a l socie ty have 
recognized them as possess ing l ega l pe r sona l i t y . 
Individual s t a t e s have entered i n t o agreements 
with them based on i n t e r n a t i o n a l and municipal law, as 
2 
corporate bodies . This led the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l servant 
to become an inc reas ing ly ubiqui tous and ac t ive f igure on the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s tage . 
As a r e s u l t of these developments, employment 
r e l a t i o n s h i p have been c rea ted in i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c r e t a r i a t s 
1. See Reports of ICJ, 1949, pp. 174, 185 and 187, 
2, See v l l UN Treaty s e r i e s , 1947, p , l l . 
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which requi re regula t ion and c o n t r o l . Theire i s a grea t 
deal of a c t i v i t y in the f i e ld of employment r e l a t i o n s , 
such as, appointments are made, whether by con t rac to r 
otherwise , s a l a r i e s are assigned or changed, bene f i t s 
are awarded, decis ions are taken regarding promotions 
and pensions , and the l i k e . To make i t convenient, there 
i s need for the t o t a l employment r e l a t i o n s h i p to be subjected 
to some system of l ega l r egu la t ion and c o n t r o l . The p a r a t i e s 
involved in the employment r e l a t i o n s h i p , both, adminis-
t r a t i o n s (or management) and employees, require a l ega l 
system to determine t h e i r r igKts and d u t i e s and to give 
them p ro t ec t i on where i t i s needed. 
Why should there be an independent system of 
law governing enployment r e l a t i o n s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l org-
aniza t ions? These are var ious p r a c t i c a l reasons , such as 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s are usual ly r e c r u i t e d from, many 
n a t i o n a l i t i e s and assigned to serve i n a var ie ty of count-
r i e s . I t i s p re fe rab le t h a t a l l s taff should normally be 
subject to i d e n t i c a l r u l e s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of where they are 
r e c r u i t e d , from where they come, or where they work. Further , 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l to preserve the independence of the i n t e r -
nat ional o f f i c i a l from na t iona l p r e s s u r e s , whether of h i s 
own na t iona l s t a t e or of any o ther . This p r i n c i p l e i s basic 
3 
to the operat ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ions . 
3. Amerasinghe, C.F . , The Law of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l 
Service, v o l . 1 . (Clarenden ^ress, Dxfox'd, 1988). 
pp. 6-7. 
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Though i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan i sa t i ona l s general ly 
have the au tho r i t y t o e s t a b l i s h acmin is t ra t ive t r i b u n a l s 
or submit employment d i sputes to t r i b u n a l s e s t ab l i shed by 
other o rgan iza t ions , the quest ion remains whether i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l to e s t a b l i s h them. I t may be asked whether the 
employment r e l a t i o n s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ions requi re 
j u d i c i a l se t t lement of employment d i spu te s , i f so, such 
set t lement could not be effecuated through na t iona l cou r t s 
which already e x i s t and have an es tab l i shed j u d i c i a l 
p rac t i ce and t r a d i t i o n . There are many defensive arguments 
in favour of e s t a b l i s h i n g the t r i b u n a l s , such as , the 
set t lement of employment d i sputes other than by j u d i c i a l 
means was an unsu i tab le a l t e r n a t i v e . For the reason tha t 
i n any case decis ion by a p o l i t i c a l organ, would mean t h a t 
the organiza t ion was the judge in i t s own case , so tha t 
a proposal to have an Administrative Council a t the f i r s t 
session of UN General Assembly was not accepted. Instead 
the General Assembly opted for j u d i c i a l se t t lement of 
employment d i spu te s for the obvious reason t h a t j u d i c i a l 
4 
machinery was the most d e s i r a b l e . 
Other argument was p r i n c i p l e accepted in many 
na t iona l l ega l systems and reaffirmed in thie Universal 
Declarat ion of Human Rights . This p r i n c i p l e made i t s emph-
a s i s t h a t where adminis t ra t ive power was exerc i sed , there 
4. UK Doc. 45, A/C 5/56. 
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should be ava i lab le machinery/ i n the event of d i spu te s , 
t o accord a f a i r hearing and due process to the aggrieved 
pa r ty . 
I t may be argued t h a t even i f j u d i c i a l body 
i s e s s e n t i a l na t ional cour t systems are ava i l ab le , so 
t ha t i t i s r e a l l y unnecessary t o e s t a b l i s h adminis t ra t ive 
t r i b u n a l s . One of the s t ronges t contrary cirguments to 
t h i s view i s t h a t most na t iona l l ega l systems ?- seem to 
recognise t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ions are immune 
from t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n in regard to emfiloyment mat te r s 
or t h a t employment matter of such organiza t ions are outside 
t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . These s t a t e s are France, I t a l y , USA 
Germany, Argentina, Mexico, Chi le , Colombia, Syria, Egypt, 
India , Luxembourg and Ph i l i pp ines . 
The next argument i s t ha t , once the f i r s t 
permanent adminis t ra t ive t r i b u n a l was c rea ted , t h i s 
n a t u r a l l y would have provided a persuasion for t h i s na tu ra l ly 
would have provided a persuasion for o ther t r i b u n a l s to be 
ere ated. 
No doubt the exis tence of the In t e rna t i ona l 
Labour Organization Administrat ive Tribunal (ILOAT) which 
had o r i g i n a l l y been the'League.of Nat ions.Adminis t ra t ive 
Tribunal (LNT) was ^ powerful reason for the c rea t ion of 
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the UK AT. Here, a quest ion t h a t may be ra i sed i s why there 
should be so many t r i b u n a l s i n ex i s t ence . The argument 
was given t h a t each i n t e r n a t i o n a l organizat ion has an i n t e r -
nal law which governs the r e l a t i o n s between the organiza-
t ion and i t s s t a f f . The i n t e r n a l law of one organizat ion 
may be d i f f e r e n t from tha t of another. In these c i rcumst-
ances i t i s not su rp r i s ing t h a t many organiza t ions have 
5 decided t o have t h e i r own adminis t ra t ive t r i b u n a l s . 
The matter concerning the establishment of an 
admin i s t ra t ive t r i buna l for the United Nations to adjudicate 
on any complaint ' lodged against the Organization by an 
o f f i c i a l i n connection with the fulf i lment of the terms of 
hi5 c o n t r a c t , was considered as ear ly as 19 45 by the Pre-
para tory Commission of the United Nations and by i t s 
Executive Committee. The Prepara tory Commission rec omnended 
in i t s r e p o r t , the c r ea t ion of a t r i b u n a l on 2 3 December i l945, 
arc the general Assembly gave e f fec t to t h i s recoirmenda-
t ion concerning an adminis t ra t ive t r i buna l by authorizing 
in Resolution 13(1)/ adopted on 13 February 19 46 on the 
recommendation of t he F i f th Committee, The r e so lu t ion asked 
5. Amerasinghe, C,F . , The law of the In t e rna t iona l c i v i l 
Service, pp. 42-47. 
6. Report of the Executive Committee, of the Preparatory 
Commission, UK Doc. PC/EX/113/Rev. 1.1945, p . 8 3 . 
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the Eecretary General to appoint a small advisory Committee 
including the r ep resen ta t ive of the staff , to d ra f t for 
submission, a s t a t u t e for an adminis t ra t ive t r i b u n a l . Pur-
suant to the General Assembly Resolution 13(1)/ the advisory 
Committee submitted a r epo r t conta in ing a d ra f t s t a t u t e , 
which was placed before the second p a r t of the f i r s t session 
7 
of the General Assembly by the Secretary General, Further , 
when the matter w^ s^ not discussed in the General Assembly, 
the Secretary General submitted h i s Report on the Es t ab l i sh -
ment of the UN Administrative Tribunal to the 4th session 
of the General Assembly on 21 September 19 49. The r epor t of 
the Secretary General was r e fe r red to the F i f th Committee by 
the General Assembly, The F i f th Committee f i r s t arranged a 
general d iscuss ion on the subject and l a t t e r on proceeded to an 
a r t i c l e by a r t i c l e d iscuss ion and vote on the s t a t u t e . 
The F i f th Committee approved the d ra f t s t a t u t e as & whole 
on 8 November 1 9 ^ by 39 votes t o 2, with 2 abs tent ions , 
and recommended i t for adopting in i t s Report to the General 
9 
Assembly. 
The General Assembly considered and accepted the 
the Report with c e r t a i n amendments proposed by some coun t r i e s 
7. UN Doc. A/986, Report of the Secretary General, 1949, pp. 
56-146. 
8. Ib id . 
9. UN DOC. A/1127, Report of the Fifth Committee pp. 167-72. 
101 
on 24th November 1949, Reso lu t i on 351 (IV.) e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the UN A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Tr ibuna l was adopted by the General 
Asserrbly on 24th Nov. 1949 by 48 v o t e s t o none, wi th no 
a b s t e n t i o n s . 
The UNAT adopted i t s Rules of conduct on 7 June 
1950, which were subsequen t ly amended on 20 December 1950 
and aga in on 20 December 1951, 9 December 1954, 30 November 
1955/ 4 December 1958, 14 Septem.ber 1962, 16 October , 1970, 
and 3 October 1972.'^° 
Though i t was the o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n t o have 
j u r i s d i c t i o n over t he s p e c i a l i z e d agenc i e s by the UNAT, 
the de l ay i n s e t t i n g i t up some s p e c i a l i z e d agenc ie s dec ided 
to maxe use of the ILOAT i n s t e a d . Even though, a f t e r the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the UNAT, most of the s p e c i a l i z e d agenc ies 
p r e f e r r e d t o accep t the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the ILCAT, for the 
r e a s o n , they f e a r e d t h a t t he UNAT would not be permanent . 
However, some agenc i e s dec ided t o accept the j u r i s d i c t i o n of 
UNAT. At p r e s e n t , t h e UNAT has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the U'N ( inc lu-
d ing , UNRUA, UNICEF, UNDF, UNIDO, And UNEP ) , ICAC, anc IMO. 
I t a l s o has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g out of the 
R e g u l a t i o n s of the UN J o i n t Staff pens ion Fund of which the 
UN, ICJ, FAC, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, UNESCO, UHO, IvMO, IKO, ITU, 
Wipe, ICITC, GATT, ICCROM and IFAD are members. ^^ 
10. Amerasinghe, C . F . , The Law of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i y i l 
S e r v i c e , V o l . 1 , p p . 56-57. 
11. Ib id . 
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The UlSiAT i s composed of seven members, no two 
of whom may be na t iona l of the same s t a t e . However, only 
three of them t ry any p a r t i c u l a r case and o thers may s i t 
without vo t ing . The members are appointed by the General 
Assembly Of the UK for 3 yea r s and may be reappointed. A 
member appointed t o replace a member whose term of off ice 
has not expired holds off ice for the remaining of h i s 
predecessors term. The members of the Tribunal e l e c t t h e i r 
p r e s iden t and two Vice-President from among them-selves. 
The s t a t u t e of the Ul^ AT i s s i l e n t on the p ro fe -
ss iona l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of judges and even non-lawyers 
may be appointed a s judges . And so Menbers of the Tribunal 
are se lec ted often from among members of de lega t ions to 
the UN, who may not even be lawyers. The secretary General 
provides the Tribunal with an Executive Secretary and such 
other s ta f f as may be considered necessary. No member of 
the Tribunal can be dismissed by the General Assembly unless 
the other members are of the unanimous opinion tha t he i s 
unsuited for fu r the r se rv ice . In case of a res igna t ion of 
a member of the Tribunal , the r e s igna t i on must be addressed 
to the p re s iden t of the Tribunal for t ransmission t o the 
Secretary General. The secre tary General of the United Nations 
i s respons ib le t o make the adminis t ra t ive assaugenents necessary 
12 for the funct ioning of the Tribunal . 
12 . I b id . Sta tute of the UNAT. pp. 1017-1018. 
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The j u d g m e n t s of UK A d m i n i s t r a t i v e T r i b u n a l 
a r e f i n a l a n d b i n d i n g and j u d i c i a l i n n a t u r e . There i s no 
o t h e r forum t o which an a p p e a l c a n b e mace . Though, t h e 
s t a t u t e of t h e UNAT do n o t s t a t e t h a t i t s d e c i s i o n s a r e 
b i n d i n g , by t h e v e r y n a t u r e of i t s p u r p o s e f o r which i t 
ha s b e e n s ^ t u p , i t s d e c i s i o n s a r e r e g a r d e d a s b i n d i n g . 
The T r i b u n a l d o e s n o t g i v e a d v i s o r y o p i n i o n s , n o r d o e s i t 
m e d i a t e o r c o n c i t i a t e . The I C J i n t h e e f f e c t o f Awards 
of c o m p e n s a t i o n c a s e , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e n a t u r e of t h e 
UNAT a n a i t s d e c i s i o n s , s t a t e d ; 
" T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s 
of t h e s t a t u t e shows t h a t t h e T r i b u n a l i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d , n o t a s an a d v i s o r y o r g a n o r a 
m e r e s u b o r d i n a t e c o i n n i t t e e of t h e G e n e r a l 
Assembly , b u t a s an i n d e p e n d e n t and t r u l y 
j u d i c i a l body p r o n o u n c i n g f i n a l j u d g e m e n t s 
w i t h o u t a p p e a l w i t h i n t h e L i m i t e d f i e l d of 
i t s , f u n c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d 
and g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d p r i n c i p l e of l a w , 
a j u d g e m e n t r e n d e r e d by such a j u d i c i a l body i s 
r e - s j u d i c a t a and h a s b i n d i n g f o r c e b e t w e e n t h e 
p a r t i e s t o t h e d i s p u t e " , 1 3 
I n t h e same c a s e , t h e ICJ l a t e r on s t a t e d t h a t 
t h i s j u d g e m e n t b a s e d on t h e c o n t e n t of A r t i c l e lO of t h e 
T r i b u n a l ' s s t a t u t e , f i n a l and w i t h o u t a p p e a l . The s t a t u t e 
d o e s n o t p e r m i t any k i n d of r e v i e w , and t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
O r g a n i z a t i o n b e c o m e s l e g a l l y bound t o c a r r y o u t t h e j u d g e m e n t 
and t o p a y t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n awarded t o t h e s t a f f member. I t 
f o l l o w s t h a t t h e G e n e r a l Assembly , a s an o r g a n of t h e 
1 3 . R e p o r t of ICJ , 1 9 5 4 , p . 47 . 
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14 United Kations must l ikewise be bound by the judgement. 
The ICJ a lso made i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s meant t h a t 
the UN could not refuse on any grounds to execute the judg-
ments of the UKAT and i t s judgments i s c l e a r l y applicable 
t o the judgments of o ther i n t e r n a t i o n a l adminis t ra t ive 
t r i b u n a l s , as far as the binding and f i n a l nature of t h e i r 
dec i s ions i s concerned. At the same time juagroents bind 
the o rgan iza t ions and a l l t h e i r organs. 
The Statute of the UNAT provides t h a t the judg-
ments of the t r i b u n a l must s t a t e the reasons upon which 
15 they are based and ICJ agreed * i th t h i s view. 
The s t a t u t e s of two t r i b u n a l s , the UTJAT and 
ILOAT, provide for reference of dec i s ions of these t r i b u n a l s 
t o the ICo for a very specia l kind of review. However, t h i s 
reference t o the ICJ i s not by way of appeal. I t affords, 
by a spec ia l procedure, an opportuni ty t o have the ICJ 
pronounce on c e r t a i n spec i f ic mat te r s ^no the scope of 
review i s very l imi ted (Ar t ic le 11 of the UNAT s ta tu te 
and Ar t i c le XII of the ILOAT s t a t u t e ) such review has 
unsuccessfully been requested in two cases decided by the 
UNAT ^^ and in one case decided by the ILOAT. "^^  
14. Ib id . 
15. Report of the ICJ, 1973/ p.166. 
16. Report of the ICJ, 1973, & 1982 p. 166 S. p. 325 respectively. 
17. Report of the ICJ, 1956, p. 77. 
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Though, the nature of judgments of t r i b u n a l 
are f i n a l and binding on the organizations,, however, there 
i s no fur ther procedure for enforcement of judgements within 
o rgan iza t ions . Thus, i t seemed to be c l e a r t h a t a l l the 
cards are in the hands of the organiza t ions , as no enforcement 
can be levied by s t a f f members agains t them. However, whether 
as a r e s u l t of the advisory opinion of the ICJ in the 
Effect of Awards of ccanpensation case or not , there do not 
seea t o have been any severe problems connected with the 
car ry ing out of judgments. There may sometimes be rumblings 
as a r e s u l t of grave d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n on the p a r t of an 
organiza t ion with a judgment of a t r i b u n a l , and by and large 
18 judgments of t r i b u n a l s have been fu l ly executed. 
Although, s t a t u t e of any i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r i buna l 
does not genera l ly place any speci f ic adminis t ra t ive power 
outside the c i r c l e of j u d i c i a l cont ro l by l im i t i ng the j u r i s -
dic t lon of t r i b u n a l , however, the i ssue has been ra i sed 
whether c e r t a i n adminis t ra t ive powers are outs ide the j u r i s -
d i c t i o n a l boundaries of t r i b u n a l s . There were two areas for 
which quest ion i s r a i s e d , i n t e r n a l adminis t ra t ive procedures 
and d i s c i p l i n a r y i s s u e s . Regarding the case of i n t e r n a l 
adminis t ra t ive ma t t e r s , i t seems to have been understood in 
18. Amerasinghe, C.F. The Law of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ciy i l 
se rv ice , p . 80 . 
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the d i scuss ion in the Sixth Committee of the Ui^ ; p repara tory 
Commission t h a t the t r ibuna l would not deal with mat ters 
of i n t e r n a l adminis t ra t ion v^ich would go before i n t e r n a l 
bodies within the Sec re t a r i a t and in which the Secretary 
Genera l ' s decifeion would be f i n a l . And for other ma t t e r , 
the F i f t h Committee at the time of d ra f t ing the S ta tu te of 
the UNAT s t a t ed t h a t the t r i b u n a l would not have j u r i s -
d i c t i o n i n d i s c i p l i n a r y cases unless such cases came within 
19 the terms of Ar t i c l e 2J. of the S t a tu t e , 
In case of d i s c i p l i n a r y mat te rs , the UNAT ear ly 
d i spe l l ed any confusion tha t i t would not exerc ise J u d i c i a l 
con t ro l in such cases when i t ac tua l ly camtj t o know in Gordon 
and a s e r i e s of other c a s e s , a f t e r examining the f a c t s , t ha t 
the adminis t ra t ive au thor i ty had acted i l l e g a l l y in iirposing 
d i s c i p l i n a r y sanct ions on s ta f f members. For t h i s reason, 
not only i s the exerc ise of d i s c i p l i n a r y powers by adminis-
t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s t r e a t e d as subjecte t o review by t r i b u n a l s , 
most t r i b u n a l s deal with d i s c i p l i n a r y powers as q u a s i - j u d i c i a l 
powers which are subject to t o t a l j u d i c i a l cont ro l r a t he r 
than as pure ly d i s c r e t i ona ry powers which are subject only 
to l imi ted review. 
Regarding the mat te rs of i n t e r n a l adminis t ra t ive 
procedures , the UNAT t r ea t ed the case as not j u s t i c i a b l e 
19, UN Boc, A/1127, the Report of the Fi f th Cormitte?,1949, pare 
9, 
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by the t r i b u n a l s . For t h i s r e a s o n . In one of t h e c a s e s the 
UNAT re fused t o dec ide upon the d e s t r u c t i o n of an a d m i n i s t -
r a t i v e document, while i n ano the r made i t c l e a r t h a t a 
committee e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y Genera l was an i n t e r -
n a l a c m i n i s t r a t i v e body upon the p rocedu re be fore which i t 
would no t p ronounce . Moreover, i t was not t t e case t h a t the 
t r i b u n a l s , were wi th ing t o ove r look what would have been 
i l l e g a l i t i e s / only 'for the r e a s o n t h a t t hey arose ou t of i n t e r n a l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s . On the o t h e r hand, Levinson d id 
crfeate a problem in so f a r as the t r i b u n a l re fused t o examine 
a l l e g e d p r o c e d u r a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s be fo re an i n t e r n a l adv i so ry 
committee s e t up by the S e c r e t a r y Genera l of the UN t o make 
recommendations on d i s m i s s a l s . L a t e r on, i t was deemed t h a t 
the approach t a k e n i n Levinson would no t be fol lowed a s , s i n c e 
the case was d e c i d e d , t h e r e have been no c a s e s i n which t r i b u n a l s 
have exc luded m a t t e r s from t h e i r j u r i s d i c t i o n or purv iew on 
the b a s i s t h a t t h e y arose ou t of i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e -
d u r e s . The r e a s o n g iven for t h i s was t h a t why s t a f f members 
should, be d e p r i v e d of sa feguards they would o the rwise en joy , 
s o l e l y due t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y had e x e r c i s e d ; power 
which might be r ega rded as r e l a t e d t o i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
20 p rocedure s. 
20. Amerasingha, C.P . The Law of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l C i v i l Se rv i ce , 
p p . 261^263. 
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However, no legal guide l ines e x i s t subject ing 
the decis ion making process of the secre ta ry General and the 
21 o f f i c i a l s to the requirements of "due process " . Although 
"due process of law" i s a bas ic p r i n c i p l e of a l l recognized 
l ega l systems, i t was not introduced in the UK Sec re t a r i a t 
e i t h e r by the Charter or the Staff Rules and Regulat ions. 
This concept was for the f i r s t time introduced 
and developed by the UN Administrative Tribunal (UKAT) in 
c e r t a i n a reas of personnel adminis t ra t ion which have had 
a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f ec t on many aspects of personnel po l i cy . 
Although the essence of "due p rocess" i s qu i te 
well known, i t may be re levan t here to give a b r i e f d e f i n i t i o n 
of the term, "Due p rocess" has come to mean &. law tha t hears 
before i t condemns, t h a t proceeds on enquiry, and renders 
judgment only upon t r i a l . U1:AT has given the term a broader 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y so as to include not only the procedures of 
j u d i c i a l bodies and q u a s i - j u d i c i a l adminis t ra t ive bodies, 
but a lso a t l e a s t some adminis t ra t ive ac ts and decis ion 
making processes . 
The major areas of personnel adminis t ra t ion in 
which UKAT has made considerable impact might now be 
analysed. 
The f i r s t such sphere has been in the procedure 
followed in c a s e s of terminat ion of a permanent appointment 
for unsa t i s f ac to ry se rv i ce . Although review of appointments 
21. Lows 3. Sohn " Due process in the United K§tions" 
American Journal of InrernRtional Law (WasMnator.,D.c. Vol. 69 
1975) pp. 620-2'27" 
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of the s t a f f members ho ld ing permanent s e r v i c e c o n t r a c t s , 
upon the co r rp le t inn of the f i r s t f ive y e a r s of s e r v i c e , 
h a s always been a func t ion of the appointment and Promotion 
Board ( A P B ) whose p r o c e d u r e s should have gua ran t eed a 
measure of "due p r o c e s s " , t h i s was not t he case where t h e 
S e c r e t a r y Genera l t e r m i n a t e d permanent appoin tments on ground 
of u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s e r v i c e . In a s e r i e s of judgments , UKAT 
l a i d down t h a t a permanent appointment can not be t e r m i n a t e d 
excep t under t h e s t a f f r e g u l a t i o n s , which enumerate p r e c i s e l y 
the r e a s o n s f o r the t e r m i n a t i o n , and the d e c i s i o n has t o be 
reached by means of a comple t e , f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e p r o c e d u r e . 
The case of Gilman Vs. S e c r e t a r y General (1966) 
i nvo lved the t e r m i n a t i o n of a permanent appointment on the 
recommendation of the AFB fo r u n s a t i s f a c t o r y s e r v i c e and poor 
r e c o r d of a t t e n d e n c e . I n t h i s c a s e , the AFB s t a t e d t h a t t h e 
s t a f f member 's s e r v i c e had steadily d e t e r i o r a t e d , t h u s d i s r e g -
a rd ing a p e r i o d i c r e p o r t conce rn ing a two y e a r p e r i o d s t h a t 
showed t h a t the a p p l i c a n t had ma in ta ined a high s tandard 
of e f f i c i e n c y . Regarding a t t e n d e n c e , i n her r e c o r d , annual 
l eave had been added t o s i ck l e a v e . The t r i b u n a l , dec ided 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the case s h a l l be remanded f o r c o r r e c t i o n 
of p rocedure s ince a complete f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e p rocedure 
t a k i n g i n t o account a l l the f a c t s of t h e case had not been 
22 fo l lowed . 
22. UN AT Judgment No. 98 . 
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In the case of terminat ion of probat ionary 
appointments , the contes ted i s s u e s were often t h a t of 
proper procedures of a competent boay. The case of Reynaco 
23 Vs. The secre tary General (1970) involved a dec i s ion by 
the Secretary General to terminate the app l i can t s p roba t ion-
ary cppointment under s ta f f Regulation 9.1(C) on the grounds 
of f a i l u r e t o meet s tandards of performance and unsui table 
conduct. In the case in po in t , the Board had before i t a 
pe r iod ic r epo r t quest ioning the judgement and the q u a l i t y 
of work of the appl icant , who, however, contes ted these 
negat ive fundings. In the case of a contested pe r iod ic r epor t , 
the head of the department should conduct an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
which hac not been conducted in t h i s case . As regards the 
grounds of unsui table conduct, i t was based on con f iden t i a l 
and p r iv i l eged s tatements mace before the J o i n t Appeals Board. 
The dec is ion to terminate the appointmenton t h i s ground was 
thus founded on a misuse of information c o n f i a e n t i a l l y presented. 
The t r i b u n a l concluded t h a t the appl icant had been denied 
the p ro t ec t i on .afforded by the adminis t ra t ive i n s t r u c t i o n 
(ST/AT/115 ) and thereby deprived of a f a i r anc reasonable 
procedure before the terminat ion of h is appointment. The 
t r i buna l maintained tha t he should be awarded monetary 
for the in ju ry suffered. 
23. UNAT Judgment No. 138. 
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Another f i e ld where UKAT ha? made a s ign i f i can t 
con t r ibu t ion in developing concepts of due process" was in 
the sphere of equal r i g h t of a l l members of the staff 
the proper defence in cases of d i s c i p l i n a r y proceedings . I t 
may be r e c a l l e d t h a t under s taf f Rule 110.3(3)* s taff members 
serving at Headquarters or at the United Nations Office in 
Geneva can not be subject to d i s c i p l i n a r y measures u n t i l the 
matter has been re fe r red for advice to J o i n t Disc ip l inary 
Committee (comprising r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the s t a f f ) . However, 
s taf f serving away from New York and Geneva was subject to 
d i s c i p l i n a r y measures without the safeguards of the procedure 
of the J o i n t Disc ip l ina ry Committee. 
The Leading case of z^ng-Atangana N.V.S. the 
0 A 
Secretary General (1969) involved the d i s c i p l i n a r y measures 
imposed on a s ta f f member holding a fixed tf^ rm cont rac t and 
serving in a United Nations fldfi o f f i ce . As t h i s s ta f f member 
was not assured of the guarantees provided by reference to 
the J o i n t D i sc ip l ina ry Committee, the t r i b u n a l went on to lay 
down the p r i n c i p l e t h a t whatever the h i s t o r i c a l reasons t ha t 
have l imi ted t h i s procedujre t o New York and Geneva , " I t i s 
necessary to e s t a b l i s h an equivalent procedure: for other 
s taff members, so t h a t a l l s taff are given equal p r o t e c t i o n " . 
The t r i buna l decided for compensation t o be paid to the 
appl icant for the in jury he had suffered. 
24. UKAT Judgment No.130. 
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The th i rd area in which the t r ibuna l has successful ly 
applied concept of "due process" i s tha t r e l a t i n g to the procee-
dings of the Advisory Board on compensation claims Judgment 
Nos, 103/ 114, 120 and 200. They a l l involved cases where the 
appl icant had challenged dec i s ions whereby the Secretary 
General approved recorrTnendations made by the Advisory Board 
on Compensation claims on the ground t h a t the procedure followed 
by the Board did not meet the requirements of "due p roces s " . 
The t r i b u n a l found t h a t the procedure followed by the Advisory 
Board fa i l ed to meet the requirements of due process and the 
cases were remanded for co r rec t ion of procedure, 
In sp i t e of many a reas where UKAT fa i l ed t o make 
a dent in personnel po l i cy , the Tribunal has performed an 
important task in introducing concepts of f a i r procedures , of 
equal r i g h t s to p ro t ec t i o n , proper defence, anc of the r i g h t 
t o be heard. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
AS a r e s u l t of h i s t o r i c a l experiences r i g h t from 
1804, when an o f f i c i a l was sj^pointed as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
c i v i l servant t o con t ro l the navigaticm of the Rhin& o f f i c i a l s 
of the League of Nations, and s t a f f of the United Nations and 
i t s spec ia l i zed agencies and other a l l i e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l orga-
n i za t i on , came to be know as i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i v i l se rvan ts , 
WhJ-ch i s an in t eg ra t ed body of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o f f i c i a l s , loyal 
to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l agency and ready to discharge fa i th fu l ly 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l ob l iga t ions incumbent upon them. 
The United Nations Charter , signed on June 26, 
and enforced on October 24, 1945 was not qu i te a new and 
sudden development, i t was r a t h e r the ac tua l i z a t i on of the 
ideas of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l uni ty t h a t hac been germinating 
during the p a s t severa l yea r s . I t was in Greece t h a t the 
idea of making an organizat ion of s t a t e s was f e l t a s back 
as 1400 ago. However, the actual concept came i n t o being in 
1306 , when Pierse Dubois, a p o l i t i c a l phi losopher a r t i cu la t ed 
the need for a confederat ion of the Pr inces of Europe with 
a Council and a court under the ru le of the Holy Roman Inpi re . 
After the c r ea t ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l o rgan iza t ions , the 
need for an i n t e r n a t i o n a l Sec re t a r i a t was f e l t t o perform 
sane e s s e n t i a l du t i e s l i k e , making phys ica l arrangements for 
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meetings, preparing conference documents, and keeping records. 
For t h i s reason an internat ional secre tar ia t has i t s history 
since the internat ional conferences were held. 
One of the f i r s t questions that the preparatory 
commission had to consider was whether the Secretar iat should 
be organized on the functional basis or in re la t ion to the 
organs, which i t had to serve, Inspite of the Charter 's support 
for the organization of Secretariat in re la t ion to the organs, 
functional basis was appreciated. For the reason that there 
were some of the work of the Secretar ia t , like the reg i s t ra -
tion of t r e a t i e s , which did not re la te to the work of any 
par t icular organ and many of the services to be provided were 
by their nature common to a l l organs. 
The UK secretar ia t i s a functional wheel, which 
makes available a l l kinds of assistance required by different 
organs and agencies of the United Nations in performing their 
functions. 
In the context of recruitment the concept of 
occupations and occupational groups i s used to identify and 
establ ish pools of candidates with comparable qual i f icat ions , 
experience and ski l ls* suitable for posts within a given 
occupational group. The key to successful recruitment i s 
career development. In UN Secretariat , the o f f i c i a l s 
appointed on permanent basis to make the i r career stable 
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are termed as career based s taf f , whereas the o f f i c i a l s 
appointed for per iods l e s s than five years are refer red 
to as fixea term s taff . The mer i t i s the p r i o r i t y of the 
Charter i n the employment of the s ta f f . Which has been 
reversed to the po in t t h a t the paramount considerat ion i n 
recrui tment has become geographical d i s t r i b u t i o n , while the 
highest standards of efficiency, competence and i n t e g r i t y 
have become secondary in s ign i f i cance . 
The 1986 was the year when the f inanc ia l emergency 
of the UN had threatend to bankrupt and enfeeble the United 
Nations, I t was perhaps the worst, the UN has ever faced in 
i t s fo r ty years old h i s to ry . This c r i s i s forced tha t Secretary 
General to announce a Ser ies of economic measures in c a p i t a l 
expendi tures , programmes a c t i v i t i e s and personnel mat ters 
l ike freeze in recrui tment and suspension of a l l promotions 
for six months. In ada i t i on , on 19 December 1986, members 
act ing by consensus in the General Assembly, approved 71 
recommendations contained i n the r epor t of the Group of 
Eighteen. 
The In t e rna t i ona l c i v i l Service Commission was 
requested by ACC and FICSA in 1975 t o consider a number of 
urgent problems, l ike grading of p o s t s and job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
in the UN s e c r e t a r i a t . Which the s t a f f of the UN common System 
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were facing for a long time. The Commission holding 24 session? 
from 1976 t o 1987 had studied the grading of pos t s to p ro t ec t 
the remuneration of the s taff i n the p ro fes s iona l and higher 
c a t e g o r i e s . The commission took the dec i s ion in 1987 to 
lower down the margin between the sa lary l e i ^ l s of the two 
se rv ices l , e . United Nations and comparators federa l c i v i l 
s e rv ices , below 115 in f i s c a l year 1988. The other area 
covered in t h i s study i s the j o b - c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . The corrmission 
had taken up examination of t h i s system for solving the problems 
r e l a t i n g t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of occupation groups/ a l l p rofess ional 
category pos t s in the S e c r e t a r i a t , r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
du t i e s of pos t and the grade. 
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was 
e s t ab l i shed on 24th November 1949 by the General Assembly. 
The judgments of UN Administrative Tribunal are f i n a l , binding 
and j u d i c i a l in na tu re . There i s no o ther forum to which an 
appeal can be made. The Tribunal has performed an important 
task in in t roducing concepts of f a i r procedures , of equal 
r i g h t s to p r o t e c t i o n , proper defence, and of the r igh t to 
be heard. 
I t i s not claimed t h a t a l l the problems have been 
overcome in t h i s work, neve r the l e s s , an attempt has been 
made to prepare as comprehensive an account of the adminis t ra t ive 
problems of the S e c r e t a r i a t as poss ib le with the help of 
authent ic records of assigned per iod . 
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